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Abstract  
This dissertation is a contribution to two fields of study: applied social 
epistemology and the philosophy of technology. That is, it is a 
philosophical study, based on empirical fieldwork research, of social 
and technical knowledge. Social knowledge here is defined as 
knowledge acquired through the interactions between epistemic agents 
and social institutions. Technical knowledge is here defined as 
knowledge about technical artefacts (including how to design, produce, 
and operate them). I argue that the two must be considered collectively 
both in the sense that they are best considered in the light of 
collectivist approaches to knowledge and in the sense that they must be 
considered together as part of the same analysis. An analysis solely of 
the interactions between human epistemic agents operating within 
social institutions does not give adequate credit to the technological 
artefacts that help to produce knowledge; an analysis of technical 
knowledge which does not include an analysis of how that technical 
knowledge is generated within a rich and complex social network 
would be similarly incomplete. I argue that it is often inappropriate to 
separate analyses of technical knowledge from social knowledge and 
that although not all social knowledge is technical knowledge, all 
technical knowledge is, by definition, social. Further, the influence of 
technology on epistemic cultures is so pervasive that it also forms or 
‗envelops‘ what we consider to be an epistemic agent.  
  




JTB The Justified True Belief Account of knowledge 
CAT Collective Account of Technical artefacts 
CCDSE Constructivist Collectivist Descriptive Social Epistemology 
DHB The Deepwater Horizon Blowout, or the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill of 2010 
DNA Dual Nature Account of technical artefacts 
PET Philosophy of Engineering and Technology 
PLA Production Logging Analysis 
PLT Production Logging Tool 
RINSE Rationalist Individualist Normative Social Epistemology 
SE Social Epistemology 
SP The Strong Programme in Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
SSK Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
STS Science, Technology, and Society Studies 
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Chapter 1 
Deepwater Horizon and technical knowledge 
1.1 Outline of dissertation 
 
It may be said that no other industry has had as significant an effect on 
the social and technological history of the 20th century as the oil 
industry. It may also be said that that which significantly affects social 
and technological history tends to affect the human condition and 
human concepts. Knowledge is a human concept and as such is not 
immune from such change. Despite this plausible suggestion, 
epistemologists have not paid close attention to social and technologi-
cal history and have instead searched for general principles that govern 
when we should say that someone knows something (or, alternatively, 
when it is the case that someone knows something).  
 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   10 
 
The focus of most epistemological research is on generating rationally 
coherent principles regardless of their practical application. In this 
thesis I want to argue that there is space within epistemology for 
practical accounts of knowledge that can decide in the here and now 
whether or not someone knows something. I will defend a communi-
tarian/collectivist approach as standing the best chance of providing 
such practical application. I will also demonstrate that such an 
approach holds its own conceptually. 
 
I defend my account by focussing on the risky world of petroleum 
engineering where being in possession of knowledge can be a matter of 
life and death. The search for knowledge that takes place in this 
epistemic community impressed upon me the importance of an 
epistemology that is grounded and useful. This is not to say that 
epistemology that lacks this immediate practical application should be 
abandoned but that it should not limit the boundaries of our subject. 
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With this in mind, I spent approximately 10 weeks training as a logging 
analyst in South-East Asia with an American multinational petroleum 
engineering company which provides services to the largest as well as 
some of the smaller oil, gas, and energy corporations in the region. The 
purpose of this venture was chiefly to learn myself the practice of 
acquiring knowledge in a particular setting and be less of a fly-on-the-
wall and more of an inquirer on-the-ground or at-the-coalface. I also 
spent this time observing my colleagues as well as talking with 
engineers about their attitudes to their profession, training, the kinds of 
inquiry they do on a day-to-day basis, and the knowledge they acquire. 
I observed work done on oil rigs around the region (visiting various 
sites around Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei), how problems were 
approached, how discussions were carried out, and how consensus was 
reached about how to solve a problem. 
 
I came to recognize two methods of knowledge-gathering: a trial and 
error approach carried out on the ground, involving back-of-the-
envelope calculations, rough-and-ready tests, and finding the best 
available solution within a given time-frame. And a more deliberate 
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consensus-based approach carried out back in the office surrounded by 
computer software, mathematical textbooks and reference tables, and 
other analysts and field engineers. 
 
Of course, there is a near-endless variety of methods in-between these 
two caricatures but these observations highlight an important tension 
between the ways we go about acquiring knowledge. Some questions 
are pressing, in the sense that William James described.1 (James 1890, 
ch. 24) They require quick, intelligent right action. Oftentimes, they 
involve testing a solution, tweaking and manipulating it, testing again, 
adjusting it again, and so on. Other questions are not immediately 
pressing although they will serve a purpose at some point in the future. 
They require careful consideration and, almost certainly, interaction 
with ones epistemic community. In engineering, they may involve 
following a specific procedure that has worked well in the past or is 
believed to work well. I believe that epistemologists can learn a lot 
                                                          
1 James‘ example has us imagine we are being chased by gunmen to the edge of a ravine and 
must decide whether to face the men and their guns or jump. Fortunately, most engineering 
decisions do not involve guns or jumping off ravines but we can still consider them to be 
pressing: in need of an answer within a specified time-frame, using limited specified resources, 
and within a certain context. 
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about knowledge by looking at how we do, in fact, acquire knowledge 
and in Chapter 5 of this dissertation I expand on some of the lessons I 
brought home with me. 
 
Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate that concepts such as knowledge are 
not found but made in the same way that we do not find technologies 
but make them. In other words, the laws of knowledge are less like the 
laws of physics and more like the laws of culture, linguistics, 
economics, and the like. I argue that what counts as knowledge, and 
who (or what) counts as a knower, can and has changed as a result of 
social and technological change, sometimes called sociotechnical 
evolution. (Bonen 1979; Trist 1981) Like technology, as we generate 
knowledge we are also defining what knowledge is. Since petroleum 
engineering has played such a crucial role in shaping our environment 
and defining our social world, it is perhaps unsurprising that its history 
and practices can also teach us something about our conceptual world. 
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1.1.1 The research problem: What does BP know and how 
does it know it? 
 
On April 20th 2010 at approximately 10 P.M. CDT a large explosion 
and fire was observed on Deepwater Horizon, the Transocean drilling 
rig licensed to BP in the US Gulf, 50 miles from the Louisiana 
coastline.2 11 crewmen died. Over the course of almost three months, a 
joint government and industry task force had failed to stop crude oil 
flowing from a well causing widespread damage to the sea and 
coastline. The accident was also damaging for the energy companies 
involved – principally BP, Transocean, and Halliburton – who received 
increasing legal and political pressure to answer questions about why 
the accident occurred, and what they knew about the rig and the 
likelihood of an accident. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill raised 
political, financial, and ethical questions about what the organizations 
involved knew, what they could reasonably have been expected to 
                                                          
2 New York Times, April 22, 2010, p. 13. Robertson, C. ‗Search continues after oil rig blast.‘ 
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know, and what they had a duty to know. Some headlines from the 
time of the accident help illustrate what was being asked, 
 
What did BP know?3 
Did BP know more than they led on?4 
BP, Halliburton Knew Oil Spill Cement Unstable5 
BP and Halliburton knew of Gulf oil well cement flaws6 
 
Specifically, politicians, journalists and members of the public were 
keen to discover if BP and other corporate bodies knew that a blowout 
was likely and preventable. On the 4th May 2010, Edward J. Markey, 
then chairman of the United States House Select Committee on 
Energy Independence and Global Warming remarked, 
 
                                                          
3 Reported in The Columbus Dispatch, 9th June 2010. Lugarten, A. & Knutson, R. What did BP 
know? Retrieved from 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2010/06/09/what-did-bp-know.html. 
4 Reported in NBC News, 30th October 2010. Wilson, J. Did BP know more than they led on? 
Retrieved from http://www.ketknbc.com/news/did-bp-know-more-than-they-led-on. 
5 Reported in Discovery News, 29
th
 October 2010. BP, Halliburton knew oil spill cement 
unstable. Retrieved from http://news.discovery.com/earth/bp-halliburton-oil-spill.html. 
6 Reported in The Guardian, 29th October 2010. Goldenberg, S. & Kollewe, J. BP and 
Halliburton knew of Gulf oil well cement flaws. 
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BP has been in control of all the information and ultimately when the 
investigation is complete we will have to ask what did BP know and 
when did they know it.7 
 
Since these questions often centre on what is, was or could have been 
known, epistemologists ought to have answers to who or what it is that 
holds the knowledge, what it means to say in the here-and-now that 
they have knowledge, how it is (or should be) transmitted, who or what 
kind of entity can be responsible for it, and so on. These ‗real-life‘ 
events give rise to philosophical problems and, vice versa, solutions to 
philosophical problems can cast light on the ‗real-life‘ event. 
Epistemologists ought to be able to say, regardless of their technical 
expertise on petroleum engineering or oil rig maintenance, whether a 
corporation can know something, or, if not, to explain what Markey 
means by, ‗did BP know…?‘ As we shall see, the problem is not easily 
dismissed as metaphorical shorthand or a casual way of talking. It is, at 
least on the face of it, incongruous with the classical account of 
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) since it is not at all obvious that 
                                                          
7 Reported in The Guardian, 6
th
 May 2010, p. 25. Goldenberg, S. ‗Deepwater Horizon oil spill: 
Obama attempts to limit political fallout.‘ 
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corporations can possess mental states such as belief.8 We can get at 
the answer to this question, I propose, by examining when and why we 
attribute knowledge to individuals and the role of technology and 
social interaction in generating knowledge. 
 
Assuming there is some way in which Markey‘s question makes sense – 
whether because the group, BP, can know or whether some individuals 
belonging to that group can know – epistemologists ought also to be 
able to classify the kind of knowledge involved and specify conditions 
under which it would be possible for agents to know. It will be an 
empirical matter whether they do in fact meet those conditions but 
there is an entirely separate question of what must the agents be in 
possession of, or in what standing must they be, in order for them to 
know. Must they truly believe that, let us say, the well was likely to 
blowout? Must they be justified in this belief and in what way? Must 
                                                          
8 I will explain the classical account of knowledge in the following discussion. For now, it will 
suffice to say that JTB was a theory of knowledge that held considerable weight up until 1963 
when Edmund Gettier published one of the best-known papers in epistemology. (Gettier 1963) 
This paper has been taken to show that there is more to knowledge than justified true belief and 
much of the subsequent near-half century of analytic epistemology has been devoted to 
responding to this task.  
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they have some degree of confidence in their belief or even be certain 
in that belief? Ought they to have believed certain other things given 
the information available to them? What standing must they be in in 
order to have an epistemic responsibility to predict future events? 
There are countless questions one might ask from an epistemological 
point of view that have factual answers once we settle precisely what 
form an answer should take. Lastly, epistemologists ought to be able to 
classify the kind of knowledge that relevant agents may have had 
(again, the practical question of whether they did have it being a 
question of fact for engineers or lawyers). In short, epistemologists 
ought to be able to say what relevant agents could have known, under 
what conditions they would have known it, and when they could 
reasonably have been held responsible for knowing it. 
 
The central research problem of this thesis will not, however, primarily 
be of interest to lawyers or BP engineers but to epistemologists 
interested in the view that technical knowledge, of the kind possessed 
by BP engineers, is a distinct genus of knowledge worthy of their 
attention. That it is not a matter of applied scientific knowledge or 
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simply a branch of ‗know-how‘. Crucially, I want to argue that 
technology is not just something that we know things about – ‗I know 
that a hammer is for hammering‘ – but that it changes what we know 
and how we know it. Technology – and technical artefacts – changes 
what knowledge is. 
 
Now, it is obvious that some sociotechnical change can affect what we 
know and how we know it in a trivial way. No one could have known, 
for example, how to operate a microscope or the physical effects of a 
gyroscope before their invention and production (though in cases such 
as these we might sometimes be able to say that they would have the 
disposition to know it). This kind of epistemic change is uninteresting 
in the same way that I now have knowledge about a species of sea snail 
recently discovered that I could not have had before. This is 
uninteresting for epistemology because the new knowledge is a new 
token of the same type; a new page in the same book. There is nothing 
essentially different about my knowledge of sea snails than my 
knowledge of any other animal. Sociotechnical change, however, 
fundamentally changes what we know and how we know it in a way 
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that, say, would merit a special chapter in the epistemologist‘s textbook 
called, ‗Technical knowledge‘ alongside chapters on ‗Perceptual 
knowledge‘ and ‗Testimonial knowledge‘.  
 
In Chapter 2, I will look at what answers are available in the existing 
literature by means of a survey of social epistemology and the 
philosophy of engineering.9 I pick out communitarianism, contextual-
ism, and the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge as being 
particularly helpful in analysing technical knowledge. This is not to say 
that any epistemology of engineering and technology which employs 
more traditional analytic epistemology is wrong-headed or irrelevant. I 
pick these approaches out as they are useful in empirical studies in a 
way in which the alternatives are not and, although I do not argue that 
all epistemology ought to have some empirical utility, the heuristic 
value provided by these approaches seems germane to a study in 
                                                          
9 Technology, I take it, is uncontroversially social. No societies, no hammers. But, for those who 
doubt this entailment, I aim to establish it in Ch. 4 of this thesis, which deals with the ontology of 
technical artefacts. Establishing that since technology is social, technical knowledge is social will 
be a harder slog but the reader should be more convinced than she is now by the ends of Ch. 5 
and 6.  
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applied epistemology, particularly so with philosophy of engineering. 
As I said in my opening remarks, a traditional JTB-style answer to the 
question of knowledge is not able to give much practical guidance 
when attributing knowledge. In other words, it does not much help us 
to guide our behaviour as we rarely have access to the validity of many 
of the relevant criteria. Is the agent‘s belief true? We do not know; we 
are not infallible. Is the agent‘s belief justified? Well, it depends on 
what counts as a justification and any general principle of justification 
is unlikely to help us. In brief, such accounts are heavily dependent on 
stipulation. Given that the agent is justified in believing a true 
proposition, it is true to say that they know it. Given that the belief 
formed by the agent corresponds to the external reality in the right 
way, it is true to say that they know it. Variations on this theme hope 
to solve the philosophical questions about knowledge but do not have 
an apparent solution to the practical question: when can I attribute 
knowledge to this person? 
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This dissertation delivers a number of central novel theses which aim 
to provide a practical solution to knowledge attributions: I argue 
against accounts which point to the convergence of scientific and 
technological disciplines and in so doing ignore the heuristic value to 
conceiving of technical artefacts and technical knowledge as separate 
from scientific knowledge (notwithstanding their relation just as 
memory as a source of knowledge is closely related to perception but 
neither is reducible to the other or could be said to progress towards 
convergence). I argue that semantic epistemologies such as semantic 
contextualism and communitarianism ought to follow the implications 
of their thesis that ‗knows‘ (and its cognate terms) should be analysed 
as semantic expressions. I argue that technical artefacts are artificial 
kinds and that knowledge thereof is consequently knowledge about 
artificial kinds. 
 
As argued by Kusch and the Dual Nature Thesis (see §4.1), artificial 
kinds are kinds which combine aspects of the type of reference-talk 
relevant to both natural and social kinds. I analyse reference-talk about 
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another artificial kind – tools – in order to develop an ontology of 
tools. In the later chapters I move on to consider what kinds of entity 
can be attributed with possessing technical knowledge. I consider, as a 
starting point, what tool use is, concluding that, in certain cases, 
animals as well as some technical artefacts (e.g. computers) can use 
tools. They can also design and produce tools. Consequently, these are 
not barriers to including them as bearers of technical knowledge. 
However, I note that the aforementioned do not, under some 
accounts, possess beliefs and mental states comparable to those of 
human knowers. This may prohibit them from truly possessing 
technical knowledge. Through an argument that focuses on perceptual 
knowledge, I argue that the bearer of knowledge can extend beyond 
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1.1.2 The research questions 
I will define the research questions for this thesis as follows: 
 
1. What is social epistemology and how can it help contextualize 
the particular epistemic responsibility that a professional per-
son holds. In particular, how can a communitarian epistemolo-
gy – which treats knowledge as a kind of social status—define 
different kinds of knowledge? 
 
2. What kind of knowledge do petroleum engineers have? What is 
technical knowledge? 
 
3. What are technical artefacts and how does this affect technical 
knowledge? 
 
4. Some technical knowledge appears to be perceptual. How do 
perceptual sources generate technical knowledge? 
 
5. What epistemic agents can have this knowledge (individuals, 
groups, animals, artefacts, computers, etc.)? 
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1.1.3 The research answers 
 
Answers to these questions cannot be generated by abstract general 
principles alone but we must refer to the real-life cases. That is, just as 
others have argued that philosophy and science are continuous, we 
should say that philosophy and engineering are continuous or, in this 
case, that epistemology and practices of inquiry and knowledge 
attribution in engineering are continuous. (see, e.g. Churchland 1986; 
Quine 1976, p. 233) Chs. 5 and 6 contain the empirical fieldwork 
research that aims to follow a continuous approach to philosophy and 
engineering. In answer to the questions outlined in §1.1.2, I will argue 
for the following, 
 
1. Question 1 is addressed in Ch. 2 and 3. Social epistemology is 
seen to be a broad church with many non-complementary fac-
tions. I pick out communitarianism, contextualism, and the 
Strong Programme, as being of particular value to my project 
for the reasons given above. Communitarianism holds that 
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knowledge is a kind of social status and I argue in favour of 
extending this principle to distinct kinds of knowledge. One 
can have the status of a technical knower, meaning that one is 
attributed with the status of possessing technical knowledge. 
Typically, this status is held by engineers although there is of 
course a bleed-through from scientists and others who hold the 
status of technical knower. Secondly, communitarianism holds 
that epistemologists should explain individual knowledge with 
reference to the relevant community. Consequently, differences 
in social factors such as training, nationality, and profession, 
take precedence over individual factors such as reliability and 
epistemic virtue. 
 
2. Although petroleum engineers, as human beings, will be in 
possession of many different kinds of knowledge – proposi-
tional, perceptual, scientific (roughly, knowledge of natural 
kinds, events, and processes), testimonial, and so on – this the-
sis will focus on their technical knowledge. As previously de-
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fined, this is knowledge of how to design, produce or operate a 
technical artefact.10  
 
3. Since I hold that technical artefacts can affect our human 
concepts (and thus what counts as knowledge) it is important 
to establish what technology is. I argue that technical artefacts 
are artificial kinds. Kinds are distinguishable by the reference-
talk associated with them and so I base my ontology of tech-
nical artefacts on a theoretical and empirical study of technical 
artefact reference-talk. Ch. 4 concerns the theoretical basis of 
this and Ch. 5 contains some empirical studies. 
 
4. Perceptual knowledge is particularly interesting as it appears to 
offer us a way to include animal and non-human technical 
knowers. In Ch. 6, I argue on the basis of extended cognition 
theory and neuroscientific research, that the bearers of percep-
tual knowledge can extend beyond the human body into tech-
nical artefacts. 
                                                          
10 The ‘or’ in this sentence is typically an exclusive or (XOR). Although in some cases it is 
possible that an agent knows how to design, produce, and operate a technical artifact I do not 
mean to suggest that it is necessary.  
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   28 
 
 
5. Although I want a theory of technical knowledge to include 
certain non-human agents such as computers and other infor-
mational technical artefacts, this only allows ‗extended epistem-
ic agents‘ into the group of technical knowers. There is still, 
somewhere in the system, a human agent that many will argue 
is the true bearer of the knowledge. In Chs. 7 and 8 I explore 
an informational approach to knowledge which allows various 
other entities to enter the fray including artefacts and groups. 
Crucial to the informational approach is that the agent need 
not possess or be capable of possessing beliefs about what is 
known. 
 
1.2 Chapter outlines 
 
Ch. 2 is a literature review, albeit with an additional aim of setting up 
various concepts and problems for the remainder of the thesis. The 
first task will be to assess what answers are available to the research 
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questions in current state-of-the-art social epistemology (SE) and the 
philosophy of engineering and technology (PET). This chapter offers a 
broad and inclusive survey, minimizing any preconceptions about what 
either discipline is or where to look for answers. I look at surveys and 
definitions of SE proposed by Lorraine Code, Alvin Goldman, Philip 
Kitcher, Martin Kusch and Frederick Schmitt and attempt to provide a 
more objective overview of the discipline. Existing surveys tend to be 
quite quick and simple and, however neat and elegant these simple 
surveys are, I intend my contribution to be more extensive. I am 
extremely inclusive with my review, attempting to cover anything that 
has gone under or been attributed with the name ‗Social epistemology.‘ 
The advantage of this approach is to put various branches in stark 
contrast with one another so that the reader can see where their own 
commitments lie and who opposes them. 
 
In the third section I describe some of the open problems in the 
philosophy of engineering and technology (PET), a discipline that 
stretches back as far as the early 1960s but has not yet made the 
necessary strides to establish itself as a recognizable discipline in 
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philosophy. These problems include the nature of engineering 
knowledge (the professional corollary to what I am calling technical 
knowledge), the relationship between science and engineering (and 
scientific knowledge and engineering knowledge), the social aspect to 
engineering (the idea that engineering is slave to social factors in a way 
that science is not), the engineering method, among others. I conclude 
by setting trends in the philosophy of engineering within the 
framework of my social epistemology survey. 
 
Ch. 3 investigates and evaluates the epistemological views of Martin 
Kusch and Keith DeRose. I see these as the best-equipped 
epistemological theories for my project as they allow the flexibility 
necessary to characterize technical knowledge as a species of 
professional knowledge, i.e. a various, context-rich social status.11 This 
                                                          
11 I use the phrase ‘context-rich’ here advisedly. This is a pedagogical term used to describe 
problems given to students set in a practical environment, either in its description or actually. An 
example would be to give an engineering student a triangulation problem and set that problem 
not in the abstract world of geometry but in the practical world of directional drilling. That is, to 
describe how triangulation can be used to determine the shortest path towards a target. I think 
this neatly captures a difference I wish to make between the (albeit worthwhile) activity of 
philosophical problem-solving set in the world of formal or informal logical inference and 
argument and the activity of philosophical problem-solving set in practical situations. 
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is necessary to make the link between the reference-talk of a 
community and the kind of knowledge it generates. Although Kusch‘s 
view has developed since its publication, I will focus on his 2002 book 
Knowledge by agreement: the programme of communitarian epistemology. (Kusch 
2002) This book contains the groundwork for a communitarian 
approach to epistemology and its central tenets are necessary 
components of my own analysis of technical knowledge viz. that 
‗knowledge‘ is a word which we use to refer to agents who meet certain 
social criteria, and that these criteria are only discoverable through 
analysing the social conditions at the time. 
 
A central virtue of Kusch‘s account is that it foregoes the tendency to 
ignore historical context and changes to what counts as knowledge in 
favour of a sociologically-informed theory of knowledge. It 
acknowledges further that our concept of knowledge changes over 
time.12 Whilst this latter point is not essential to my own thesis it is, I 
                                                          
12 See, by comparison, the recent work in the ‘genealogy of knowledge.’ For example, Craig 
1990, 2007; Fricker 2008; Kusch 2011; Williams 2002. Craig suggests how our concept of 
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think, an inevitability once we decide that the concept is socially-
dependent. Thus, any non-social account of knowledge fails to explain 
any change that is observed. My thesis demonstrates that one element 
affecting this change is technological change or evolution. 
 
In the second half of this chapter I explore what contextualism has to 
offer a study of technical knowledge. I look at its history and concerns, 
focussing on DeRose‘s semantic contextualism which dovetails neatly 
with certain aspects of Kusch‘s book. In order to substantiate the claim 
that technology affects our concept of knowledge in a genealogical 
manner, we need to know what technology (and technical artefacts) is. 
If they were natural kinds, we would need to know what makes them 
different from other natural kinds. We would need to know why the 
new knowledge that technical artefacts (as natural kinds) enables is any 
                                                                                                                                     
knowledge might have evolved from a concept of proto-knowledge (which may be thought of as 
a concept which can be used to flag reliable informants, for example). Note that Craig’s 
suggestion, if it is taken as a claim as to how our concept of knowledge did originate, does not in 
itself entail that our concept of knowledge continues to change. To make this claim we would 
need to establish that there is continuous feedback between our behavior as epistemic agents and 
historical change.  
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different from the kind of knowledge that is already enabled by natural 
kinds: e.g. knowledge of physical processes, entities, and events. It is 
true to say that technical artefacts do resemble natural kinds in some 
respects: they exist in spatiotemporal physical space; they have a certain 
physical structure and can cause physical effects. 
 
However, in other respects, they more closely resemble social kinds 
like money or religious ceremony. There is a clear sense in which a gas 
pipeline is not a gas pipeline merely because of its existence in 
spatiotemporal physical space but because it serves a human purpose, 
that of allowing safe transport of said hydrocarbon between two 
locations of interest. Without this purpose it would seem very odd to 
call it a gas pipeline at all.13 In Ch. 4 I describe two attempts to take the 
ontology of technical artefacts seriously. One is the Dual Nature of 
                                                          
13 One can imagine an object with the same physical structure of the Forth rail bridge in 
Edinburgh but floating purposelessly in Outer space. Here we would be more tempted, I think, to 
call it a coincidence than a bridge. By contrast, there is a sense in which a natural object, such as 
a rock, floating purposelessly in Outer space is still very much a rock, it just so happens to be 
extra-terrestrial. 
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Technical Artefacts account which describes technical artefacts in 
terms of combinations of natural and social descriptions and the other 
is influenced by the work of Kusch and Pablo Schyfter which I call the 
Collectivist Account of Technical Artefacts. This proposal describes 
technical artefacts in terms of their reference-talk. 
 
Ch. 5 introduces the fieldwork case studies. I give a brief history of the 
engineering knowledge involved and provide some observations on 
problem-solving and the engineering method which endorse the 
hypotheses stated in §2.3. In the second section I provide an empirical 
analysis of reference-talk in these disciplines and develop a putative 
definition of what a tool is. I analyse the references made to a certain 
class of technical artefact – tools – in various kinds of documents 
pertaining to the engineering disciplines studied. I classify each of these 
references according to distinctions made in discussion with a group of 
engineers. In the third section I discuss some implications of this 
definition, problems and paradoxes. I look at each part of the 
definition of tool given previously and discuss some of their finer 
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aspects in the context of the engineering disciplines. Technical 
knowledge is found to be more than simply knowledge of how to 
design, produce, and operate something. It is knowledge of how to 
design, produce, and operate something that provides information to 
the user of variable reliability and which has a proper (social) function.  
 
One of the most fascinating discoveries of my fieldwork research was 
that the more knowledge someone possessed in a particular discipline, 
the more likely they were to describe the phenomenology of knowing 
in perceptual terms. With novices in production logging analysis, for 
example, I asked, ‗How do you know x,‘ and the typical response was 
procedural in nature: ‗this is how we calculate x,‘ or ‗x seems to 
correlate with other values I have,‘ or ‗this is how I usually do it, if such 
and such is the case.‘14 However, in the case of more experienced 
analysts, their expertise and familiarity with the data led them to almost 
perceptually ‗feel‘ their way to the answer. When one asks these 
                                                          
14 As part of my fieldwork research I undertook training as a production logging analyst. I 
acquired a basic knowledge of the principles of analysis and the use of two computer software 
programmes: PLWin and Emeraude. 
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analysts, ‗How do you know x,‘ they were more likely to answer, ‗It just 
looks like x,‘ or ‗I can see that x,‘ or, by instruction, ‗You can see here 
that x.‘ Although this may be simply a metaphorical way of speaking 
that one acquires after so many years in the job, it seemed to me more 
significant. In Ch. 6 I argue that work in extended cognition may 
provide an explanation for this phenomenon. Through a discussion of 
research in cognitive science and neuroscience I come to the 
conclusion that it is quite possible not only that analysts are acquiring 
knowledge through perceptual activity but that the software used in the 
field attempts to emulate this activity. We thus have a viable analogy 
between human and non-human epistemic agents. 
 
The aim of Chs. 1-4 is principally to emphasize the need to analyse 
knowledge as a social phenomenon. Chs. 5 and 6 give an example of 
what a social account of knowledge would look like in practice. 
However, I do not believe that a purely sociological approach would be 
enough. It is too capricious, too unstable. Surely, it enjoins us to ask, 
knowledge is not purely subject to what a group of engineers happen 
to agree upon at any one time. This would be a strong concession 
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towards relativism and would force us to say that a systematically 
misled society could happily acquire knowledge on its own that could 
bear little relation to what was going on, as it were, in reality. Whilst I 
think this objection can be overplayed, Ch. 7 uses work in the 
philosophy of information to give a more nuanced account of how 
concepts become meaningful through a constructive process within a 
society and how the kind of work done by analysts in the fieldwork 
study can be compared to the information-processing of computer 
software that constantly threatens to make them redundant. In brief, I 
argue that neither a purely social account nor a purely informational 
account could give a comprehensive account of an epistemic culture. 
Instead, we need a combination of the two. 
 
Finally, Ch. 8 returns to the original research questions and answers set 
out in §1.1. I discuss what it would mean for a group, such as BP, to 
know a proposition, to the extent that it is meaningful, and develop the 
idea of an epistemic community. I return to each of the problems 
described at the start of the thesis and draw together the selection of 
answers I have given in each chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Social epistemology and the philosophy of 
engineering and technology 
2.1 A survey of surveys 
2.1.1 The existing surveys 
This chapter contains two literature reviews: a survey of work in social 
epistemology and a review of the philosophy of engineering and 
technology. In the first section, I discuss the aims and methods of 
social epistemology, broadly construed. Whilst many existing surveys 
are limited to particular approaches to studying social knowledge my 
aim here is to be inclusive and general. I suggest that the simplicity of 
existing surveys sacrifices detail for elegance. Instead, I suggest we can 
identify three ‗sticking points‘ about which various accounts diverge 
and plot these on a Cartesian coordinate system. This provides a useful 
way of distinguishing between different approaches to social 
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knowledge and the various ‗sticking points‘ at which different 
approaches diverge. The third section reviews the history and current 
state of the philosophy of engineering and technology (as well as some 
related disciplines). I discuss the relationship between science and 
engineering and how attitudes to this relationship have changed over 
the last half decade. Finally, I set out an argument for studying 
engineering and technical knowledge in its own right rather than either 
a) as an epistemically uninteresting form of applied science, or b) as a 
hybrid technoscientific discipline mixing knowledge and methods from 
both science and engineering. (See Gille1986) 
 
The term ‗social epistemology‘ has been reserved by and for a broad 
range of actors over the last 40 years from library scientists to 
sociologists to analytic epistemologists to ethnomethodologists to Karl 
Marx and many more besides. (Goldman 2006) Here are some recent 
descriptions from the literature: 
 
Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge 
or information. (Goldman 2006) 
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Social epistemology distinguishes itself from sociology of knowledge in 
its goal of providing a normative analysis of knowledge (Grasswick 
2008, paraphrasing Fuller 1987) 
 
Social epistemology begins at the point of rejecting the individualistic 
reduction. (Kitcher 1994, p. 112) 
 
Social epistemology is the philosophical study of the relevance of 
communities to knowledge. (Kusch 1998) 
 
Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the 
relevance of social relations, roles, interests, and institutions to 
knowledge. (Schmitt 1994b, p. 1) 
 
Testimony‘s relegation to last place on this list [of sources of 
knowledge] signals its lesser ranking in relation to the other sources - 
perception, memory, and reason (or induction) - because reliance on 
testimony has long been thought to compromise epistemic self-reliance. 
Social epistemology, I suggest, reverses this ranking.15 (Code 2010, p. 
29) 
 
It is usually a little myopic to survey a fledgling discipline based on a 
brief history of development. In their own time, for example, none 
would have thought to group Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza together 
                                                          
15 By way of explanation, Code is here referring to what she considers much early 21st-century 
Anglo-American epistemology to be ‘residually loyal’ to. Namely, a tradition in which 
perception, memory, reason, and testimony are the principle, most reliable sources of knowledge, 
roughly in order of priority and reliability. 
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as one side of a debate with Berkeley, Hume and Locke. It was only 
posthumously that these names were organized as belonging to either a 
Rationalist or Empiricist movement. The quotes above demonstrate 
how a new field is often deliberately positioned against an existing field 
whether that is individualist epistemology, as in Goldman‘s case, 
analytic epistemology in general, as in Kusch‘s case, or the Strong 
Programme in the sociology of knowledge, as in Fuller‘s case. 
Nevertheless, there have, in recent years, been several general surveys 
of social epistemology from prominent scholars. 
 
The first section reviews surveys from Goldman, Kusch, Schmitt, and 
Kitcher. I will show that each of these efforts fail to comprehensively 
and objectively characterize an emergent discipline either by being 
unjustifiably exclusive or overly simplistic in their metric. Each of these 
three bases their survey on what may be called a spectral metaphor. 
That is, all have in mind a spectrum of views with each view 
representing a fixed point along a single axis. Typically, each ‗end‘ of 
the spectrum represents an extreme view (sometimes held by none). 
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The extremes are often dismissed in favour of a middle path between 
the two. 
 
2.1.2 Goldman‘s spectrum of social epistemology 
 
Alvin Goldman has been perhaps the most prominent advocate of SE 
in analytic philosophy. He also has a specific conception of what SE is 
or should be. In Goldman 2010a, he responds to a criticism from 
William Alston that ‗much of the material in [his] book would be 
rejected by many contemporary epistemologists as ―not real 
epistemology.‖‘ (Alston 2005, p. 5; and Goldman 1999) Of course, 
Goldman denies this and argues that his work is indeed ‗real‘.16 What is 
real epistemology for Goldman? As it turns out, he does not much 
                                                          
16 Goldman’s book (Goldman 1999) is controversial in some circles for wishing to include non-
traditional subjects of epistemological concern such as social organizations (e.g. research 
laboratories, law courts, democratic institutions, schools and universities, and websites such as 
Wikipedia). I am greatly indebted to this work in forming my thinking about ‘knowledge in a 
social world’ but suspect the debate over whether or not it counts as real epistemology is of more 
significance to shaping the future of a discipline than of collecting under one term attempts to 
study similar phenomena. This book is probably still the primary source in social epistemology 
despite being over a decade old. 
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disagree with Alston; he just thinks that his SE meets Alston‘s 
conditions. Real epistemology for Alston and Goldman is simple 
epistemology as it has been typically practiced in twentieth-century 
Anglo-American philosophy departments up until now. Goldman 
identifies six central tenets of this practice, some of which are overtly 
responses to work elsewhere that challenges traditional epistemology. 
 
TE1. Individualism: the epistemic agents are exclusively individuals. All 
stories, situations, thought experiments, intuition pumps, and so on focus 
on lone individuals without any need to describe their social context, role, 
status, history, etc. 
TE2. Normativity: it focuses on a narrow remit of evaluating distinctively 
epistemic states such as justifiedness, rationality and knowledge. 
TE3. Objective standards: these evaluative or normative standards are 
assumed to be objective standards. Justifiedness and rationality are ‗not 
merely conventional or relativistic, but have some sort of objective 
validity.‘ (Goldman 2010a, p. 2) 
TE4. Truth: if a proposition is known then it is true. 
TE5. Realism: truth is an ‗objective, largely mind-independent, affair.‘ 
(Goldman 2010a, p. 2) 
TE6. The ‗central business‘ of traditional epistemology is the ‗critical 
examination of doxastic ―decision-making‖.‘ (Goldman 2010a, p. 2) 
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Goldman‘s proposed spectrum relates to these conditions. He argues 
that there are currently three groups of views in competition with each 
other over the same theoretical ground: preservationism, revisionism 
and expansionism. Preservationism broadly sticks to the tenets above; 
revisionism rejects them all; and expansionism (Goldman‘s preferred 
position) wants to go beyond the traditional tenets to examine social 
aspects to knowledge whilst preserving its general methodology. These 
positions can be located on a spectrum such as that represented in Fig. 
1. 
 
Figure 1. Goldman’s spectrum. 
 
Expansionism and preservationism belong in the category of ‗real 
epistemology‘ and revisionism is a kind of non-epistemology or 
pseudo-epistemology. 
 
Expansionism Preservationism Revisionism 
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2.1.3 Real vs. un-real epistemology 
 
Goldman‘s spectrum is exclusive and (fairly) conservative. He seeks to 
exclude some areas of research which are, erroneously, bracketed 
under SE. For Goldman, these are ‗deformed or bastard versions of 
epistemology‘ including postmodernism, deconstructionism, social 
constructionism, and various studies of science including the Strong 
Programme in sociology of science (SP).17 Goldman states that these 
disciplines are incompatible with many, if not all, of the tenets above.18 
                                                          




I disagree with Goldman‘s attempts to bracket these theories together as it is only their 
opposition to a form of analytic epistemology that seems to mark them out. I would argue instead 
that disciplines should be collected by the phenomena they study. It is true that we do not collect 
homeopathy or phlogiston theories in serious medical and chemical textbooks but to say that 
these revisionist theories are not sufficiently serious seems unproven. At the very least, Goldman 
ought to say more about why they do not deserve to be considered as possibly useful methods. 
All are explicit attempts to study the social character of knowledge. Whilst social 
constructionism and SP may be said to be incompatible with the tenets mentioned above, it is not 
obvious that others, e.g. Richard Rorty, are. Rorty would, at the very least, concur with TE4 and 
TE5 and his opinion on the others is the subject of my forthcoming paper with J. Adam Carter 
(Carter & Kerr, in preparation). (Rorty 1989, 1995, 1998) The sticking point is not said to be 
with a different conception of social knowledge but with divergence from current ‗traditional‘ 
methods of epistemology which, after all, may or may not be correct and a case still needs to be 
made to show that they are the best methods for studying social knowledge. What more 
accurately, perhaps, characterizes the revisionist for Goldman is a rejection of what he calls the 
distinction between truth and institutionalized belief. (Goldman 1999, p. 7) For Goldman, 
veritism (giving appropriate place to truth in the sense of some kind of correspondence with 
reality) and epistemology are inseparable. Goldman has since tempered this position, noting that 
often aiming in non-truth-conducive ways can be epistemically better. For example, information 
about previous guilty pleas by the alleged in a court trial is non-truth-conducive but can be 
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Most of the practitioners of these subjects do not describe themselves 
as social epistemologists (SEs) but are sometimes called such or 
discussed as presenting challenges to SE. The revisionist camp extends 
to those who engage directly with traditional epistemology on its own 
terms but who reject some of the tenets. Martin Kusch for example, 
does not consider himself a social epistemologist precisely because of 
disagreements with SE. (see §3.1.1) Lynn Hankinson Nelson is a social 
epistemologist who denies that individuals are epistemic agents and so, 
presumably, does not practice real epistemology for Goldman. 
(Hankinson Nelson 1993) 
 
Real epistemology, on the other hand, is characterized by the 
preservationists and the expansionists. Preservationists keep the 
traditional tenets but would like to add some questions for epistemolo-
                                                                                                                                     
epistemically better since it may prevent undue bias given to this fact. Similarly, the identity of 
Deep Throat was kept secret for some time in order to pursue the higher epistemic end of 
uncovering the Watergate scandal. (Goldman, in a presentation to the Episteme 2012 conference 
on privacy and secrecy, Delft, Netherlands) One problem, I submit, that remains with this 
approach is that it is not obvious why someone who does not hold the same intuitions about 
knowledge and truth should accept this characterization of proper research in social 
epistemology. As I show in later chapters the engineers as a group do not seem to factor truth 
into their decisions (largely because it is usually not possible to establish what is true in non-
trivial cases) and there is a further case to be made that South-East Asians represent the kind of 
community that does not recognize a strong correlation between truth and knowledge. 
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gy that have a social dimension. Most commonly these include: What is 
the nature of testimony-based justification? What does rationality 
require agents to do, in terms of belief revision, if they find themselves 
in a situation of peer disagreement? And so on. Goldman‘s 
expansionist project is more ambitious. It seeks to identify activities 
which require some kind of communal doxastic-decision-making; 
social activities which are conducive to epistemic ends (e.g. true belief, 
justified belief, knowledge, etc.) Examples might include legal trials 
(especially regarding issues of evidence), political inquests and 
democratic structures, forensic medicine, journalism, electoral voting 
or Wikipedia.  
 
In other words, they include any organization with an explicit aim to 
acquire knowledge collectively. It is unashamedly evaluative, and seeks 
to assess and, if possible, suggest improvements in the policies and 
procedures of epistemic or quasi-epistemic social systems. Epistemo-
logical inquiry into these organizations still qualifies as real epistemolo-
gy so long as it coheres with most of the traditional tenets. My work in 
this thesis continues Goldman‘s efforts to apply epistemological 
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principles to real-life problems and social institutions although I do 
draw on the work of revisionists such as Kusch and the Strong 
Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SP) to support 
this problem-solving exercise.19 I am also skeptical of Goldman‘s 
commitment to veritism and his own skepticism towards ‗veriphobic‘ 
epistemology.20 Whilst no one would surely doubt that we ought often 
to promote knowledge practices that are likely to lead to truth I will 
here offer two reasons why we may not want to put this goal at the 
centre of our epistemology. 
 
The first is that there are cases where we are genuinely not interested 
primarily in the truth and that we would rather have a practice that was 
not likely to lead to the truth but did suit some other end. For example, 
I can inquire into whether a colleague is wrong on a certain matter of 
                                                          
19 SP is a research area in the sociology of scientific knowledge developed by a group of 
sociologists at the University of Edinburgh in the 1960s including Barry Barnes, David Bloor, 
John Henry, and Donald MacKenzie. I discuss this work in detail in §3.1 in particular although 
these authors appear throughout the thesis. 
20 Veritism is the view that we should conduct our epistemic activities in a way that, generally, 
produces, generates or promotes true belief. Thus any theory that does not support this unified 
goal could be called ‗veriphobic‘. 
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fact not because I am interested in what the truth of the matter is but 
because I want to show my colleague to be wrong.21 Whilst Goldman 
would probably concede this point, he can respond by saying that 
whilst there are such cases these are ‗outliers‘ and, in general, we are 
typically interested in finding out the truth. Certainly, truth is not 
always the aim of inquiry. But it may also be demonstrable that it is not 
the constitutive aim of inquiry. Hongladarom (2002a) demonstrates 
that in some cultures truth is not the primary goal of inquiry and that 
some cultures have different intuitions on whether knowledge requires 
that the proposition be true. It may simply be a consequence of our 
own cultural determinations that we intuitively accept that knowledge 
is truth-entailing. Certainly it is not currently proven that there are 
cultures which are content for their inquiries to systematically lead to 
falsehood but we ought not to be complacent in thinking that the 
opposite is therefore proven. 
 
                                                          
21 I would not like the reader to think that I ever engage in such vindictive activities but the 
example sprung to mind and seems apposite. 
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Further, my own fieldwork research indicates that engineers are often 
disinterested in whether or not something is true. This is not to say 
that they think it is probably false or that they would not care if they 
were told that it was true (although they may ask on whose authority 
you say that it is). Indeed, were I to provide evidence that what they 
believe is not true they would surely consider it relevant. Rather, it is to 
say that the concept of truth does no work in deciding how to act, in 
reflecting on how one did act, or in monitoring or adjusting one‘s 
epistemic practices. I simply cannot aim at the truth out of a desire to 
do so. I can at best pursue reliable, successful practices and hope that 
these promote truth but we have an entire history of scientific inquiry 
that shows us that we can spend a lot of time aiming at what is true 
only to find that very little of what we discovered was. This is the 
attitude of the engineers I spoke to – and to some extent the interviews 
with non-Western people – that I wish to emphasize here. 
 
First, if we want to claim that truth and knowledge are linked we have 
to show that this claim is based on more than our personal intuitions. 
We must show that it is based on more than an appeal to the seemingly 
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counter-intuitive fact that it sounds odd to say, ‗She knows it but it 
isn‘t true.‘ As our scientific history shows us, our intuitions and 
common sense frequently turn out to be dramatically mistaken. I do 
not aim to bolster this claim in this thesis. In fact, I wish to put the 
issue to one side for the purpose of pursuing another goal viz. to 
develop a theory of knowledge that is useful to analysing and 
evaluating epistemic practices. I think only such a theory would be able 
to contribute to Goldman‘s efforts to extend the domain of 
epistemology into evaluating, improving and contributing to our 
epistemic practices. 
 
2.1.4 Kusch‘s spectrum of social (and communitarian) 
epistemology 
 
In Knowledge by Agreement, Kusch embarks upon a similar programme to 
Goldman (Goldman 1999, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) albeit towards 
different ends. (Kusch 2002, 2004) Kusch is more inclusive in what 
counts as real SE but wishes to distinguish his own position from 
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many of the traditional projects in SE. For Kusch, SE is a spectrum of 
positions which give varying degrees of privilege to social and political 
explanations in the study of knowledge. He identifies two distinct 
movements in SE: one allied with the sociologist Steve Fuller which he 
calls the science policy programme (see Fuller 1987); and one allied 
with Goldman which he calls the complementary programme.22 The 
science policy programme is an explicitly political attempt to influence 
policy-making decisions in scientific institutions in order to make them 
more democratic and accountable to the public. It considers 
knowledge to be a social phenomenon and approaches this 
phenomenon sociologically. The complementary programme is also 
evaluative of policy-making decisions but it distinguishes between 
individual and social aspects to knowledge. Traditional epistemology, it 
says, is going in the right direction but has largely neglected these social 
aspects.23 Kusch‘s project – communitarian epistemology – 
distinguishes itself by being descriptive, rather than prescriptive, 
towards the epistemic make-up of scientific and other knowledge-
                                                          
22 Somewhat surprisingly, SE has an older history of systematic use in sociology than in 
philosophy – Steve Shapin, one of the key figures in the Edinburgh School‘s SP was using the 
term in 1979. 
23
 Key proponents of this programme are Goldman, Philip Kitcher, Hilary Kornblith and Keith 
Lehrer. 
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based institutions. It uses traditional methods of epistemology but 
rejects the dualism of the complementary programme. 24 (see Fig. 2) 
 
Figure 2. Kusch’s spectrum. 
 
The science policy programme and complementary programme are 
species of SE as opposed to communitarian epistemology. 
2.1.5 Other spectra of social epistemology 
 
Frederick Schmitt defines SE as follows: 
Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the 
relevance of social relations, roles, interests, and institutions to 
                                                          
24 The complementary programme is dualistic in the sense that it conceives of two aspects of 
knowledge – a social and an individual – which can be analysed separately without reference to 
each other. That is, in some cases I can describe the epistemic status of an agent without any 
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knowledge. Thus it differs from the sociology of knowledge, which is an 
empirical study of the contingent social conditions or causes of 
knowledge or of what passes for knowledge in a society. (Schmitt 
1994b, p. 1) 
 
For Schmitt, social epistemology evaluates the nature of knowledge in 
itself and necessarily, whereas the sociology of knowledge describes the 
sociology of what passes for knowledge in a given society. This is similar 
to the distinction made by Goldman between veritistic and veriphobic 
approaches. The worry in both cases is that a theory which concerns 
itself with what people happen to think is liable to run into various 
relativistic problems. Schmitt also cites the distinction between 
understanding knowledge individualistically or socially as a useful 
marker. (see Fig. 3) 
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Figure 3. Schmitt’s spectrum. 
 
Philip Kitcher, like Goldman and Fuller, has ambitions that SE can be 
used as the ‗theoretical wing‘ of science policy. (Kitcher 2002, p. 197. 
See also Fuller 1987, 1992, 1996, 2002) Like Goldman, his project is 
veritistic (truth-oriented). He argues that instead of formulating a 
context-free, general-purpose standard which evaluate the truth-
promoting potential of any social practice, we ought to work by degree 
to develop ‗standards of collective veritistic value in specific contexts 
and to offer formal analyses of special cases that might reveal hitherto 
unnoticed possibilities‘. (Kitcher 2002, p. 197) He defends ‗minimal 
social epistemology‘ against what he perceives to be more radical or 
Subject Social epistemology 
Sociology of 
knowledge 
Studies... Necessary relations 
Contingent 
relations 
Domain Normative, conceptual 
Descriptive, 
empirical 
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extreme views. (Kitcher 1994) His view also rejects the traditional 
individualistic reduction which he believes derives from Descartes. 
Since philosophers are now aware of the theory-ladenness of belief we 
require a more sophisticated account of knowledge acquisition within a 
cognitive team. (See Fig. 4) 
 
Figure 4. Kitcher’s spectrum. 
 
For the reductionist programme, belief and theory are conceived 
independently. For more ‗social‘ SE and the relativist programme, 
belief is theory-laden.25 
 
                                                          
25 Essentially, for Kitcher, individualistic reduction is the claim that, whilst much knowledge is 
achieved through a division of cognitive labour, this work is ultimately reducible to an aggregate 
or combination of the work of individual members of the cognitive team. Kitcher is marking the 
difference between social epistemology which considers only individual persons to be epistemic 
agents and a more radical view which contends that the sum of this individual work is less than 
the whole generated by the group or the even more radical view that the group itself may possess 
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Whilst being of excellent value for their insight into the field from the 
perspective of weighty contributors to that field, I intend in the 
following to create a less entrenched survey of SE than is present in 
these surveys by identifying what their authors and others have in 
common and why they see incompatibilities between their own 
research and that of others.26 I will use these sticking points to plot a 
more representative chart of positions in SE. This will be highly 
impressionistic but will serve as a ‗bird‘s eye view‘ of the subject as it 
currently lies and may point to future developments and controversies. 
We can identify three sticking points and plot them as points on three 
axes. We can think of these axes as directions in which the author or 
group wish to take SE, and hence I have called this a compass rather 
than a spectral metaphor.  
 
 
                                                          
26 ‘Entrenched’ is meant in the sense that the survey may itself be limited by the author’s 
substantial involvement and contribution to the field. At the risk of overstating things and having 
made a less substantial contribution to the field, this is perhaps the one virtue I can offer here. 
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2.2 The compass rose of social epistemology 
2.2.1 Advantages of the compass rose 
 
Fig. 5 below is a representation of an (admittedly impressionistic) 
survey of most major figures in SE, broadly construed. Approximated 
values for each scholar were exported to MatLab (The MathWorks, 
Inc., Natick, MA, USA), calibrated along two axes, and designated a z-
axis direction. In the first section of this chapter we discussed various 
surveys of SE. Some of these, such as Goldman‘s, are more exclusive 
than others. They seek to define what counts as social epistemology 
and what does not in a relatively narrow sense. This is a useful 
approach for those already involved in that narrow sliver of the field 
but it seems epistemically vicious to prohibit potentially fruitful 
approaches in the early stages of establishing a methodology and 
knowledge base for SE. SE does not currently have the rigorous, 
widely-accepted methodology, ontology, and knowledge base of the 
physical sciences or even of relatively new sciences such as psychology 
and sociology. It would be disingenuous of me to provide a survey of 
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SE which purports to be ‗the study of the social dimensions of 
knowledge or information,‘ but does not include rivals to my own 
theoretical affections. Even epistemology as we know it, after all, does 
not have a monopoly on studying the social dimensions of knowledge 
or information. The survey consequently includes epistemologists, 
sociologists, ethnomethodologists, feminists, and cultural theorists. 
Those curious about the social dimensions of knowledge or 
information ought to consider these varied contributions as relevant. 
 
Hence, whilst many existing surveys are limited to particular 
approaches to studying social knowledge my aim here is to be inclusive 
and general. I suggest we can identify three ‗sticking points‘ about 
which various accounts diverge and plot these on a Cartesian 
coordinate system. 




Figure 5. The compass rose of social epistemology. 
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The end points of these axes are incompatible. They are as follows, 
 
i. X-axis (East to West) – rationalism and constructivism 
ii. Y-axis (North to South) – individualism and collectivism 
iii. Z-axis (Inwards to Outwards) – descriptivism and norma-
tivism 
 
Of course, such values are far from scientific but the results do indicate 
two general groups which scholars tend to belong to. The majority of 
points occupy either the top left quadrant or the bottom right 
quadrant. That is, most rationalists are normative individualists and 
most constructivists are descriptive collectivists. Let us split the final 
section of this literature review into three sections: Rationalist 
Individualist Normative Social Epistemology (RINSE), Constructivist 
Collectivist Descriptive Social Epistemology (CCDSE), and Outliers. 
 




Each axis reflects recurrent themes in the literature. The X-axis derives 
from Kitcher but is also mentioned by Helen Longino who compares 
rational or cognitive approaches with sociological ones. (Kitcher 1994; 
and Longino 2002) Constructivism (or constructionism elsewhere) is 
often taken to be opposed to realism. Here it is opposed to rationalism 
because it is the name given to an idea proposed by Barry Barnes and 
David Bloor, encapsulated in the sound-byte: ‗there are no context-free 
or super-cultural norms of rationality.‘ (Barnes & Bloor 1982, p. 27) By 
that token, rationality is the claim that there is one and only one norm 
of rationality summed up in Goldman‘s third tenet above, viz. 
 
TE3: Traditional epistemology assumes that the normative standards of 
rationality and justifiedness are not merely conventional or relativistic, 
but have some sort of objective validity. 
 
The rationalism component states, in some form, that the norms of 
rationality do not depend on the peculiarities of our social and political 
organizations. They are most readily comparable to the universalizabil-
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ity of mathematical axioms. There are non-contextual, invariant 
standards for what counts as knowledge, justified, proper or warranted 
assertion or attribution, and so on. Individualism regards the units of 
analysis as individual agents. Thought experiments, intuition pumps 
and descriptions of decisions, attributions, and so on, are populated by 
individual agents and their possession of particular properties and 
relations. Normative theories make prescriptive judgments of how 
agents ought to behave and what is or is not epistemically valuable. 
The combination of normativity with rationalism means that appeals to 
the epistemic good are typically given authority either by intuitive 
plausibility or derivation from unquestioned or unquestionable 
fundaments. Significant persons in this field include Alvin Goldman, 
Philip Kitcher, Larry Laudan, and Frederick Schmitt.  
 
Descriptions of the Y-axis are present in the work of Bloor, Kusch, 
Schmitt, inter alia. (Bloor 1997; p. ix; Kusch 2002, p. 121; Schmitt 
1994b & 1994c) Indeed, individualism vs. collectivism, in some form, 
is often portrayed as the motivation for SE. (See, e.g., Bird 2010, p. 1) 
However, even within SE scholars disagree profoundly on what 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   64 
 
collectivism and individualism are. In this survey, I have taken the 
following extremes to be emblematic of collectivism and individualism. 
Individualism focuses on the interactions between individuals such as 
through testimonial knowledge or in mass collaborations. (See, e.g., 
Brad Wray 2009; and Magnus 2009) A more moderate individualism 
might also analyse the epistemic product of aggregations of individuals, 
although it should always consider the primary unit to be the 
individual. (See, e.g., Lackey forthcoming a, and forthcoming b; List 
2005, and forthcoming; and List & Pettit 2002, 2004, and 2006) 
Extreme collectivism reverses this order: the primary unit is now the 
group. (See, e.g., Kusch 2002; and Hankinson Nelson 1993) The real 
bearers and producers of epistemic ends (true belief, justified belief, 
knowledge, etc.) are communities, groups, collectives, institutions, 
organizations, and so on. A more moderate collectivism might also 
analyse individuals but would always relate this analysis to the 
individual‘s place, role and status in the group.  
 
Another example is provided in the work J. Angelo Corlett, Margaret 
Gilbert, and Raimo Tuomela who endorse what Goldman would call a 
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preservationist strategy and what Bird would call an ‗analogical 
approach to social knowing‘. (Bird 2010; Corlett 1996; Gilbert 1989, p. 
313-14; and Tuomela 1992, and 2004) The general approach is to seek 
analogues for the individualist components of knowledge or, in other 
words, preserve the individualist structure. So, for instance, to take 
JTB, one may consider what in social knowledge is analogous to 
justification in individual knowledge.  Most preservationists provide 
reliabilist accounts along precisely the same lines as reliabilist 
individualist epistemology namely endorsing some statement of a form 
similar to, 
 
S knows that p iff S‘s true justified belief that p has been produced by a 
reliable cognitive process (given other conditions obtain). 
 
The ―analogue‖ approach suffers from several problems as Bird 
observes. (Bird 2010, p. 39-40) First, committing oneself to an extant 
account of knowledge (and consequently a problematic account already 
subjected to counterexample and flaw) leaves one‘s social account 
open to the same objections. Second, it does not appear to reflect how 
we use the term ―knows‖. There is little reason to suppose that just 
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because we apply ―knows‖ to both individual and social cases, that this 
propensity is based on our tacit understanding of a ―structural 
isomorphism‖ between the two kinds of case. (Bird 2010, p. 40)  
 
Last of all, we should consider the Z-axis which separates normative 
and descriptive SE. For the purposes of this survey, normative projects 
are those which attempt to answer questions such as: What is 
epistemically good or virtuous? How should we make and organize our 
doxastic decisions? How best should an organization be structured so 
as to make it epistemically optimal? As stated above, the approaches of 
Goldman, Kitcher, Fuller, and others have this ambition. Descriptive 
projects make no (or much fewer) evaluations of epistemic decisions, 
behaviours or organizations. It may provide social or political 
explanations and descriptions of what an individual or community 
considers being epistemically good but makes no (or few) judgments 
on how things ought to be. 
 
 




Goldman‘s six tenets outlined in §2.1.2 provide an excellent measure 
by which to compare an alternative approach such as the Strong 
Programme whose subscribers would probably find objection in each 
one. SP is an example of a constructivist, collectivist, descriptivist SE 
and its practitioners are all situated in the South-East quadrant. (Fig. 5) 
Let us define what this means. Constructivism states that there are no 
supra-cultural norms of rationality. (Barnes & Bloor 1982) Rather, any 
identified norms are always relative to the specific political and social 
organizations within a culture or community. In some forms, this is 
taken to apply to all possible truths, even those of mathematics and 
logic. (Bloor 1986, and 1997, p. 35-42; Ernest 1998; Restivo 1992; and 
Triplett 1986, p. 439-50) 
 
Collectivist accounts may view the primary unit of analysis as 
communities or may consider communities as a formative influence on 
the properties and relations of individuals. For example, Margaret 
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Gilbert, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Frederick Schmitt, and Raimo 
Tuomela defend strongly anti-individualist epistemologies which posit 
collective belief and collective knowledge. (Gilbert 1987, 1994, and 
2004; Hankinson Nelson 1993; Schmitt 1994a, 1994b, and 1994c; and 
Tuomela 1992 2004) Descriptivism aims to make no normative 
judgments about what agents ought to do but provide only a 
description of what individuals or communities do in fact take as being 
epistemically valuable. Most CCDSE is agnostic as regards truth and 
this presents a problem for traditional epistemology which takes truth 
to be a central component of knowledge. (Gettier 1963) The 
‗descriptive‘ element of CCDSE is essentially a non-normative, 
‗symmetrical‘ approach towards truth and knowledge thereby denying 
TE2 and TE3.27 CCDSE is non-veritistic in the sense that the truth of a 
belief (meaning something other than ‗mere‘ institutionalized belief, 
which SP roughly reduces truth to) has little or no explanatory value.  
 
                                                          
27 See §3.1.3 for more on the role of symmetry in SP. 
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Others have called this attitude towards truth (and knowledge) social 
constructivism to capture the idea that truths and knowledge are 
constructed by communities iteratively, performatively, and contingently 
rather than representing an objective relationship between a 
proposition or mental state and the world. The history of constructiv-
ism spreads well beyond the reach of philosophy and sociology. If one 
were to argue in favour of it, one might point to its apparent 
uncontroversial acceptance in some disciplines, such as psychology and 
biology of the eye, for example. Ch. 6 considers in some detail a 
constructivist approach to theory of perception.28 Perceptions have 
been shown in these disciplines to be constructs in the sense that they 
are fabricated by the perceiver‘s perceptual apparatus in various ways 
and not invariable representations of visual stimuli. 
 
Constructivism about ‗higher order‘ cognitive processes is much more 
controversial although I will defend it in this thesis. Constructivism 
about knowledge and social constructivism do not have the same 
                                                          
28 Detailed discussions of constructivism in psychology are to be found in Raskin 2002, p. 1-25; 
and Balbi 2008, p. 15-27. 
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empirical scientific backing that constructivist perception and 
psychology do. Ch. 3 presents the constructivist approach to reference 
provided by the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge. In 
Ch. 4 I will argue on behalf of social constructivism about ontology 




Whilst almost all of our subjects fall into either the North-West or the 
South-East quadrant of the compass rose (Fig. 5), there are a few 
conspicuous outliers. The most notable of these I have represented as 
‗actor network theory,‘ an approach favoured by, among others, Bruno 
Latour.29 
 
                                                          
29 An overview of this branch of STS which goes beyond the brief treatment here can be found in 
Biagioli 1999. For more on Latour‘s early social constructivism the reader is directed towards his 
1979 (with S. Woolgar), 1987 and 1988. Other work of interest to social epistemologists is to be 
found in Bijker & Law 1992, Callon 1986, Knorr Cetina 1982a, 1982b, 1999; Latour 1998, 2005; 
Pickering 1984 and 1995; Pinch & Bijker 1984; and Rabinow 1999. 
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The theory was developed by sociologists of scientific knowledge 
partly as a critical response to those in the ‗CCDSE‘ quadrant, 
particularly the Strong Programmers David Bloor and Barry Barnes. 
(Latour 2005) Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law (and, for the 
purposes of characterizing a general social epistemology we might add 
‗semi-like-minded‘ contemporaries Wiebe Bijker, Trevor Pinch, and 
Steve Woolgar) who approached SSK and STS from an ethnomethod-
ological, strongly constructivist perspective.30 Of particular interest to 
this thesis is their work on technology, technoscience, and technical 
artefacts and so well shall consider some of this work in the review of 
PET literature, §2.3.5. (See Callon 1986; Latour 2005; and Pinch & 
Bijker 1984) Callon and Latour have argued that we should not 
conceive of nature and society (and, consequently, natural and artificial 
things) as distinct but of all items in our ontology as actors in a 
network. (Latour 1998, 2005; and Callon 1986) Indeed, Latour has 
gone as far as to say that non-human artefacts (such as other organisms 
and technical artefacts) be granted equivalent status with the human 
                                                          
30 Latour has since distanced himself from social constructivism. (Latour 2003) For classic 
earlier work which inspired these relativist ethnomethodologies see Garfinkel 1967; Schütz 
1962; and Schütz & Luckmann 1974. For a retrospective survey of this work see Lynch & Peyrot 
1992. 
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observer. This became a severe bone of contention for Strong 
Programme researchers and produced a heated and extremely readable 
debate between Bloor and Latour within the pages of the journal 
Studies in history of philosophy and science (Bloor 1999a, 1999b; and Latour 
1999). Bloor‘s criticism is taken by Latour to be a virtue: 
 
Latour makes no systematic distinction between nature and beliefs 
about, or accounts of, nature… It is as if he has difficulty telling these 
two things apart. (Bloor 1999a, p. 87) 
 
Yes, I have great difficulties in convincing myself that it is useful to 
create an artefact to get at the facts. (Latour 1999, p. 122)  
 
Callon‘s paper—perhaps the first exposition of ‗actor network 
theory‘—describes a methodology for studying the social interactions 
of scientists. His proposal is an extension or generalization of the 
Strong Programme‘s symmetry principle. (See §3.1.3) Whereas the 
Strong Programme proposed that sociologists be agnostic with respect 
to the truth-falsehood, rationality-irrationality, expert-lay status of the 
elements of their study, Callon generalized this principle to include all 
natural-social and human-artificial distinctions.  
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   73 
 
 
Instead of imposing a pre-established grid of analysis upon these, the 
observer follows the actors in order to identify the manner in which 
these define and associate the different elements by which they build 
and explain their world, whether it be social or natural. (Callon 1986, p. 
4) 
 
This methodology places actor network theory in a theoretical no 
man‘s land as far as the compass rose is concerned. They would be 
suspicious of the distinctions I have made and do not see themselves 
as constructivist or rationalist, individualist or collectivist. Being 
strongly agnostic and abductive they represent the extreme end of 
descriptivist approaches. Whether their views can be of use to analytic 
epistemologists is an interesting question but not one which I will be 
pursuing here mostly for reasons of concision. The distinction between 
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2.3 Philosophy of engineering and technology 
 
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and 
settle for the indiscriminate description of on-going procedures. For 
me, normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of 
truth-seeking, or, in more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. 
Like any technology, it makes free use of whatever scientific findings 
may suit its purpose. It draws upon mathematics in computing standard 
deviation and probable error and in scouting the gambler‘s fallacy. It 
draws upon experimental psychology in exposing perceptual illusions, 
and upon cognitive psychology in scouting wishful thinking. It draws 
upon neurology and physics, in a general way, in discounting testimony 
from occult or parapsychological sources. There is no question here of 
ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, 
truth or prediction. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, 
becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed. (Quine, 
1986, pp. 664-5. My emphasis) 
 
2.3.1 The current state of philosophy of engineering and 
technology 
 
This thesis is about knowledge in general and perceptual knowledge in 
particular but concerns itself more with perceptions acquired using 
technology than, as it were, purely biological perception (i.e. ordinary 
unaided human perception). This is for two reasons. The first is that 
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although we do of course use our unaided perception continuously in 
our everyday lives the most interesting and novel aspects of perception 
and knowledge acquisition come from the increasing presence and use 
of technology. Secondly, after undertaking the groundwork required 
for this thesis it became clear what has been readily apparent to many 
other researchers: that it is very difficult to draw a line between which 
particular perceptions are ‗natural‘ and which are ‗artificial‘; between 
which tasks are accomplished by the ‗skin and skull‘ and which are 
accomplished by a co-production between skin, skull, and extra-skeletal 
schemata – extended cognitive systems (i.e. couplings of human 
cognitive processes and/or technical artefacts, other persons‘ cognitive 
processes, and the performative work of communities). (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998) 
 
The extent to which technology pervades our experience and 
behaviour is often underestimated, from enveloping and controlling 
the environment around us to aiding our cognitive and physical actions 
to enabling new activities and opening up new fields of inquiry that 
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were previously unavailable or simply did not exist.31 One of the ways 
in which technology affects our experience and how we conceptualize 
our human condition is through these extensions to our existing 
cognitive capacities. I argue for this position in more detail in §6.1. 
 
The philosophy of technology is a term used to describe an older 
discipline than the philosophy of engineering. There are differences 
between the two in terms of subject matter, domain and method but 
for my purposes here I use them more or less interchangeably. The 
epistemology of technology concerns what I am here calling technical 
knowledge (knowledge of, for and by technical artefacts) and this is 
primarily the possession of engineers and technologists. The subject 
matter of PET includes definitions of engineering and technology and 
demarcations of their relationship with science and other bodies of 
knowledge and practice; the ethics of engineering and technical 
professions; the nature and ethics of design; the relationship between 
engineering, technology and society; and much more. Construed more 
                                                          
31 Information technology is an excellent example. For more on the ‘enveloping’ influence of 
technology see Floridi 2011b. 
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broadly, their domain often dovetails with that of the philosophy of 
science. As I discuss below, many commentators have criticized the 
boundary often drawn between science and engineering/technology.  
2.3.2 The science-engineering relationship 
 
Central to PET is the ‗ti ên einai…?‘ question: What is science and what 
is engineering? In 1995, the committee of the American Society of 
Engineering Education classified the engineering sciences into six 
categories: 
i. mechanics of solids, including statics, dynamics, and strength 
of materials; 
ii. fluid mechanics; 
iii. thermodynamics; 
iv. rate mechanisms, including heat, mass, and momentum 
transfer; 
v. electrical theory, including fields, circuits, and electronics; 
and 
vi. nature and property of materials. (in Downey and Lucena, 
1995, p. 169) 
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This demarcationism was far behind the academic research on 
‗boundary work‘ which had been critical of demarcating engineering as 
separate from science.32 As Downey and Lucena note, it is likely to 
have been politically motivated: an attempt to construct a legitimate 
educational framework for engineers beyond the core scientific 
subjects of mathematics and physics. It had been assumed up until the 
late 1960s (and is still assumed by many) that the distinction between 
science and engineering/technology was clear. Science aimed to 
discover the nature of reality and understand the natural world. 
Engineering and technology, by contrast, aimed to improve upon 
reality and create a new, better artificial world. Engineers and 
technologists applied science and appropriated it as a knowledge base 
to do things and to allow us to do things. (Auyang 2009b, Bunge 1966, 
Kline 1999) The renowned aeronautical engineer Theodore von 
Kármán exemplified this view when he said, 
 
                                                          
32 The study of how boundaries, demarcations, and divisions between disciplines or professions 
are constructed, advocated, reinforced, and challenged. See, e.g. Gieryn, T. F. 1983. Boundary-
work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and interests in professional 
ideologies of scientists. American Sociological Review 48, pp. 781–795. 
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Scientists study the world as it is; engineers create the world that has 
never been.‘ (Von Kármán 1970, p. 467)  
 
Notably, given these alleged political motivations, engineering has 
often been described as different from science and more closely 
aligned with art (for example, with reference to Leonardo da Vinci, 
craft and design, concept cars, architecture, and so on). The sentiment 
behind this is that in engineering, problems are given by societal needs 
and requirements. Some problems are well-defined and readily imply 
standard, well-known heuristics to solve them. This is sometimes 
known as ‗cookbook engineering‘. (Pitt 2001, p. 24-25) 
 
Other problems, however, are well-defined but there is considerable 
and valid disagreement over the best heuristic(s) to employ in solving 
them. (Vincenti 1990; Bucciarelli 1996; Franssen & Bucciarelli 2004) 
That is, there is creativity, innovation, ingenuity, and art involved in 
how to solve a particular problem or how to design an artefact to best 
suit the societal needs and requirements. Engineers do utilize concepts 
and models from mathematics and physics but these sciences provide a 
range of models that the engineer must then use, together with her 
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experience and judgment, to select the best for the current problem. 
Another prominent engineer in aeronautics, Walter G. Vincenti, quotes 
approvingly a British engineer speaking to the Royal Aeronautical 
Society in 1922, 
 
Aeroplanes are not designed by science, but by art in spite of some 
pretence and humbug to the contrary. I do not mean to suggest that 
engineering can do without science, on the contrary, it stands on 
scientific foundations, but there is a big gap between scientific research 
and the engineering product which has to be bridged by the art of the 
engineer. (Vincenti, 1990, p. 3) 
 
Vincenti‘s What engineers know and how they know it is perhaps the sine qua 
non text in the philosophy of engineering. (Vincenti 1990) Through a 
detailed history and exploration of US aeronautics from 1908-1953, 
Vincenti constructs a distinctive account of engineering knowledge and 
the engineering method. He is critical of the ‗applied science‘ view of 
engineering that had been prevalent for many decades, namely that 
engineers typically ‗borrow‘ or appropriate their knowledge from 
scientists and ‗by some occasionally dramatic but probably intellectually 
uninteresting process,‘ use this knowledge to build technical artefacts 
and shape our local environments. (Vincenti 1990, p. 3) 
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We would likely conclude from this, as Vincenti says, that studying the 
epistemology of science will be more than enough for understanding 
the knowledge content of engineering; the former will subsume the 
latter. Yet we would be mistaken do draw this conclusion. Vincenti 
argues that there is something unique about engineering knowledge 
that would warrant interesting study in the epistemology of 
engineering. This is contained in the engineering method. (§2.3.4) We 
should not think of engineering knowledge as treasure handed down 
by science and parasitic upon science.33 The engineering method is a 
distinct method for producing knowledge from within the discipline 
that is not contained within the scientific output. 
 
                                                          
33 §8.2.2 will discuss different attitudes towards the purpose of knowledge within different 
communities, professions, and cultures. Not all of these groups will take it as intuitive that 
knowing and inquiring are primarily aimed at true belief (as argued in, e.g., Sosa 2011). Some of 
these groups will take knowledge to be a kind of treasure that is acquired much as one acquires 
new material possessions; some will take knowledge to be functional, i.e. that it will enable them 
to do things; others still will take the purpose of knowledge to be to better understand the 
universe; and so on. See §8.2.2. 
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Vincenti and Edwin Layton subscribe to the thesis that technological 
knowledge (of which engineers are the primary possessors and, 
crucially, which requires an education in the engineering subjects, such 
as those listed above) is knowledge of how to do or make things 
whereas science has a more basic epistemic aim. (Layton 1974, 1976, 
1991) Vincenti invoked Gilbert Ryle‘s distinction between knowing 
that (the propositional kind of knowledge with which epistemology is 
almost entirely concerned) and knowing how to describe the 
distinction between what engineers and scientists know. (Ryle 1962, p. 
441; c.f. Stanley & Williamson, 2001) This seems too crude. 
 
If we are to preserve the distinction, it should be to the extent that 
there is a distinction between technical knowledge, which tends to 
enable know-how, and theoretical knowledge, which tends to enable 
know-that.34 Secondly, although Vincenti writes in support of Barry 
                                                          
34 This is the distinction between the Greek concepts of epistêmê and technê; the two kinds of 
knowledge which allow one to know that things are as they are and to know how to do and make 
things. It is not always a useful or, indeed, an appropriate distinction as, for instance, engineers 
make use of ontology and knowledge of underlying mechanistic models as often as scientists 
make use of their knowledge of how to use instruments, create experiments, and construct.  
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Barnes‘ ‗interactive model‘ (which purports to describe the way in 
which science and engineering are in mutual symbiosis rather than 
non-mutual parasitosis), this seems to dilute the claim that these are 
two separate types of knowledge, one of the central claims of his book. 
I would argue that although the two professions do intermingle and 
there is certainly no clear line to draw between the two – as if an 
engineer could not walk across the corridor and pick up and make use 
of a physics textbook and vice versa – there are good reasons for 
looking carefully at the particular practices and institutions that 
produce knowledge in a field like petroleum engineering as distinct and 
different from those practices in, for example, a molecular biology 
laboratory. I hope that these differences are made clear in Chs. 4 and 5. 
 
For now, let us turn to how scholars have changed their minds with 
regard to the relation between science, technology and engineering. 
Towards the mid-1970s a number of scholars began to criticize the 
‗applied‘ model. In 1974, for example, Edwin Layton wrote in a 
landmark paper that,   
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   84 
 
 
Science and technology have become intermixed. Modern technology 
involves scientists who ―do‖ technology and technologists who 
function as scientists… The old view that basic sciences generate all the 
knowledge which technologists then apply will simply not help in 
understanding contemporary technology. (Layton 1974, p. 210) 
 
A general consensus emerged in philosophical and sociological circles 
that simplistic models and generalizations ought to be abandoned in 
favour of studying an ‗intermixed‘ discipline: technoscience.35 This was, 
according to Barry Barnes, a ‗major reorientation in our thinking about 
the science-technology relationship‘. (Barnes 1982, p. 166) He wrote, 
referring in part to a traditional attitude in the UK and elsewhere that 
engineers and technologists were considered to be intellectually or 
professionally inferior to scientists. In the UK it is common to see 
people‘s surprise when someone introduces themselves as an engineer 
and then describes how they are working on, say, diagnoses of flat feet 
and pedal movement, or designing robots for handling nuclear 
material. For more common for the person to assume that a person 
who introduces themselves as an engineer will be able to help with 
                                                          
35 The term ‘technoscience’ was coined by Gilbert Hattois to encapsulate this interactive 
relationship. (Hattois 1984, p. 59-60). 
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household plumbing or repairing their car. This apparent intellectual 
snobbery has given the profession a desire to establish itself as as 
institutionally significant as the various scientific disciplines.  
 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, one of the consequences of the 
increasing respect given to engineering as a discipline of equal 
intellectual significance to science in its own right, is the trend to 
analyse science and technology as converging upon a single point – a 
new technoscientific discipline which incorporated the reciprocal 
interaction between both disciplines. 
 
We recognized science and technology to be on a par with each other. 
Both sets of practitioners creatively extend and develop their existing 
culture; but both sides also take up and exploit some part of the culture 
of the other…. They are in fact enmeshed in a symbiotic relationship. 
(Barnes 1982, p. 166) 
 
Layton had described the view that, if there is a distinction between 
science and engineering, that it is social and not based on ‗abstract 
functions of knowing and doing.‘ (Layton 1974, p. 209) Researchers 
were criticized for assuming that science and technology were ‗well-
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defined monolithic structures‘ (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch 1987, p. 20) 
and failed to notice the social constructions that gave them that 
appearance. (Mayr 1976) Sociologists such as Barnes, Wiebe Bijker, and 
Trevor Pinch suggested that Science and Technology Studies should 
use social distinctions rather than abstract-theoretical ones. They 
argued, indeed, that there were no underlying distinctions beyond the 
particular, contingent distinctions that arise out of social negotiation 
and organization.  
 
Likewise, Vincenti argues that the engineering method and engineering 
knowledge are not the same as, or derived uninterestingly from, the 
scientific method and scientific knowledge. He quotes the British 
engineer G. F. C. Rogers saying, 
 
Engineering refers to the practice of organizing the design and 
construction [and, I would add, operation] of any artifice which 
transforms the physical world around us to meet some recognized need. 
(Vincenti 1990, p. 7. Original parenthesis.)36 
                                                          
36 For further ‘boundary work’ done by Vincenti in demarcating the science-engineering 
relationship see p. 11, 112, 151, 166, 170, and 200-58.  
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Indeed, towards the end of the book he provides a case study which 
purports to show that sometimes science plays ‗no role‘ in solving the 
problem. (Vincenti 1990, p. 193) Vincenti starts from the appealing 
proposition that, if technology is merely applied science, then there is 
no unique form of knowledge that could account for the many 
achievements of technology which are independent of scientific 
discovery, such as the pyramids of Egypt or the roads of ancient 
Roma. (Pitt 2001) Vincenti‘s own case studies from the history of 
aeronautic engineering appear to back this up. One can make 
technological discoveries that are not scientific discoveries. 
Consequently, despite his admiration for the interactive, mutual, 
technoscientific model of Barnes et al. Vincenti also wants to claim 
particular territory for engineering knowledge – what has been called 
the ‗epistemic emancipation of technology‘. (Houkes 2009, p. 310) 
 
Layton had similarly wanted to position engineering as its own 
discipline and area of knowledge. He argued that it may be divided into 
two types: 
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i. the ‗less idealized natural sciences‘, and 
ii. sciences that seek ‗to gain a scientific understanding of the 
behaviour of man-made devices,‘ such as parts of thermody-
namics that advance idealized models of heat engines. (Layton 
1974, p. 10) 
 
Layton‘s concept of a ‗less idealized natural science‘ is perhaps better 
illustrated by thinking of scope and scale. When we describe a 
mechanistic model in, say, fluid dynamics, as a true model of the 
viscosity and flow of a fluid our expression ‗true‘ is indexical to the 
scope of the investigation. It would also be possible to describe the 
behaviour of the fluid at a Newtonian or Quantum level but this is not 
needed for statements in fluid dynamics to be true. Here we assume 
that the matter has some sort of heterogeneous microstructure even 
though a model calibrated for a different scope of investigation may 
reveal that it does not. In engineering, whether something is true 
depends on the scope of the investigation. This is, at least on some 
accounts, different from how we normally think of scientific 
knowledge. If we read our physics textbook and it tells us that the 
density of a material is equal to its mass divided by its volume then we 
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do not think this is true only given a certain scope of investigation but 
true simpliciter. Likewise, it we learn that blood cells are produced in 
mammals by haematopoiesis, then we do not take this to mean that 
this process produces blood cells given a certain scope of investigation 
but that the process produces blood cells no matter at what level we 
wish to look at it. In engineering, the very opposite can be true. What 
is true of a substance given the methods of fluid dynamics is not true 
were one to undertake a more atomistic level of inquiry. We will also 
discuss later how, in some cases, what is true depends on geographical 
location, contingent operating procedures, and what a particular group 
of professionals takes to be true.37 Denying this, generally speaking, is 
to deny the existence of the body of knowledge Layton describes under 
(i). 
 
                                                          
37 Whilst it is, of course, trivially true that scientific theories may also take account of 
geographical location it is not typically true that they admit of difference across different 
geographical locations depending on the particular historical and pedagogical differences to be 
found there. In other words, as I discuss below, whilst there is no such thing as French physics or 
Russian chemistry, I have observed in my fieldwork that there is such a thing as Scottish and 
American logging analysis. 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   90 
 
By contrast, science is, usually, concerned with general, non-
geographical, absolute principles. As Sunny Auyang writes, 
 
Science generally means state of knowing or possessing knowledge that is 
sufficiently general, clearly conceptualized, carefully reasoned, 
systematically organized, critically examined, and empirically tested. 
(Auyang 2009b) 
 
Finally, we should also be careful not to characterize engineering as a 
heterogeneous discipline. Larry Bucciarelli has described the various 
design processes used in engineering and demonstrated that no one 
process is dictated by the nature of the object being designed or the 
problem to be solved. (Bucciarelli 1996) Central to the philosophy of 
engineering and technology is the concept of design. Proper function is 
thought, in part, to be determined by design considerations. Design, in 
this instance, can mean both the content of a set of places (as in ‗the 
design for a new production logging tool‘) and the process by which 
those plans are realized, which typically will involve specifications of 
the configuration, layout, and dimensions of the artefact; testing of the 
artefact to see if it fulfils its function either through mathematical 
analysis or experiment; and modification. (Vincenti 1990, p. 10) Larry 
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Bucciarelli (1996, 2003, 2009), Edwin Layton (1974), Walter G. 
Vincenti (1990), and others have placed design at the centre of their 
philosophy of engineering.  
 
In fact, Bucciarelli and Vincenti both almost exclusively restrict 
themselves to talking about design knowledge, it is such a central 
component in their work. In The origins of the turbojet revolution, Edward 
Constant makes a distinction (echoing that made in the philosophy of 
science) between ‗normal‘ and ‗radical‘ technology. (Constant 1980) 
Normal technology, he states, is what engineers and technologists 
spend the vast majority of their time doing. It involves practicing and 
making small improvements to the accepted traditional practices of the 
community. Radical technology, on the other hand, occurs when 
technological communities face a problem which cannot be solved 
using traditional methods and must innovate to produce an entirely 
new artefact, the configuration of which, and even how it works, is 
largely unknown to the community. 
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To this concept of normal and radical technology, Vincenti adds 
normal and radical design. (Vincenti 1990, p. 10) Normal design 
adheres to the accepted customs and practices of the community when 
designing an artefact. The type of artefact, how it functions, and how it 
should be used, is well understood. When an engineering problem 
requires the invention of a new kind of artefact, the mechanics and 
functions of which are little understood, practitioners become involved 
in radical design. Both design paradigms are multilevel and hierarchical.  
He describes the levels at which design takes place in aeroplane design 
and how problems at the higher levels (including the project definition 
and the general overall design) tend to be ‗conceptual and relatively 
unstructured. (Vincenti 1990, p. 12) This typically includes the 
translation of military or commercial requirements into some technical 
problem.  
 
These are socially-sourced requirements and, as such, must be 
interpreted by the team of engineers into a problem of engineering 
science. As you can imagine, this translation may be normal (reducing 
to well-known engineering principles and heuristics) or radical (such as 
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the cases described in Constant 1980 or Bloor 2011). Vincenti is keen 
to emphasize the effect of social concerns on whatever design 
approach is taken, 
 
Engineering knowledge reflects the fact that design does not take place 
for its own sake and in isolation. Artifactual design is a social activity 
directed at a practical set of goals intended to serve human beings in 
some way. As such, it is intimately bound up with economic, military, 
social, personal, and environmental needs and constraints. (Vincenti 
1990, p. 11) 
 
If we accept Vincenti‘s claims we should be careful not to separate 
social from non-social elements. In fact the two are inextricably linked. 
 
2.3.3 The myth of the lone engineer/scientist/epistemic 
agent 
 
The theoretical physicists Freeman Dyson once said, ‗A good scientist 
is a person with original ideas. A good engineer is a person who makes 
a design that works with as few original ideas as possible.‘ (Dyson 
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1979, pt. 1 ch. 10) Dyson here suggests that science when it is at its 
best creates new ideas, unlike engineering which adapts existing ideas 
as expediently and frugally as possible. Science is about discovering 
knowledge, as opposed to the technicians in engineering who apply it 
in an efficient and expedient manner. There are two things wrong with 
this picture. The first is the reliance on an interpretation of engineering 
which does not include technical knowledge. We discussed this in 
§2.3.2 so there is no need to retrace it here. The second is its 
individualist bent. The myth of the scientist as a lone man looking at 
the world around him, drawing up hypotheses, and then testing them 
against the evidence in a dispassionate and amoral manner bears little 
relation to reality. As a society, we have convinced ourselves that 
discovery and knowledge are produced by individual flashes of 
inspiration in the mind of a single genius. The tale of Friedrich August 
Kekule von Stadonitz, the 19th century organic chemist who discovered 
the molecular structure of benzene after dreaming of a snake biting its 
own tail, exemplifies this idea which is repeated throughout scientific 
historicizing as well as in popular cultural heroes such as Sherlock 
Holmes or Dr. Gregory House. 
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Of course, there is no doubt that science does occasionally leap 
forward as a result of a ‗Eureka‘ effect but most progression is through 
collective step-by-step advancement; a tower of ancestors each 
standing on each other shoulders. (Merton 1965) Not only is the lone 
scientist rare but it, if it was common, science would progress at a 
slower rate. Dunbar shows that teams of scientists have a significant 
advantage over individuals pursuing the same task but only when the 
members of the group have different areas of expertise. (Dunbar 1993) 
He suggests that this may be because progress and discovery in science 
often depends on analogy and application of knowledge from other 
disciplines to the current problem. Where members of the group all 
have similar ‗analogical reserves‘ to draw upon, this confers little 
advantage above and beyond the work of any single member of the 
group.  
 
Equally, there existed (and does exist) a mythical engineer: again, 
typically, a man acting alone. This man is personally interested in ‗how 
things work‘ and making: homo faber rather than homo rationalis. Billy V. 
Koen, for instance describes the engineer as a pragmatic individual 
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using a set of heuristics to ‗cause the best change in a poorly 
understood situation within the available resources.‘ (Koen 2003, p. 28) 
Whilst this is a good definition of the engineering method, it is a poor 
definition of the distributed reasoning that most commonly 
characterizes that method. This involves drawing on the resources and 
background knowledge of others—the analogical reserves—to solve 
problems.  
 
This myth is not the fault of scientists or engineers or even our lay 
understanding about science and engineering. It exists in philosophy as 
well, suggesting it reveals something much more deeply grained in our 
understanding of us and our place in the world. As we have seen, part 
of the motivation behind social epistemology is to challenge 
epistemologists who draw conclusions based on lone, isolated 
individuals, single-handedly inquiring into the nature of some fact or a-
socially and apolitically going about their business, as if they were 
always behind the veil of ignorance. (Harsanyi 1955; and Rawls 1971) 
No doubt these individualist epistemologists are partly motivated by 
Occamian considerations but it seems that social epistemology, which 
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gives consideration to more complex social organizations and 
individuals‘ places in them, has solid grounds to justify its position as 
an important addition to the individualistic epistemology, particularly 
in the fields of science and engineering.  
 
2.3.4 The engineering method  
 
Another reason to distinguish engineering from scientific knowledge is 
by its dependence on scarce resources. Engineers are tasked with 
‗improving‘ the world in some way and consequently desire a method 
that would maximise their chance of success, but also to minimise risk, 
cost, time, and so on. Demands for these improvements typically come 
from wider society, governments, commerce, industry, military, and so 
on, as do the constraints. Consequently, the method is always a 
sacrificial, compromising, social heuristic: you cannot please everyone 
all the time but you can please some of them some of the time. Many 
cases of scientific knowledge proceed in exactly the opposite manner. 
In answering the question of how the universe began, for example, we 
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do not need an answer tomorrow, or even within decades. Instead, we 
hope to arrive at better and better answers as our scientific knowledge 
advances. In other words, science and engineering often differ in terms 
of their method or heuristic. Here is Billy V. Koen's definition of 
heuristic: 
 
A heuristic is anything that provides a plausible aid or direction in the 
solution of a problem but is in the final analysis unjustified, incapable 
of justification, and potentially fallible. (Koen, Discussion of the Method, 
p. 28) 
 
Other engineering heuristics might include ‗allocate resources to the 
weak link‘, ‗safety first!‘, ‗improve upon designs incrementally‘, ‗rules of 
thumb‘, and so on. It is easy to see why these methods appear to 
suggest that engineering is very different from science. Further, 
whereas in science we tend to assume that there is one correct answer 
for each problem, if there is an answer at all, different engineers may 
approach a problem in different ways and be able to provide 
justifications as good as each other for their solutions. Thus, Koen 
suggests the following definition of the engineering method, 
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…the use of heuristics to cause the best change in a poorly understood 
situation within the available resources. (Koen 2003, p. 28) 
 
These heuristics are inevitably dualistic. They are based partly on 
knowledge of physical structure and dynamics as well as knowledge of 
social needs and requirements. (Kroes 2010; and Kroes & Meijers 
2006) John Dewey once argued that whilst one can quite properly 
speak of a national philosophy, the same cannot be said of science: 
there is no ‗Indian neuroscience‘ or ‗Japanese biology‘. Science is the 
same all over the world; or, at least, it ought to be the same even if 
individual nations or communities will have their own traditions and 
histories. Whilst we might wish to argue this point, Dewey could not 
have denied that there are national engineering practices. Each has 
acquired their own set of heuristics – dependent on school, university, 
practical experience, geographical conditions, available resources, 
moral attitudes, and much more - which they use to solve problems. 
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In my fieldwork research I was taught by and interviewed Scottish, 
American, Thai, Malaysian, Filipino, and English engineers. Most had 
worked in a variety of different countries and, in particular, many had 
undergone training in the United States. It was clear that different 
countries and communities had their own favoured approaches or 
‗styles‘. Many of these may not be at all easy to study or codify in the 
way that a science studies researcher might be able to ask a chemist, for 
example, why they do experiments on particular animals and not others 
or why they test their equipment in such a way. Estimations, 
judgments, figures, and so on may be made on the basis of extensive 
practical experience and, crucially, trial and error, optimization, and the 
techniques used in design synthesis. (Vincenti 1990, p. 166) There are 
many methods and no one correct approach in engineering for a 
problem: the best approach is the one that is likely to bring the best 
results or, in hindsight, brought about the best results. Another aspect 
that must be emphasized is that some problems are ‗pressing‘ in a way 
that some scientific questions—such as how was the Universe formed 
or why humans have two legs—are not. (Lamberth 1999, p. 57) They 
call for a decision to be made within a specified time frame and using 
certain limited resources. 
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Knowledge attribution and inquiry are inextricably linked. In fact, it 
has been argued that inquiry is the central focus of knowledge 
attribution. (Hookway 1999, p. 7) Further, it seems plausible that one 
could construe all knowledge as the answer to a question and inquiry is 
the process by which one finds an answer to that question. (Pritchard 
2008b, p. 232; Schaffer 2007) Thus, changes in the context of inquiry 
entail changes in the context of knowledge ascription. When we ascribe 
knowledge we, at least in part, assert that the attributee can, generally, 
answer a question. (Schaffer 2005, p. 117) 
 
Now, consider the following example:38 Suppose I ask an audience of 
engineers and non-engineers to tell me how many ping-pong balls you 
could fit in this room. Typically, according to Koen, most non-
engineers will not put their hand up to offer an answer. The engineer, 
at least so the story goes, always will. The quality and nature of the 
answer depends, in part, on resources, time and the importance or pay-
off awarded for a good solution. If we gave the audience 30 seconds 
                                                          
38 The example is taken from a presentation by Koen to the Workshop in Philosophy of 
Engineering at the Royal Academy of Engineering, London, 10
th
 November 2008, although I 
believe he took the example from a discussion at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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we could expect a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation. If we gave 
them a couple of minutes and a tape-measure, we might expect them 
to quickly measure the walls, estimate the dimensions of a ball and 
derive a figure from the difference. If their lives depended on an 
accurate answer and they had several months, we might well expect 
them to fill the room with ping-pong balls and count them or go to 
even more extensive measures. 
 
It is an anecdote but it carries a point: that an engineering answer, a 
perfectly correct engineering answer, depends on the resources 
available to dedicate to that problem and that the initial back-of-the-
envelope calculation may be a perfectly good answer relative to that 
context. The answer the engineer gives is never the answer to a 
problem, but it is her best answer to the problem she is given - all 
things considered. (Koen 2003, p.61) 
 
This seems to support a contextualist account of knowledge 
attribution. (See §3.2) For example, in any given situation, I can ask, 
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‗How many ping pong balls could one fit in this room‘ and attribute 
knowledge based on context-relative criteria such as the profession of 
the speaker or the importance of the outcome. We can illustrate this 
using the high-low framework of some contextualist theories. These 
hold that there is a high context, under which the conditions for 
ascribing knowledge are strict and demanding, and a low context, 
under which the conditions for ascribing knowledge are not so 
demanding.39 If the answer I am given is ‗About 10,000‘ and I am in a 
high-stakes context (i.e. it is important that I am given a precise answer 
to the nearest 5 balls and I require a precise and demanding 
justification) I can appropriately infer that my interlocutor does not 
know how many ping pong balls could fit in this room. If, on the other 
hand, I am in a low-stakes context (i.e. all I require is a ‗ball park figure‘ 
                                                          
39 Different authors spell this out in terms of high and low ‘standards’, (Cohen 1987; DeRose 
1992, 1995, 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012; Williams, M. 2001) ‘stakes’, (Leite 2005; Nagel, J. 2008; 
Stone 2007) ‘thresholds’, (Cohen 1998) ‘practical interests’ (Stanley 2005), as well as contexts 
of ‘alternatives’ (Dretske 1970, cf. Schaffer 2001), ‘warranted assertability’ (Blaauw 2003, 
Brown 2006, Stone 2007; cf. Baumann 2011, DeRose 2002, Leite 2005, and Pritchard 2005 for 
critical discussion), and so on. Schaffer (2005) observes that there are fine details to be made 
between what it is that shifts relative to a context. He further argues that defending the claim that 
x shifts relative to a context must ‘illuminate inquiry.’ (Shaffer 2005, p. 117) That is, whether we 
focus on stakes, as I have here, standards, thresholds, practical interests, or whatever else, our 
account of this variable must connect to the role that knowledge ascriptions have more widely in 
practices of inquiry. Although it is of course true that one can know something and not be able to 
answer a particular question (either out of shyness, or muteness, or whatever else), the purpose of 
ascribing knowledge is, in part, to assert that the attributee can, generally, answer a question. 
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or rough estimate and a less demanding justification), then it may be 
appropriate for me to say that my interlocutor does know how many 
ping pong balls could fit in this room. §3.2 considers the validity of 
contextualism in this context in detail, its merits as an epistemology, 
and its detractions. 
 
With all this in mind, then, how does engineering knowledge differ 
from scientific knowledge? Is it accurate to say that all engineering 
knowledge consists in the content and application of heuristics? The 
first thing we can say is that engineering knowledge is does not attempt 
to produce accurate (in the sense of true, in the sense of corresponding 
to reality) models of the phenomena it studies. Rather it produces 
useful models which can aid engineers in accomplishing their ultimate 
aim, whether that is to extract hydrocarbons from a subterranean rock 
or to build a gas pipeline and so on. The model is instrumental to the 
problem-solving process; it is not the product of the inquiry. Further, 
there is no one-to-one correlation between the process of inquiry and 
the model as there is in the natural sciences; the engineer may select 
from a number of available models. The second thing is that what 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   105 
 
counts as a correct procedure of inquiry depends on a lot of extra-
theoretical factors: time, resources, location, personnel, and so on. 
Likewise, what counts as a good answer depends on the same extra-
theoretical factors. 
 
2.3.5 RINSE and CCDSE in philosophy of engineering and 
technology (PET) 
 
Much of the work in characterizing the epistemology of technology has 
been done within schools of sociology and history, rather than analytic 
philosophy, particularly regarding CCDSE. Trevor Pinch and Wiebe 
Bijker argued in their seminal paper that the constructivism which had 
been so productive in the sociology of sciences can be fruitfully applied 
to an empirical analysis of technology. (Pinch & Bijker 1984) Pinch and 
Bijker tick all the relevant boxes for constructivist, collectivist, 
descriptivist social epistemology and their work has been prominent in 
much of the subsequent research. Generally, we can segregate RINSE 
and CCDSE in PET in an analogous manner to how they were 
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separated in §2.2.40 CCDSE in PET is suspicious of ‗rationalistic‘ or 
‗veritistic‘ concepts used in explanation of why a theory succeeds or in 
normative prescriptions for scientific and engineering practice. These 
concepts include logical inference from theory, inference to best 
explanation, parsimony, commensurability, derivation from true 
axioms, falsifiability, induction from experience, and so on. CCDSE 
typically states that a philosopher, sociologist or historian who studies 
scientists and engineers should look at the practices involved, the 
behaviour and relationships within scientific and engineering 
communities, the interactions between people, the settling of disputes, 
and the resolution of problems. What one should not do is appeal to 
logical abstractions, idealized visions of the scientific method and 
Platonized interpretations of what scientists and engineers say, to 
explain the success of theory, progression, and design. 
 
                                                          
40 Collections of CCDSE articles in the philosophy of technology can be found in Hackett, et al. 
2008; Kaplan 2004; and Scharff & Dusek 2003; and Barnes, Bloor, & Henry 1996. See also 
Mitcham 1999 who presents a history of PET and constructs his own philosophy of engineering 
and technology from a Continental philosophical perspective. An analytic approach can be found 
in Kroes & Meijers 2000. See also Ch. 4 of this thesis. 
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In the last couple of decades, more attention has been paid to PET in 
analytic philosophy. These researchers seek to use the methods of 
analytic epistemology and metaphysics to deliver solutions to 
outstanding problems in PET. That is, instead of the relativist, 
sociological/ethnomethodological model presented by CCDSE, they 
evaluate technological change using the concepts of ontology, rational 
design, know-that/know-how, and so on. One example of this work is 
discussed in detail in §4.1.2. Another example is the work, already 
mentioned, of Walter Vincenti and Edwin Layton. These two authors 
preserved a distinction between scientific knowledge and technical 
knowledge. To defend this epistemic emancipation, Layton and 
Vincenti pointed to examples where engineering and technology have 
been responsible for expanding our knowledge and outline the 
cognitive and heuristic differences between an engineer and a scientist.  
 
Such a view immediately defines the science-technology relation—
technology is hierarchically subordinate to science, serving only to 
deduce the implications of scientific discoveries and give them practical 
application…. Such a hierarchical model leaves nothing basic to be 
discussed about the nature of the relationship. A model with such 
rigidity is bound to have difficulty fitting the complex historical record. 
(Vincenti 1990, p. 5) 




We might restate the matter by noting that the laws of science refer to 
nature and the rules of technology refer to human artifice. The function 
of technological rules is to provide a rational basis for design, not to 
enable man to understand the universe. The difference is not just one of 
ideas but of values; ―knowing‖ and ―doing‖ reflect the fundamentally 
different goals of the communities of science and technology. The 
thought that embodies the values of technology will relate to active and 
purposive adaptation of means to some human end, that is, it will relate 
to design. (Layton 1974, p. 39) 
 
Both Layton and Vincenti demarcate engineering as separate from 
science and direct their research towards on understanding of those 
differences, particularly the relation of engineering design and the 
growth of knowledge to social demands. Ch. 4 and 5 are, in many 
respects, repeating these differences and marking them out as worthy 
of epistemological study—specifically, social epistemological study. I 
argue that there are such things as technical artefacts. This can be 
demonstrated by showing that we talk about them in different ways. 
These differences in reference-talk (see §3.1) lead to the possibility of 
different kinds of knowledge, such as technical knowledge. 
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Having said that, the relationship between scientific and technical 
knowledge is rarely clearly distinct—there are engineers and 
technologists doing science as well as scientists doing engineering and 
technology—and several authors are skeptical as to whether we should 
preserve any such distinction at all (e.g. Barnes 1982b; Latour 1987; 
Latour & Woolgar 1979). It is also worth noting, contra Layton and 
Vincenti, that particular scientific worldviews have had influence on 
engineers and technologists and that much engineering and technical 




                                                          
41 It is easy to think of historical examples of this, but for some recent examples see Zelić and 
Stahl (2005) who show that the Irish government’s decision to implement an electronic voting 
system was (mis)guided by an ontological commitment to realism; and Hongladarom (2002b) 
who demonstrates that technology and engineering in Thailand has been adopted from research 
and development in other countries and has developed in a different manner due to its 
ontological commitment to Buddhism rather than a ‘Western’ modern scientific worldview. See 
also Reynolds (1976) and Day & Reynolds (2000) who describe the adoption of Western 
cosmography in Thailand. 
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2.3.6 Conclusions of literature review 
This chapter presented two literature reviews: a survey of work in 
social epistemology and a review of the philosophy of engineering and 
technology. In the first section, I discussed the aims and methods of 
social epistemology, broadly construed. I then presented a novel way 
of surveying the field through a ‗compass rose‘ metaphor. This 
provides a useful way of distinguishing between different approaches 
to social knowledge and the various ‗sticking points‘ at which different 
approaches diverge. I described three such sticking points and their 
implications: rationalism vs. constructivism, individualism vs. 
collectivism, and normativism vs. descriptivism. It was found that most 
scholars tend to fall into one of two camps: a rationalist, individualist, 
normative camp; and a constructivist, collectivist, descriptive camp. 
This is not to say that all social epistemologies must fall into one or the 
other of these categories (indeed, some represented in Fig. 5 do not). It 
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is to say that these are two prevailing, incommensurable trends in 
social epistemology.42 
 
The third section reviewed the history and current state of the 
philosophy of engineering and technology (as well as some related 
disciplines). I discussed the relationship between science and 
engineering and how attitudes to this relationship have changed over 
the last half decade. Others have argued that the distinction between 
science and engineering ought to be abandoned. (Barnes 1982b; Latour 
1987; Latour & Woolgar 1979) These authors tend to cite the 
intermingling of scientists and technologists and the transfer and 
convergence of knowledge across multiple disciplines to argue against a 
distinction between science and engineering. However, this is to ignore 
the valuable work which demonstrates that engineers create a 
distinctive kind of knowledge that cannot be explained under the terms 
of history, philosophy, and sociology of science. I intend this thesis to 
                                                          
42 Work which discusses whether two representatives from each of these camps — the Strong 
Programme in the sociology of knowledge and analytic social epistemology — really are 
incommensurable is discussed in §3.1.3. 
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provide one example of this unique kind of knowledge, which I am 
calling technical knowledge. 
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Chapter 3 
Communitarian and contextualist epistemology 
3.1 Knowledge by agreement 
3.1.1 Introduction, commitments and politics 
 
Having provided a general survey of social epistemology, this chapter 
focuses on Martin Kusch‘s communitarian epistemology as a 
promising means of navigating between the three sticking points. 
Kusch explicitly attempts to bridge various opposing sides in SE. I 
discuss Kusch‘s communitarian roots in the sociology of knowledge 
and some important analytical concepts that will be used in following 
chapters including the ontology of artefacts, collective performance, 
and reference-talk. In the second section I compare communitarianism 
with contextualism, a similar but distinct movement in epistemology. 
The two are found to be incompatible although aspects of contextual-
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ism are relevant for illuminating the central theses of epistemological 
communitarianism. 
 
The epistemological programme advocated in the 2002 book Knowledge 
by Agreement by Martin Kusch commits itself to two principles: 
 
CE1. The term ‗knowledge‘ and its cognates like ‗know‘ and ‗knower,‘ 
mark a social status – like ‗head of department.‘ 
 
CE2. The social status ‗knowledge‘ is typically granted to, or imposed on, 
groups of people. Knowledge is not just social in that it is a social status; it 
is also social in that it is typically attributed to groups rather than to 
individuals (Kusch 2002, p. 1, original emphasis). 
 
In Kusch‘s view, many (if not all) social epistemologists have departed 
from the initial radical claims that the movement promised and his 
book serves as a redress. Kusch views SE as a spectrum of positions 
which give varying degrees of privilege to social and political 
explanations in the study of knowledge. (See §2.1.4 and Fig. 2) He 
notes that the term has been applied to both philosophical and 
sociological theories and each end of the spectrum represents the 
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methods of each of these disciplines. The most prominent figure in the 
sociological movement has been Steve Fuller whose prescriptive 
programme Kusch terms the ‗science policy programme‘. The most 
prominent figure in analytic philosophy has been Alvin Goldman who 
also has prescriptive ambitions for a ‗complementary programme‘. 
Goldman‘s expansionist complementary programme seemed to leave a 
window open for a radical critique of the tenets of traditional 
epistemology from within the framework of analytic epistemology (see 
§2.1.2). Kusch‘s epistemological communitarianism (henceforth, e-
communitarianism) purports to offer such an approach. It also 
distinguishes itself from Fuller and Goldman by being an explicitly 
descriptivist programme and, therefore, having no ambition to 
prescribe or recommend policy change. 
 
Consider CE1 and CE2. The first identifies one crucial subject matter: 
the shared practices and language of social roles that confer status 
upon an agent. The second subject matter involves reversing the 
traditional order of explanation by claiming that ‗knowledge‘ is most 
often granted to communities rather than individuals thus contravening 
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Goldman‘s TE1. (§2.1.2) These two tenets demonstrate how difficult it 
can be to steer clear of political theory when discussing knowledge 
simpliciter. Despite being a descriptive theory of knowledge and not 
advocating any particular policy or rearrangement of social organiza-
tions (as argued for, e.g., by Goldman), e-communitarianism does have 
a political element in its origins, its interdisciplinary framework, and its 
theoretical concern with differentials of social power. Kusch writes at 
the beginning of the book, 
 
…epistemology and politics are more closely connected than tradition 
would have it. To understand knowledge is to understand epistemic 
communities: and to understand epistemic communities is to 
understand their social and political structures. (Kusch 2002, p. 2) 
 
Statements such as these are part of a wider trend in epistemology 
which acknowledges the Hobbesian-Baconian maxim that knowledge 
is power.43 This is particularly relevant when discussing knowledge 
produced in an artificial social organization such as a science laboratory 
                                                          
43 See Fricker (2007) where the author makes the claim that any SE must be political since 
epistemic interdependence is connected to social power structures. Standpoint and feminist 
epistemology also display a commitment to tease out the connections between epistemic agents, 
social organization, and politics. See, e.g., Alcoff 2001; Anderson 1995; and Harding 1991. 
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or an engineering office. The role that trust, authority, expertise, and 
hierarchy play in generating knowledge is discussed at various points 
throughout the case study. 
 
There are two schools of thought that have influenced Knowledge by 
agreement more than any others: communitarianism in political 
philosophy (henceforth, just communitarianism) and the Strong 
Programme in sociology of scientific knowledge. I will now turn to 




Epistemological communitarianism alludes explicitly to political 
communitarianism, the movement in political theory which opposed 
John Rawl‘s claim that the primary function of governments is to 
distribute resources according to principles of fairness. (Bell 2012) The 
reader might ask why anyone would oppose such an obviously 
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reasonable proposal. For Kusch, the pertinent insight of this 
movement that epistemologists ought to heed is that the community is 
prior to the individual in the order of explanation. Put another way, the 
task of epistemology is to ‗explain why individuals can know only in so 
far as they are members of epistemic communities‘ (Kusch 2002, p. 
10). 
 
There is more to the affinity than this, however. Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, three key political communitarians, 
argued against universalism and individualism and emphasized the role 
of the community in cementing political and moral values. (Bell 2012) 
Kusch deploys similar arguments against universal claims in 
epistemology in the form of global theories of justification as well as 
foundationalism and coherentism which base universal theories of 
knowledge on universal features of human psychology. The 
communitarian dispute with Rawls‘ ‗original position‘ thought 
experiment – as well as his description of an ‗Archimedean point‘ from 
which a person may regard the human condition ‗from the perspective 
of eternity‘ (Rawls 1971, p. 587) – is comparable to Kusch‘s criticisms 
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of individualist epistemology and its de-contextualized thought 
experiments.44  
 
By the same token, a project which aims to recapture knowledge as a 
social institution is the epistemological (and sociological) equivalent of 
the communitarian project to explain political and moral values via an 
explanation of specific local contexts in which political communities 
and institutions are created. In short, the take home message of 
communitarianism and the sociology of knowledge for epistemology is 
that knowledge is a social institution created within particular 
communities in diverse, locally-contingent ways. It is the specific 
determinations of these systems that should be understood before we 
can properly understand how individuals engage in epistemic activities: 
acquiring or generating knowledge; ascribing knowledge to others both 
within and without their own community; justifying these ascriptions 
and their own claims to knowledge against the challenges of others; 
and so on. 
                                                          
44 Note that Rawls later recanted from the import of this thought experiment for his theory of 
justice, describing it as ‗a useful rule of thumb‘ (Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A restatement, p. 
97). 
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3.1.3 The Edinburgh School: the Strong Programme in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge 
 
The second theoretical influence on e-communitarianism is the 
Edinburgh School or Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SP). SP is a research area in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge developed by a group of sociologists at the University of 
Edinburgh in the 1960s including Barry Barnes, David Bloor, John 
Henry, and Donald MacKenzie. Kusch believes, and this dissertation 
follows through some of these claims, that some of the most urgent 
challenges to real epistemology do not come from disciplines which 
philosophers most readily and commonly ally themselves with: 
cognitive science, evolutionary biology, psychology, and so on. These 
subjects will never give comprehensive answers to epistemological 
questions because they are predominantly individualistic in their 
outlook. They can answer questions about an individual‘s cognitive 
processes, brain events, and thinking but cannot answer questions of 
socialization, status, expertise, and so on. Rather they come from the 
sociology of knowledge, particularly its attempts to provide empirical 
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methods for analysing the function of communities and epistemic 
teams.45 
 
SP originated as an attempt to correct a common fallacy perpetrated by 
sociologists, historians and philosophers of science. These scholars 
often gave sociological explanations for the development of scientific 
theories but reserved such explanations for the unsuccessful ones – 
eugenics, the Lysenko affair, phrenology, etc. Successful and surviving 
theories could be explained by appeal to their truth-value, natural facts, 
rationality, objectivity, logical inference from theory, inference to best 
explanation, and so on. This was taken by SP to be asymmetrical, given 
that scientific theories have historically tended to replace others even 
when substantiated by the rules given above. Sociological explanations 
ought to be applied across the board in explanations of any theory 
succession or cessation. Cultural values, self-interest, commitment, 
education, trust, expertise, education, history, and so on, are always 
                                                          
45 See, e.g., Barnes 1982a; Barnes, Bloor, & Henry 1996; Bloor 1983, 1991; and MacKenzie 
2006. 
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relevant explanatory factors. The myth (often replicated even in 
influential works on SP such as R. K. Merton‘s The Normative Structure of 
Science 1979) of the objective, detached scientist ought to be dispelled 
and replaced by a conception of scientists as human beings: ‗highly 
gregarious, interdependent social primates.‘ (Gagnier and Dupré 1998, 
quoted in Barnes 2000, p. ix) 
 
Interestingly, the connections between SP and communitarianism are 
also politically vexed. The term ‗communitarian‘ has a history in 
political theory also dating back to the 1960s where researchers used it 
to replace the ‗dubious‘ term communist that would otherwise represent 
collectivist or community-centric sociologies. R. K. Merton, the early 
sociologist of science who strongly influenced the formation of SP, 
defined four universal norms of science: Communism, Universalism, 
Disinterestedness, and Organized Skepticism (known as CUDOS). 
(Merton 1979. See Mitroff 1974 and Mulkay 1991 for some compelling 
counter-arguments.) Merton defined the norm of communism as, 
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The common ownership of scientific discoveries, according to which 
scientists give up intellectual property rights in exchange for recognition 
and esteem.46  
 
This criterion was renamed communitarianism or communalism by 
successors embarrassed by possible connotations with Leninism. 
Essentially, Merton believed that scientific knowledge is a public good. 
Scientists consider, according to Merton, that their epistemic product is 
free and only ask that they are rewarded with recognition of their 
achievements. Whether or not Merton believes that this is how 
scientists do feel or rather how they ought to feel is not clear.  
 
Kusch uses the term ‗communitarianism‘ to distinguish his approach 
not from Soviet-era politics or Marxist ideologies but from a particular 
class of social epistemologists, viz. Goldman‘s real epistemologists 
(§2.1.3). Kusch wishes to take seriously SP‘s criticisms of real 
epistemology and use them to develop a sociophilosophical 
epistemology. (Kusch 1997) According to this account, real 
                                                          
46
 It is interesting to note at this point that Merton identified communism (communitarianism) 
with common ownership of discoveries (or the collective bearing of knowledge). 
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epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman are wrong to speak of a social 
‗dimension‘ or ‗aspect‘ to knowledge which is deserving of additional 
research. For real epistemologists, the social is an aspect or feature of 
knowledge which epistemologists have not much noticed and ought to 
expand their research into. For SP and e-communitarians, on the other 
hand, all knowledge is social. That is, there is no knowing subject 
without a shared context of knowledge ascriptions. Knowledge 
generally requires learning, education, and teaching, and these comprise 
socialization. (Durkheim 1956) Methodologically speaking, analysts 
must explain the social context (the socialization) in order to 
understand and explain the acquisition and stabilization of knowledge.  
 
Whilst the Strong Programme focused its attention on scientific 
knowledge, the point is much stronger with regard to engineering 
knowledge. Successive research has shown how technology and 
engineering develops and generates knowledge in tandem with social 
developments and ideas.47 Walter Vincenti (1990) argues that the 
                                                          
47
 See, e.g., Aitken 1985 who argues that the history of technology should be seen as a subject 
within the history of ideas. He explains the development of technological invention in the history 
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history of technology cannot be done properly with ignorance of social 
history and sociology. Barnes, Bloor, et al. would doubtless agree but 
saw a tougher and subtler challenge from the philosophy of science 
(and from anti-constructivist practising scientists, such as Alan Sokal, 
see Sokal & Bricmont 1998).  
 
However, the focus on the sociology of scientific knowledge has, at 
least in its formative years, paid little attention to the specific 
challenges for a sociology of engineering knowledge. This is beginning 
to be addressed within the Strong Programme through Bloor‘s work 
with Vincenti (Vincenti & Bloor 2003) and his most recent book 
comparing British and German approaches to aeronautics during the 
First World War; (Bloor 2011) and Donald MacKenzie‘s analysis of the 
performative models used in economics (MacKenzie 2006, 2007) and 
military technology. (MacKenzie 1993)48 I chose to concentrate on 
                                                                                                                                     
of radio by examining the social ideas that emerged at the same time as new innovations were 
being developed. See also Laudan, R. 1984 who argues that changes in thought cause shifts in 
the kinds of solution adopted by technologists.  
48 There are many more examples which could have been mentioned from inside and outside SP. 
A notable example with a tangential approach to SP is Collins & Evans 2008, which examines 
the ‘Hawk-Eye’, a device used in sports such as tennis to decide difficult ‘calls’ and which, they 
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technology and social epistemology in this thesis in part because of a 
desire to contribute to this recent work and to approach the challenge 
of synthesizing SP and SE from a slightly different angle. 
 
SP proposes a radical theory of knowledge, one that is highly 
controversial even in its own field. (Brown, J. R. 2002; Friedman 1998; 
Haddock 2004; Laudan, L. 1984; Okasha 2000; Ritsert 1990, p. 101-26; 
Sokal & Bricmont 1998) So why should we take its challenges to SE 
seriously? Haddock (2004) proposes a useful way to steer clear of 
arguments that seem to lose their force the more one considers them. 
Instead, Haddock argues, we can focus on those arguments from 
constructivism that do pose a threat to our current methods and 
understanding in epistemology. In Bloor‘s manifesto for SP (1991) he 
set out four principles which the sociology of knowledge ought to 
adhere to: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
argue, may cause naïve spectators to ‘overestimate the ability of technological devices to resolve 
disagreement among humans. 
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1. Causality: All explanations must be causal. That is, they must 
concern conditions which enable a particular belief to come 
about. In particular, Bloor is introducing a method for the so-
ciology of scientific knowledge and so he is talking about causal 
explanations of why a particular scientific belief gains traction. 
For example, the belief that such and such a genome is respon-
sible for a chosen hereditary medical condition or the belief 
that Mendelian inheritance correctly describes how characteris-
tics are passed from parent organisms to their offspring. 
2. Impartiality: Sociologists should be impartial with regard to the 
truth and falsity or the (ir)rationality of a belief. This is closely 
connected to principle 3, viz. 
3. Symmetry: They should explain both true and false beliefs in 
terms of the same kinds of causes. For example, they ought not 
to explain successful theories by appeal to rationality, necessity, 
and correspondence to reality, whilst explaining superseded 
theories by appeal to sociological and ideological commitments 
on behalf of scientists and other interested parties. In fact, 
Bloor would like all theories to be explained sociologically. 
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4. Reflexivity: Remember that Bloor is attempting to put the 
sociology of science on the same strata as the natural sciences. 
Accordingly, the sociology of science ought to be critically ex-
amined according to the three previous principles with which it 
examines natural sciences. We should, therefore explain any 
sociological belief (including those of SP) causally, sociological-
ly, and without preconception of its truth or falsity. 
 
The third principle — the principle of symmetry — has received the 
most attention from advocates and detractors. However, Haddock 
argues that the symmetry principle does not, given a certain 
interpretation, come into conflict with much of contemporary 
epistemology. Indeed, there is much in these principles that can be 
made to work with a traditional epistemological account of knowledge. 
Here is the statement of the symmetry thesis from Barnes‘ and Bloor‘s 
‗Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge,‘ 
 
[A]ll beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the causes of 
their credibility. It is not that all beliefs are equally true or equally false, 
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but that regardless of truth or falsity the fact of their credibility is to be 
seen as equally problematic. The position we shall defend is that the 
incidence of all beliefs must be accounted for by finding the specific, 
local causes of this credibility. This means that regardless of whether the 
sociologist evaluates a belief as true or rational, or as false and irrational, 
he must search for the causes of its credibility. In all cases he will ask, 
for instance, if a belief is part of the routine technical competencies 
handed down from generation to generation. Is it enjoined by the 
authorities of the society? Is it transmitted by established institutions of 
socialisation or supported by accepted agencies of social control? 
(Barnes & Bloor 1982, p. 23) 
 
Haddock considers what it means to ask for the ‗causes‘ of a belief‘s 
credibility. One way of interpreting this request is to ask: ‗What causes 
this proposition (that N holds true) to be worth holding true?‘ 
(Haddock 2004, p. 22) A second way of interpreting the request is to 
ask: ‗What causes people to hold this proposition true?‘ In this passage, 
Barnes and Bloor seem to be asking both ‗seek the causes of its 
credibility‘ and ‗seek the causes for people judging it credible,‘ which is 
of course contradictory. Unless, that is, we assume that Barnes and 
Bloor are adopting what may be called a non-evaluative understanding 
of credibility. 
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To understand this, let us look at Bloor‘s definition of knowledge as: 
‗that system of beliefs that a community collectively accepts as 
knowledge. (Bloor 1991, p. 3)49 Elsewhere, Barnes adds that there ‗is no 
reason, of course, why philosophers should adopt this conception of 
knowledge for their epistemological purposes.‘ (Barnes 2001, p. 268) In 
other words, Barnes and Bloor are not making the claim that beliefs 
cannot be both true and justified. Rather, they are offering an 
instrumental or methodological definition of knowledge which they 
suggest is useful for sociological purposes. 
 
Haddock suggests that we understand their use of the word ‗credibility‘ 
similarly. A belief is credible, in the non-evaluative sense, if and only if 
a given community accepts it as credible. This definition need not 
conflict with an evaluative definition of credibility. Thus, Haddock 
shows that we need not think of the Strong Programme as posing a 
challenge to epistemological (evaluative) accounts of knowledge and 
                                                          
49 A definition which Bloor acknowledges is ‗rather different to that of either the layman 
or the philosopher‘ given that philosophers usually take knowledge to be, at the least, a 
true and justified belief. (Bloor 1991, p. 3) 
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credit but rather that the two are proposing theories of two different 
kinds of concept. 
 
Whilst I agree with Haddock‘s approach taken here I do think that SP 
provides something that epistemologists have failed to provide: a 
methodology for analysing practical situations and for deciding 
whether an agent is right to attribute knowledge to another. The 
problem lies with a difference of opinion over the limits of 
epistemology. Most epistemologists would say that it is possible to 
define the conditions for knowledge attributions to be true. As 
Haddock says, it is often unclear whether SP argues that it is not 
possible to define truth conditions or whether it is just methodological-
ly impractical. I believe that either statements such as those above are 
equivocations or that they are shorthand for saying that it is 
methodologically preferable to avoid any discussion of what is true or 
not beyond the consensus of the community. 
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Nevertheless, there remains a conflict between SP and most 
epistemologists and it is this conflict that I would like to focus on. As 
described in the opening chapter, the questions raised by Deepwater 
Horizon are questions that epistemologists are obliged to tackle. They 
are not merely empirical questions about who knew what and when 
but about when it is appropriate, correct or true to ascribe knowledge 
to an agent or a group, if it is ever appropriate, correct or true. 
However one wishes to expand on the terms appropriate, correct or 
true there remains a task to be undertaken here. A JTB-themed 
account of knowledge cannot answer whether the knowledge 
ascription is true or not as it leaves open the question of whether the 
belief is true and what is required for it to be justified. The sociological 
approach advocated by SP has the potential to provide an answer. The 
penalty is that we must, at least methodologically, assume knowledge 
attribution to be commensurate with knowledge itself. 
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3.1.4 The ontology of knowledge: Is knowledge natural, 
social or artificial? 
 
The Strong Programme, and to a certain extent Kusch, claim that 
knowledge is socially constructed. In stating this, we should be careful 
to delineate three senses of epistemological social constructivism: 
(Schmitt 1994, p. 20-7) 
 
1. The propositional content of knowledge is social. (e.g. Rouse 
1987) 
2. The conditions of knowledge are social. (e.g. Latour & Woolgar 
1979; 1987; Kusch 2002; Rouse 1987) 
3. Knowledge is typically caused by social, economic, and political 
interests. (e.g. Barnes 1977; Bloor 1991) 
 
We can also frame the issue in terms of what kind of thing we consider 
knowledge to be. Different societies have different attitudes towards 
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what kind of thing knowledge is and what other doxastic attitudes or 
metaphysical concepts it is cognate with. (see, e.g., Goldman 2004; 
Hallen 2004; Harding 1998; Hongladarom 2002a; Maffie 1995; Mulder 
1996; Weinberg, Nichols & Stich 2001) This will be discussed in 
greater detail in §8.3.2 of this thesis. Hilary Kornblith – a preservation-
ist, for Goldman, and a member of the complementary programme, 
for Kusch, makes the argument that knowledge is a natural kind. 
(Kornblith 2002, esp. p. 61 and 161) Kusch, on the other hand, claims 
that knowledge is a social institution. These are ontological claims 
about an epistemological concept. In other words, they are claims 
about what sort of thing knowledge is.  
 
Let us examine Kusch‘s account in more detail before it is applied to a 
case study in Ch. 5. Although SP purports to be naturalistic it should 
not be confused with attempts such as Kornblith, Karl Popper, and W. 
V. O. Quine‘s to ‗naturalize‘ knowledge. (Kornblith 2002; Popper 
1972, p. 106-15; Quine 1969) Such naturalizing theories view 
knowledge as belonging to a group of natural kinds (such as water, 
H2O) or artificial kinds (such as works of art or spiders‘ webs). 
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Kornblith, Quine, and possibly Popper, are committed to the view that 
knowledge continues to exist even if we, as a community, cease to refer 
to knowers, knowledge, and cease to make the relevant communal 
performative utterances. (Kusch 2002, p. 165) If we deny this, we 
should make explicit that knowledge is a social kind. (§4.2) SP and e-
communitarianism view knowledge as a social kind (the set of things 
that include, e.g., marriage, money, and professional promotions). 
Kusch distinguishes these kinds by the nature of the references or 
‗communal performative utterances‘ made of them. (See Fig. 6) 
 
Kind Examples of things Ontological status if references cease 
Natural H2O, spiders, hydrocarbons Continues to exist 
Social Marriage, money Does not continue to exist 
Artificial Works of art, gyroscopes Continues to exist as a natural thing only 
 
Figure 6. Kinds of things and their ontological status. 
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3.1.5 Barnes on natural and social kinds 
 
Before deciding whether we should accept Kusch‘s claim that 
knowledge is a social kind let us look at the history that led him to this 
point. In 1983, Barry Barnes published an influential paper making 
explicit SP‘s ontological commitments. (Barnes 1983) This paper 
relates the question as a problem of reference.50 For Barnes, reference 
concerns the relationship between ‗our speech and that which is 
spoken of.‘ (Barnes 1983, p. 524) Barnes considers as central to this 
problem an epistemological question: how can we know that the terms 
we use match the external world to which they purport to refer? Even 
the natural sciences seem to ignore any need for a systematic definition 
of what counts as successful reference for their own terms.  
 
                                                          
50 When Kusch speaks of ‗knowledge‘ marking a social status, he is also equating the ontological 
problem with a problem of reference. That is, when ‗knowledge‘ marks a social status the term 
‗knowledge‘ or the practices that take the attributee to be a knower this term or practice refers to 
that social status. In such cases, the referencing practice constitutes the social status. §5.2 
provides an example of referencing practices and communal performative utterances with the 
view to providing empirical methods for studying the production of knowledge although I come 
to different conclusions about the ontological status of that knowledge. 
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We tend to think of most things we encounter as belonging to kinds: 
things which may be treated or taken as being similar to other things of 
the same kind. Some kinds of things, for example minerals or plants, 
we think of as existing independently of ourselves. We can group 
elements in the periodic table or construct taxonomies of living beings, 
and yet in these cases we have come across a classificatory system, in 
some sense, already in place before we got there or, perhaps, that we 
were naturally, necessarily or inevitably inclined to so classify. If we 
stop grouping minerals and plants as kinds – if we stop referring to 
them as minerals and plants – then they will not pop out of existence. 
Barnes claims that, for these kinds of things, the reference becomes 
fixed because each person has a stored pattern which they compare to 
the object before them and attach a label accordingly. 
 
For example, as I approach what I think looks like a flower I expect 
certain empirical characteristics. If what I encounter matches my 
internally stored pattern for ‗flower‘ then I will (typically) identify it as a 
flower. If it does not, I will put it in the non-flower category. Either of 
these confirming or disconfirming references adds to the community‘s 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   138 
 
proper use of the term ‗flower‘. Proper use and proper concept 
application are key theoretical terms. We will later discuss the 
collectivist view on properness and its relation to proper function, a 
much-used term in the literature on technical artefacts. (See, e.g., 
Millikan, 1987 pp. 1-50; Franssen 2006) The proper application of 
‗flower‘ will likely differ across lay communities, horticulturalists, and 
so on, and is liable to change if enough agents change their behavior. 
The proper application of „tulipa gesneriana‟, on the other hand, will 
change only incrementally and slowly, if at all. In general, all these 
terms are applied by comparing empirical characteristics to a pattern, 
model, norm or prototype. 
 
The situation cannot be the same for social kind terms. There are no 
shared empirical characteristics for ‗marriage‘, for example. No 
superficial pattern recognition could fix proper use. Marriage may be 
symbolized through wedding rings or another physical object but these 
are not necessary to constitute a marriage (if a person loses their 
wedding ring, for example, or burns their marriage certificate, the 
marriage remains intact or, if you like, we may still properly refer to the 
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couple as ‗married‘). Rather, marriage is constituted (in part) by a series 
of performative utterances. (Austin 1975) These references could 
include the initial ceremony, the pronouncement of the minister, the 
idle chatter of neighbours and colleagues, official documents, and so 
on. 
 
Social kinds are considerably more nebulous and varied in their 
properties and behaviour than natural kinds and the variety of social 
kind term references is a consequence of this. Consensus, concord and 
agreement between community references, together with the initial 
instantiation which ‗primes‘ the whole process, forms this stereotypical 
account of social kind terms. (Barnes 1983, p. 529) If the stereotype for 
referencing natural kinds is broadly ostensive – identifying a thing by 
comparison with previous examples – then the stereotype for 
referencing social kinds is broadly stipulative – defining a thing by 
stating it as such. 
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Central to Barnes‘ account of reference is the ‗performative model.‘ 
This model is a representation of what constitutes a natural or social 
kind. (Barnes has a dualist ontology to which Kusch added artificial 
kinds, see §4.1.4 and §4.2) In cases of natural kinds, references are 
constituted by a community‘s iterative use of the term to refer to 
objects displaying similar empirical qualities. For example, an individual 
encounters what looks to her like water: it is liquid, transparent, 
odourless, and tasteless; it is in a bottle labelled ‗water‘; and so on. She 
acquires a pattern for ‗water‘ which she can compare to liquids she 
encounters in the future. If she uses this application in her interactions 
with others they may sanction, correct or rebuke her usage. It is 
through successive iterations such as these that the proper usage of the 
term ‗water‘ comes to be stabilized within the community. What we are 
told of water and how others use the term affects our own behaviour. 
 
Social kind terms, on the other hand, are not classified by their 
empirical characteristics. Instead, according to this model, they are 
entirely constituted by performative utterances which baptise and then 
either reward or sanction proper use of the name. For instance, take 
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the social institution of money. ‗Money‘ cannot be said to refer to any 
single physical structure or kind of thing. Rather, it can take many 
physical forms from metal coins to cheques and signatures to 
electronic data. In such cases proper use of ‗money‘ depends on a 
system of use within the community. 
 
Firstly, if we, as a community, stop calling the metal coins and cheques 
money and switch to an entirely electronic monetary system then the 
nature of money – its ontological status – changes. The rules of proper 
use change and the coins and paper simply no longer belong to any 
special kind of thing. Secondly, when an individual uses the term 
‗money‘ or ‗married‘ he may look at certain physical markers in the 
same way that he may identify water or species of animal. However, no 
one set of markers is enough to fix proper use. For instance, physical 
markers that someone is married may include a diamond ring on the 
person‘s digitus medicinalis (the ‗ring finger‘) or a signed marriage 
certificate. Nevertheless, the absence (or destruction) of any of these 
signs does not preclude proper use. Thus social kind terms are not 
dependent on empirical characteristics or perceptual performance.  
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3.1.6 Authority and trust 
 
In some cases, agents may have been given some authority by the 
community to make the proper classifications. In others, the authority 
to classify will be dispersed across the community. By comparison, 
many philosophers (as well as scientists and lay people) argue that 
natural scientists enjoy an authority in classifying natural kinds. 
(Putnam 1975; Bird & Tobin 2008) They maintain that if, for instance, 
we want to know to what the term ‗water‘ refers we ought to ask a 
scientist who explains that ‗water‘ refers to a substance with the 
chemical formula, H2O. Kusch and Barnes, along with John Dupré and 
Ian Hacking and others, have argued against such realist essentialism 
instead insisting that there is no single ontology appropriate to all 
communities ahistorically. (Barnes 1983; Dupré 1996; Hacking 19990, 
1991a, 1991b, 1995; Kusch 1999) Rather, Dupré and Hacking favour a 
promiscuous realism where interests limit the class of relevant 
properties of an entity. On their account, no taxonomy is best for 
deriving generalizations regarding all properties and none is privileged 
by the world. Consequently, classification becomes a collective 
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enterprise always indexed to a community and their interests. Kusch 
and Barnes can be said to be, in a certain sense, relativists about kinds 
in that what kinds there are depends on the interests and behaviour of 
those making the classifications. (See §4.1.3) 
 
Some terms have technical uses. That is, the proper use of some terms 
differs across communities. Some terms, such as digitus medicinalis is 
typically only used within a specific community of medical experts. 
Others are common words which acquire technical uses within a 
discipline, such as ‗information‘ within computer science. In fact, one 
might argue that almost all terms are technical terms in that all have 
proper uses indexed to particular communities. In many cases, some 
individuals or groups carry more weight in their uses of a term than 
others. For example, in a University classroom, a professor may have 
more authority than a student or group of students in deciding how to 
properly use a technical term. 
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The above description of natural and social kind terms is a stereotype. 
In reality, both are part-determined by authorized use. In considering a 
very simple example of social kind terms, Barnes asks us to think of 
one individual, I, holding unassailable authority to instantiate the 
proper use of a term ‗as if by fiat‘. In such a case, he pronounces 
something, X, an S, or any kind of a thing, K, an S, and by this very act, 
make X or K an S. (Barnes 1983, p. 526) In such a case, an ‗S‘ just is 
whatever I calls an S. From the baptism on, whether X or K is an S 
depends solely on whether X or K is sufficiently similar to what I 
originally called an S.  
 
Of course, there are few occasions where one individual would wield 
such power. In most communities cognitive authority is dispersed with 
a ‗web of diverse and conflicting usages, with the simple self-reference 
loop of the first case replaced by spaghetti junction.‘ (Barnes 1983, p. 
526) It requires careful and diligent analysis with particular attention to 
the specific properties of the community to understand any reference-
talk that takes place. Of course, this kind of analysis applies to all social 
kinds. ‗Authority‘ is also a social status and having authority is entirely 
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dependent on being granted that authority by a community. Sometimes 
the authoritative status a person holds aligns with an epistemic 
responsibility. (§8.2.2 and §8.2.3) The person may be considered an 
authority or expert on a particular matter; they may be relied upon in 
testimony as a credible witness; or they may hold professional 
positions in which they have a responsibility to advise others on what 
is known.  
 
3.2 E-contextualism vs. E-communitarianism 
3.2.1 Historical background 
 
In this section I will discuss a comparable theory to communitarianism 
with the distinction of being both individualist and truth-oriented. 
Despite their differences, there are elements of this group of theories, 
bracketed under the term ‗epistemological contextualism‘ (henceforth, 
just contextualism), which can be preserved under an e-communitarian 
approach. Contextualism, put simply, is a theory about the truth 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   146 
 
conditions of knowledge attributions. It was initially proposed as a 
means of dealing with the problem of radical skepticism but has since 
been used to deal with other epistemological problems. (Cohen 1988, 
1999, 1998, 1999; DeRose 1995)  The essence of the idea is that 
attributions of knowledge are contingent upon a determining context, 
whether conversational or circumstantial. 
 
Contextualism originated in the Relative Alternatives Theory (RAT) 
advocated by Fred Dretske during the 1970s and 1980s. (Dretske 1970, 
1981)  Dretske attempted to provide a more acceptable account of 
knowledge by replacing justification (that is, the requirement that an 
agent must have some grounds, or reason for their true belief) with the 
requirement that the agent is able to eliminate as possibilities all the 
‗relevant alternatives‘ to what she believes. In other words, possessing 
knowledge depends on an agent‘s capacity to rule out a certain range of 
alternatives which varies according to what kinds of alternatives are 
relevant. In subsequent formulations by Dretske and other sympathetic 
voices, the range of alternatives which are relevant has been held to be 
sensitive to a variety of factors. Unfortunately, it has proved as difficult 
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to define ‗relevancy‘ as it was to respond to Gettier. (Cohen 1994; 
Floridi 2008b, 2010a, p. 303)  
 
3.2.2 DeRose and standards 
Contextualism is similar to e-communitarianism and the reader might 
ask why it is not more appropriate to adopt a contextualist approach, 
thereby preserving a more orthodox individualist stance and not 
multiplying entities beyond necessity. Let us recall what contextualism 
asserts, its similarities to e-communitarianism, and whether it can be 
applied to sociotechnical knowledge. We will then consider what can 
be saved from the valuable contextualist insights in a communitarian-
collectivist epistemology. I will focus on Keith DeRose‘s theory as it is 
among the most developed.  
 
Contextualism, as DeRose describes it, is the position that the truth 
conditions of knowledge ascriptions (i.e. attribution and denial 
statements of the form ‗S knows that p‘ and ‗S does not know that p‘, 
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etc.) vary according to the conversational context in which they are 
uttered. What varies, for DeRose, is the epistemic standards S must 
meet (or fail to meet) in order for such a statement to be true. In some 
contexts S must have a true belief that p and also be in a very strong 
epistemic position with respect to p. In others, S need only meet some 
lower epistemic standards. This is in direct contrast to Unger‘s 
invariantist account which argues that knowledge is invariant across all 
contexts. (Unger 1975) 
 
Unger advocated a skeptical form of invariantism whereby a single set 
of standards governing knowledge ascriptions are consistent and highly 
demanding. This has the disconcerting consequence that much of the 
‗knowledge‘ that is routinely attributed to agents is, in fact, knowledge 
that they do not have. Unger later appeared to retract from an absolute 
commitment to invariantism, presenting a contextualist account in 
opposition to the invariantist account of his ‗Ignorance‘. (Unger 1975. 
See also Unger 1984) After proposing this account, he came to the 
relativist conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to which of 
these views is correct.  
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DeRose‘s account is largely an attempt to resolve the apparent 
dilemma left unresolved by invariantist responses to the skeptical 
problem – what Michael Williams refers to as our ‗biperspectivism‘, the 
intuition that skepticism is compelling under the conditions of 
philosophical reflection but never able to affect our everyday life 
wherein it is all but ignored. (Williams 1999; Williamson 2001) 
Contextualists argue that the truth-value of knowledge ascriptions vary 
according to a context and DeRose‘s bank cases are often used as an 
illustration. (DeRose 1992, p. 913) Here, there are two cases for us to 
consider. The reader should ask whether in each case DeRose knows 
that the bank will be open on Saturday morning. 
 
Bank Case A 
My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop 
at the bank on the way home to deposit our pay cheques. But as we 
drive past the bank, we notice that the lines are very long, as they often 
are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our pay 
cheques as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case 
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that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight 
home and deposit our pay cheques on Saturday morning. My wife says, 
‗Maybe the bank won‘t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on 
Saturdays.‘ I reply, ‗No, I know it‘ll be open. I was just there two weeks 
ago on Saturday. It‘s open until noon.‘ 
 
Bank Case B 
My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, 
and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our pay 
cheques on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on 
Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open 
until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very 
important cheque. If our pay cheques are not deposited into our 
checking account before Monday morning, the important cheque we 
wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the 
bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She 
then says, ‗Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be 
open tomorrow?‘ Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank 
will be open then, still, I reply, ‗Well, no. I‘d better go in and make sure.‘ 
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The message we should take home from this is that, although DeRose 
has precisely the same information, beliefs, and reasons for believing in 
both cases he is much less inclined to say that he knows in Bank case B 
and, intuitively, we are inclined to agree. What is the reason for this? 
‗The context of my utterances in the two cases make it easier for a 
knowledge attribution to be true in Case A than in Case B.‘ (DeRose 
1992, p. 914) In other words, the truth-value of a knowledge 
attribution varies according to the context. Those who would agree 
with this interpretation, Unger calls ‗contextualist‘ and those who 
disagree he calls ‗invariantist‘. (Unger 1984) As noted by Kent Bach, 
DeRose‘s case is interesting but problematic. (Bach 2005, p. 6. Fn. 6) 
The case asks us whether DeRose is justified in attributing knowledge 
to himself: ‗Do I know that the bank will be open on Saturday 
morning?‘ Bach points out that the standards for evaluating a self-
attribution of knowledge such as this can vary for reasons other than 
the subject‘s epistemic position, qua subject. First-person cases like this 
‗muddy the waters‘. Instead, we should concentrate on third-person 
cases where the attributer of knowledge is not the subject, such as the 
airport case provided by Cohen, (Cohen 1999, p. 58) 




Mary and John are at the L. A. airport contemplating taking a certain 
flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover 
in Chicago. They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows 
whether the flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he 
got from the travel agent and responds, ‗Yes I know – it does stop in 
Chicago.‘ It turns out that Mary and John have a very important 
business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport. Mary says, 
‗How reliable is that itinerary? It could contain a misprint. They could 
have changed the schedule at the last minute.‘ Mary and John agree that 
Smith doesn‘t really know that the plane will stop in Chicago. They 
decide to check with the airline agent. 
 
Cohen suggests that examples of this form strongly suggest that 
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3.2.3 Semantic contextualism 
 
One common accusation against contextualism is that its theories are 
not epistemological but linguistic, and so should be confined to the 
philosophy of language and not epistemology. However, this is to 
misread the contextualist project. Contextualism is concerned with 
knowledge-attributing and knowledge-denying statements, not 
knowledge per se. Its central tenet is that when we attribute knowledge 
to someone, what matters is the context in which we use the term 
‗knowledge‘. Pritchard considers semantic contextualism - as put 
forward by such figures as Cohen, DeRose and Lewis to be the most 
dominant form of contextualist response to the skeptic. (Pritchard 
2002, p. 215) Early contextualist theories did not explicitly express 
their account in conversational terms but, as DeRose recognises, the 
primary support for contextualism necessarily comes from ‗how 
―knows‖ and its cognates are utilized in non-philosophical conversa-
tion.‘ (DeRose 2002, p. 168) In other words, it appears almost 
unavoidable that any contextualist theory will depend on conversation-
al usage of the concept of knowledge. 
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For any comprehensive theory of knowledge, I would suggest, the 
meaning of ‗knowledge‘ – and precisely whether its character and/or 
content are variable – must be articulated. Without such a definition 
we have an incomplete picture of how statements, assertions, and 
knowledge attributions are used. (Wittgenstein 1953, para. 43) However, 
this articulation will be revealed in our linguistic accounts of knowledge 
and it seems that the only accessible meaning that can be given to 
‗knowledge‘ is with respect to knowledge attributions. There is no 
other way to access ‗knowledge‘ other than through knowledge 
attributions. One does not experience ‗knowledge‘ in the same way that 
one experiences pain, visual stimuli, and immediate experience. I 
cannot report the sensation of knowing. Instead, our access to it comes 
through our articulation of the concept, our use of it in assertion and 
attribution.   
 
DeRose acknowledges the objection that his conception of 
‗contextualism‘ is a theory of language not epistemology but does not 
see this as necessarily deleterious to the importance of the theory. 
(DeRose 1999b, p. 188) DeRose‘s response to the charge that his is a 
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linguistic theory seems accurate but weak (although he hints that others 
could be made). He argues that, if it is a theory about language, then 
this does not detract from the significant importance it will have on 
any theory about knowledge. DeRose points out that those who work 
on the problem of free will and determinism, for example, should be 
very interested in the issue of what it means to call an action ‗free‘. 
 
However, they would not reduce their theory merely to equivocations 
over linguistic meaning. DeRose seems to accept a lesser role for his 
theory as a guide for bigger epistemological questions but that seems to 
underplay the relevance of the meaning of terms to the study of 
concepts. He accepts the accusation that all his theory can tell us is 
how we use words and he may then use these conclusions to shed light 
on our theory of the real thing. But unless we think that knowledge is 
something that exists out there in the world independently of society and 
our human language, there does not seem to be reason to think there is 
much more to shed light upon. Instead, we can present an entirely 
linguistic account of knowledge and, at the same time, understand it as 
a functional concept within particular communities. Analytically – that 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   156 
 
is, when it comes to empirical investigation – one cannot properly 
detach ―knowledge‖ from its conversational context.  
 
For Jonathan Schaffer, the central dispute is over the interpretation of 
―knowledge,‖ specifically whether it is considered an absolute or 
contextually variable term. Schaffer considers the issue a straight 
dispute between the skeptic – who argues that ‗knowledge‘ is an 
absolute term – and the contextualist – who argues that it is a 
relationally absolute term. (Schaffer 2004) The task for epistemologists 
is therefore to determine which of these provides the better 
hypothesis. Peter Unger defines ―knowledge‖ as belonging to a 
category of ‗absolute concepts‘. (Unger 1975) This includes terms such 
as ‗flatness‘ or ‗emptiness‘ which are ‗absolute‘ in the sense that they do 
not admit of degree: an object is either flat or it is not. It does not 
make sense, for instance, to talk of a person knowing that the sky is 
blue better than someone else. Admittedly there is a sense in which we 
might say that someone knows better than someone else. We might 
say, for example, ‗Nobody knew the seas around the Cape of Good 
Hope better than Ferdinand Magellan.‘ Here we are making an 
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assertion about someone‘s general knowledge on a subject. We are 
stating that they have more, or more quality, knowledge on the subject 
than anyone else. This is a common use of ‗knowledge‘ but it is 
sufficiently exceptional for us not to be distracted by it here. If pushed, 
we might say that this is a shorthand for expressing that someone has 
more knowledge about something or that they have knowledge which 
is of a higher quality. 
 
Unger points out that nothing is ever absolutely flat or empty just as 
one never obtains absolute knowledge (i.e. certainty). A road may be 
called flat but it still contains bumps and ridges. A fridge may be called 
empty but it still contains water droplets and plastic trays. Dretske 
(1981a) and Lewis (1979) both argue that Unger‘s alleged ‗absolute 
terms‘ should properly be understood as ‗relationally absolute terms.‘ 
That is, that knowledge is absolute in relation to a range of contexts. 
Thus, absolute knowledge is obtainable in one context but there is no 
real context-independent absolute context. Dretske feels justified in his 
rejection of Unger‘s classification as ‗to be empty is to be devoid of all 
relevant things.‘ (Dretske 1981b, p. 367) 
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In his attempt to answer the skeptic, DeRose constructs a linguistic 
account of knowledge where the term ‗knowledge‘ is to be understood 
as an indexical. Broadly, this stipulates that the term has two aspects: a 
fixed character and a non-fixed content. (Kaplan 1989) For example, 
the word ‗I‘ has a fixed character (or sense or meaning) in that in each 
mention of it, the word refers to the speaker. These are the rules or 
conventions that govern the use of the word. The content (or 
‗propositional component expressed by‘ or ‗referent‘) of the word, 
however, is non-fixed in that it may fluctuate depending on who the 
speaker is. Similarly, according to DeRose, ‗knows‘ has a fixed 
character – true belief – and a non-fixed content depending on the 
context expressed by the following: S is able to track the truth of p through 
a set of relevant possible worlds. By extension, the meaning of complex 
lexical terms, such as ‗S knows that it is raining‘ are also context-
sensitive. DeRose claims that the truth-conditions for all knowledge-
attributing and knowledge-denying sentences can vary according to the 
context in which they are used. He maintains that what varies is the 
epistemic standards that S is required to meet (or fail to meet) in order 
for such a statement to be true. (DeRose 1999a) 
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3.2.4 Meaning and reference 
We have seen in this chapter that e-communitarianism rejects all forms 
of globalism about justification; foundationalism; and the ‗universal 
pretensions‘ of Rawlsian agents and thought experiments. In this sense, 
it can be described as a relativist programme. We have also seen that 
Kusch adopts a semantic approach to epistemology: he is concerned 
with the meaning of the terms ‗knowledge‘, ‗knows‘, ‗knower‘, etc. In 
§3.1 ‗knows‘ was claimed to refer to the social status of an agent. In 
§3.2.3 and §3.2.4, we discussed a theory of knowledge attribution 
where ‗knows‘ is considered an indexical. There are however, once 
again, subtle differences in which Kusch appears to distance himself 
from the orthodox SP account. In this section I argue that we should 
consider the use of ‗knows‘ (and cognates) in language as relevant to 
our study of it. 
 
First I would like to introduce a particular approach to meaning. Here 
is Alice Carroll‘s character Humpty Dumpty‘s take on meaning, 
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‗I don‘t know what you mean by ―glory‖,‘ Alice said.  
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‗Of course you don‘t – till I 
tell you. I meant ―there‘s a nice knock-down argument for you!‖‘  
‗But ―glory‖ doesn‘t mean ―a nice knock-down argument‖,‘ Alice 
objected.  
‗When I use a word,‘ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‗it 
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.‘  
‗The question is,‘ said Alice, ‗whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.‘  
‗The question is,‘ said Humpty Dumpty, ‗which is to be master – that‘s 
all.‘ (Carroll 2012, p. 123) 
 
Most people, I am assuming, find Humpty Dumpty‘s pronouncements 
absurd. We might formulate a widely-held intuition about meaning 
thus,  
The meaning of a word does not depend on what I decide, at this 
moment, that it means. 
 
 If I decide now that ‗lion‘ refers to, say, tigers I have not changed the 
meaning of ‗lion‘ one iota. My use of the word would be viewed by 
others as incorrect: perhaps I am wrong about what ‗lion‘ means, or 
perhaps they might think that I am trying to deceive them. But what 
makes such use wrong or deceptive?  Extensional semantics is the view 
that a term‘s extension - the ‗set of things of which it is true‘ (Barnes 
1982, p. 31) - constitutes its meaning. On this account, there exists, in 
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advance of any particular application of a term, an extension, which 
determines whether or not that application is correct. The extension of 
‗lion‘ is all the lions in the world that have been, are, and will ever be. 
Note that this view is compatible with social as well as non-social 
theories of meaning. 
 
What it does commit one to is the view that, once the extension of a 
term is fixed - whether individually or collectively - then it follows 
from this that some applications will be correct and some will be 
incorrect. Once the meaning of ‗lion‘, say, is fixed, this divides the 
entire infinite universe of entities that have been or may be 
encountered into two sets: entities that may be correctly referred to as 
lions and entities that may not be so referred; green entities and entities 
that are not green; solutes and substances that are not soluble. In other 
words, it divides the world into a set of entities of which the 
application of the term is true, and a set of which it is false. This is not 
to say that the meaning of words cannot change. Of course, they can 
and do. It is, however, to say that at any particular given time there is a 
determinate, fixed meaning. 
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Whilst being an intuitively plausible theory of meaning, it leads to some 
undesirable conclusions. Suppose that the meaning of ‗knows‘ is 
determinate in this way. That is, at any time, t, there is a set of 
propositions of which it is true to say that S knows, and a set of 
propositions of which it is false to say that S knows. If we think of 
knowledge as a social kind this is problematic. It would mean that our 
social institution is structured in such a way that it neatly divides all 
propositions into those that are known and those that are not known. 
Considering that there are a near-infinite number of propositions 
which may be known, this seems wholly implausible. It would, at the 
very least, be extremely convenient if we had evolved an institution 
that could do this. It is much more likely that whether it is appropriate 
to say that someone knows something is not determined in advance 
but is a feature of their utterance within a particular context that comes 
into play when the assertion is made.  
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If we agree with the semantic contextualist approach we can apply this 
to our understanding of knowledge. Hence, knowledge is not a fixed, 
absolute term which, once its character is determined, cannot be 
altered. Instead it is a term with specific meanings that have evolved 
within particular communities. This explains why knowledge may have 
a meaning in engineering quite different from that used in everyday life 
and why it can have a different meaning in one community that is not 
compatible with another. 
 
Consider the following case, 
 
New Tribe Case 
Kent is an anthropologist who has been staying with a newly discovered 
tribe in the Indian Ocean. He has been observing their behaviour and 
practices and thinks he may have seen the tribe performing religious 
rituals and ceremonies. He sends a message back to his research team 
that, ‗I now know that the tribe practice religious rituals and ceremony.‘ 
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Let us suppose that the meaning of religious ritual and religious 
ceremony is something that is constructed by the community rather 
than from outside pressure of some sort. That is, religious rituals, for 
example, do not exist out there in the world prior to our performing and 
deciding that such and such behaviour would constitute a religious 
ritual. It does not seem at all fanciful in this case to suggest that Kent 
could not possibly know in advance of his observations whether the 
tribe practised religious ritual, not just because he had not yet observed 
any putative ritualistic behaviour but because the meaning of ‗religious 
ritual‘ within that community is being produced by the behaviour itself 
and by others taking that behaviour to be a religious ritual. If we have 
indeterminacy in the case of religious ritual – a social kind – then we 
also have it in the case of knowledge attribution. If that does not sound 
plausible, consider another (real) case, 
 
Odd Mammal Case 
It is the 18th century and a team of British zoologists are presented with 
a new animal which they have never seen before. It looks extremely odd 
– something between a duck and an otter. It looked like a mammal with 
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its beaver-like tail and otter-like feet, but it also lay eggs and had a bill 
like a duck. The zoologists are convinced the animal is an elaborate 
hoax created, perhaps, by Chinese taxidermists who are well-known for 
expertly stitching together animal parts.  
 
It was later discovered, of course, that what we now know as a 
platypus is real and not a taxidermic chimera. Imagine the first scientist 
to christen the platypus. It does not make sense to think that he knew 
that the animal was a platypus. Nor does it seem justified for the 
second person, who was told by the first scientist that the animal is a 
platypus, to assert that they know that the animal is a platypus. After 
all, precisely what ‗platypus‘ refers to is contentious and in the midst of 
formation. By comparison, one might think of how many ascriptions 
of the word ‗quark‘ to particular phenomena created by hadrons had to 
be made before we could correctly say that anyone knew that such and 
such a phenomena was the effect of quarks.  
 
Whether one thinks of knowledge as a social kind – such as a religious 
ceremony – or a natural kind – such as a platypus and a quark – it 
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would seem that there is always an initial stage of indeterminacy 
around whether we are correct to use such and such a term to refer to 
such and such an object or event. If it becomes more stable and 
definite precisely what the term refers to then this is because of the 
hundreds and thousands of previous references that combine to make 
up proper use of the term. It would not be possible for a single 
individual utterance to overturn these thousands of uses and this is 
why the use has the appearance of determinacy. 
 
The same applies to ascriptions of terms to objects as with ascriptions 
of knowledge to subjects. ‗Knowledge‘, in ordinary settings such as 
those in the bank cases and the airport case, is a term whose proper 
use has been formed over countless utterances and so this gives the 
appearance that there should be determinate rules in place before any 
particular utterance that determine whether, say, DeRose and Kent are 
correct in their knowledge ascriptions. (§3.25) In fact, it is not 
determinate but highly-determinable. That is, one can say with a high 
degree of confidence what the conditions are given the large bank of 
previous instances contributing to proper use, even though this 
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assertion cannot ever by true since for it to be true would require one 
to know in advance what the utterance was going to be and what effect 
that utterance would have on the proper use of the term.51 
3.2.5 Conclusions on communitarian and contextualist 
epistemology 
 
Gettier‘s paper purported to demonstrate that a widely-accepted 
definition of propositional knowledge is susceptible to a range of 
counter-examples. It had been assumed by many that propositional 
knowledge required three conditions to be met: a truth-condition, a 
belief-condition, and a justification-condition. Accordingly, knowledge 
requires that an agent possesses a belief in the proposition, reasons or 
adequate justification for believing the proposition, and the 
proposition must be true. Indeed, it does seem odd to characterize 
knowledge as being false, not believed, and lacking adequate 
                                                          
51 Remember that some single utterances can dramatically change the proper use of a term. Some 
historians, for example, attribute Marco Polo’s use of the word ‘Madagascar’ to refer to the 
African island rather than a part of the mainland to have changed the general meaning of the 
term. (Evans 1973; Kripke 1980) 
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justification. However, §3.1 discusses an account of knowledge that is 
not dependent on knowledge being true or, rather, given Haddock‘s 
refinements, does not require us to answer that question within the 
approach I am taking here. 
 
In the first section of this chapter we discussed Martin Kusch‘s e-
communitarianism, its historical roots in the Strong Programme in the 
sociology of knowledge and in political communitarianism. I presented 
a number of issues arising from the book that are relevant to my thesis: 
the ontology of knowledge or what kind of thing knowledge is; and the 
distinction between natural, social, and artificial kinds. The second 
section compared e-communitarianism with contextualism. I discussed 
the role of semantics in contextualism and its putative solutions to the 
skeptical problem. 
 
We can conclude by saying that semantic theories are critical to 
epistemology and not a side-issue that might illuminate the ‗true nature‘ 
of knowledge. Knowledge is, after all, not obviously a phenomenon 
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that exists in the world but is a feature of language: we attribute it to 
others, claim it for ourselves, and argue over who has it and what it is 
that is known. Semantic theories are useful for this kind of phenomena 
as it provides a method for analyzing the use of terms and their place 
in social structures. In the next chapter I will look more closely at one 
kind of social structure or, to put it more precisely, a kind of 
sociotechnical structure. That is, structures and institutions which 
generate knowledge through the machinations of people and technical 
artefacts. The semantic approach is very useful for explaining not just 
how we can have various kinds of knowledge in different communities 
but also how the proper function of a tool can similarly evolve (see 
§4.2.7 and §5.2). In Ch. 4 I discuss what kinds of thing technical 
artefacts are and suggest that a communitarian approach will be the 
most fruitful in illuminating their various aspects. 
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Chapter 4 
The collectivist and dual nature accounts of 
technical artefacts 
4.1 The continuity of philosophy, science, and 
engineering 
 
There are not two (or five or seven) fundamental ontological categories, 
rather the act of categorization itself is always interest relative. (Searle 
2002, p. 59) 
 
How does it happen that a properly endowed natural scientist comes to 
concern himself with epistemology? Is there no more valuable work in 
his specialty? I hear many of my colleagues saying, and I sense it from 
many more, that they feel this way. I cannot share this sentiment… 
Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such 
an authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them 
as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as ―necessities of 
thought,‖ ―a priori givens,‖ etc. The path of scientific advance is often 
made impassable for a long time through such errors. For that reason, it 
is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing the 
long commonplace concepts and exhibiting those circumstances upon 
which their justification and usefulness depend, how they have grown 
up, individually, out of the givens of experience. (Einstein 1916, p. 101-
102) 
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It is little more than a platitude to note the ubiquity of technology in 
everyday life.52 What is perhaps even more platitudinous would be to 
note the ubiquity of technical artefacts in knowledge production. In 
fact, almost every area of inquiry that we use today – particularly 
inquiry that expands our common knowledge – is sociotechnical. That 
is, it involves the generation of collective technical knowledge. This is 
knowledge produced not with individual unaided human minds but 
with technically-enhanced human minds. And yet epistemology, for the 
very most part, studies only the unaided minds and treats the technical 
aspect as unimportant, unnoticed, or worse, uninteresting. 
 
This is a chapter about the kinds of things that populate our world and 
how they affect our knowledge attributions. In particular, I argue that 
technical artefacts are a kind of thing in the same way that natural 
things such as water or vitamins are generally taken to be things that 
populate our world. In other words, technical artefacts are ‗genuine 
                                                          
52 Parts of this chapter are adapted from Kerr 2013. 
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substances‘. (Baker 2008, p. 3-4). There are a number of theories which 
have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to establish technical 
artefacts as ontologically significant. In this chapter I focus on two 
competing theories in the metaphysics of technical artefacts: the Dual 
Nature of Technical Artefacts (DNA) and the Collectivist Account of 
Technical Artefacts (CAT). I argue on behalf of the latter being the 
most fruitful of the two theories although the two have several 
elements in common as well as differences.  
 
Here is a fairly typical statement from the philosophical literature on 
natural kinds. 
 
Scientific disciplines divide the particulars they study into kinds and 
theorize about those kinds. To say that a kind is natural is to say that it 
corresponds to a grouping or ordering that does not depend on 
humans. We tend to assume that science is successful in revealing these 
kinds; it is a corollary of scientific realism that when all goes well the 
classifications and taxonomies employed by science correspond to the 
real kinds in nature. (Bird & Tobin 2008) 
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Different scientific disciplines may be accorded different privileges 
with respect to dictating what kinds are real. Chemistry may be taken 
to supply paradigmatic examples of natural kinds – chemical elements, 
compounds, and so on. Physics and astronomy may be second in line 
providing such kinds as electrons, quarks, and red dwarves. 
Taxonomies in biology were once taken to be paradigmatic but are 
now generally thought not to represent natural kinds.53 Nevertheless, it 
would be inconceivable that, were science to discover a fault in its own 
classificatory systems, that this would not force a change in 
philosophical ontology. It is inconceivable, for example, that 
metaphysicians would continue their ‗essentialist‘ talk about species 
following the advent of Darwin‘s theory of evolution. (Dupré 1993, p. 
3; Okasha 2002, p. 191)  
 
Similarly, quantum physics forced changes in certain metaphysical 
theories such as determinism (de Koninck 2008) and the philosophy of 
space and time has been brought through paradigm shifts with 
                                                          
53 Seminal works by Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) refer to biological kinds as natural kinds 
although more recent work has challenged this. (Dupré 1993; Sober 1994, p. 163) 
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Newton, Mach, and then Einstein. (Whitrow 1980) The continuity of 
philosophy and science – the idea that philosophy ought to heed the 
results of empirical investigation in the natural sciences – has become 
orthodox, albeit a controversial orthodoxy, in contemporary analytic 
philosophy of science. Following this line of thought, philosophers of 
technology might say that if the natural sciences should inform the 
ontology of natural kinds, the engineering sciences should inform the 
ontology of artificial kinds.54 That is to say, the privilege which 
scientists have enjoyed when it comes to classifying what Mario Bunge 
(1977) and David Bloor (2007) have metaphorically called the 
‗furniture of the world‘ – its basic constituents; what classificatory 
systems refer to – should also be accorded to engineers when it comes 
to classifying the actual furniture of the world – its made, or otherwise 
artificial, objects. If we accepts this thesis, then the purposes of this 
paper should be clear: to ascertain what kinds of entities engineers do 
posit with a view to including them in our ontological framework.  
 
                                                          
54 The view that engineers are in a position of authority with respect to the nature and our 
knowledge of artificial kinds (or, alternatively, technical artefacts) has been proffered by 
Garbacz 2012; Layton (1974); and Vincenti (1990). 
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Despite what I have said above, that there is a distinction at all 
between natural and artificial things has recently been called into 
question. (Baker 2008; Pitt 2011; Preston 2008; Thomasson 2008) 
Others have argued for the stronger position that not only are artificial 
things not significantly distinct from natural things but they do not 
really exist at all. (Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997, p. 173) Lynne Rudder 
Baker cites digital organisms, robo-rats, bacterial batteries, and ‗search-
and-destroy‘ viruses as technological advances that blur the ontological 
distinction between natural and artificial kinds. (Baker 2008, p. 2)  
 
However, as has been pointed out elsewhere, the blurred line between 
the natural and the artificial is not a consequence of modern 
technology, as these state-of-the-art examples might indicate, but has 
been present for at least as long as technology itself: as long as, for 
instance, the domestication of cattle or the agricultural cultivation of 
land and crops. (Preston 2008) Synthetically-created chemical 
compounds, genetically-modified foodstuffs, and many other things 
could cause us problems if we were to draw a fine line between natural 
and artificial things. What this suggests is that the distinction between 
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the natural and the artificial has been problematic for a long time. 
Baker predicts that the distinction that is drawn between natural and 
artificial kinds on the basis of their mind-dependence or mind-
independence (that is, in some sense, that the former do not depend 
on human minds whereas the latter invariably do) will continue to be 
eroded by future technological advances. (Baker 2004, p. 15; 2008, p. 5)  
 
One normative constraint that is placed on putative distinctions which 
is often elided by philosophers interested in formal definitions is that 
they are useful. In other words, classifications are, on this understand-
ing, interest relative. (Searle 2002, p. 59) We carve nature at various 
joints to suit our purposes of inquiry, knowledge expansion, and, in the 
case of engineering, to reshape our environment to better suit our 
needs. They are also profession-relative. That is, as Ian Hacking puts it, 
‗some kinds are essential to some crafts.‘ (Hacking 1991a, p. 123) 
Hacking‘s argument is that we should not expect one particular taxa, 
which has been formed historically to suit particular theoretical and 
experimental needs in one subject, to also be an excellent model for 
other fields of inquiry. None of this should be read as implying that the 
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physics taxa or the biological taxa are the real taxa whilst the 
engineering taxa are not of, in Baker‘s terms, ‗genuine substances‘. 
(Baker 2008, p. 3-4) Rather, we place certain authority on expert 
classifiers and these professional taxonomies ought to be continuous 
with, or at least inform philosophical ontology. In the following 
sections I will describe a theory of classificatory practices that is 
particularly suited to empirically analyze reference practices to technical 
artefacts within the engineering professions and the results of which 
should be taken into account in discussions of the ontology of 
technical artefacts. 
 
Instead of being considered worthy of attention in itself, it has often 
been assumed that technology aids various kinds of knowledge 
acquisition in a supporting role only. As we saw with the ‗applied 
science‘ model of engineering in §2.3.2, technology and engineering are 
often not considered distinct fields of inquiry and areas of epistemo-
logical import in the way that science has been. That is, the technology 
itself has taken the role of the archetypal ‗lab assistant‘ whose 
contribution is to bring supplies to the real ‗brains‘ or hand the 
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scientists what they need in order to produce knowledge. The job 
could not be done without the technician, but what she does is 
transparent and uninteresting. I wish to demonstrate that this picture is 
as inaccurate for the role that technical artefacts play in our epistemic 
practices as it is for the role that technicians play in scientific practices. 
Artefacts are not merely conduits for knowledge to simply pass 
through but shape knowledge and it is only through looking at what 
the artefacts are doing and what they are that we can understand the 
knowledge that is produced with them.  
 
4.1.1 The ontology of technical artefacts 
 
There are several ways in which we might build an ontology of 
technical artefacts. We could list examples of what is meant by 
‗technical artefact‘ – scissors, computers, microscopes, pianos. One 
might suggest that these are instruments or tools for accomplishing 
some goal; that they are means to ends. Perhaps this is a good 
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definition of a technical artefact. The problem is that it appears to 
open the net too widely as a great deal of things can be said to be 
means to ends or tools for accomplishing goals. My preparatory school 
entrance exam was a means to entering a University programme. 
However, if I were to call it a ‗tool‘ I would be speaking figuratively. If 
I walk into the woods and use a tree branch to overturn a large stone 
we could say that my using the branch was a means to an end: 
overturning the stone. However, again, it sounds odd or metaphorical 
to call the branch a ‗tool‘ or a ‗technical artefact‘. It is, at most, being 
used as a tool but is not itself a tool. Tree branches are natural objects 
that exist independently of us whilst tools are, typically, objects which 
we create. 
 
Crows, which remarkably are better at using natural objects as tools 
than most primates, will bend wire into hooks to access food and 
Woodpecker finches will use sticks to wheedle out a grub. (Bluff et al. 
2010; Shumaker et al. 2011) However it sounds odd to describe the 
length of wire used by the crow as a ‗tool‘ in anything but a 
metaphorical sense. (See §4.2.6) There are a number of intuitive 
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reasons why these examples do not constitute tool use. At first glance, 
in order for something to be a tool it must have been designed for a 
specific purpose by a designer with a community of users in mind who 
use the tool in an appropriate way. It must also have some physical 
presence and be structured in such and such a way within limits. 
However, these reasons are based on intuitions and a more systematic, 
empirical approach is needed. 
 
4.1.2 The dual nature of technical artefacts 
 
The Dual Nature Thesis of Technical Artefacts (DNA) is a thesis 
about the epistemology and ontology of technical artefacts. This 
research comprises one of the few systematic, analytic approaches to 
technical artefacts. (See, e.g., Kroes & Meijers 2002, 2006; Houkes & 
Meijers 2006; and Houkes & Vermaas 2004) DNA stipulates that 
technical artefacts have two components: a structural, physical 
component and an intentional, social component. The guiding 
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intuition is that we routinely describe the world in terms of two basic 
conceptualizations, 
 
 a world of physical objects interacting through causal connections, 
which we describe by means of the concepts of the natural sciences 
(e.g. position, velocity, spatial dimension, and other physical magni-
tudes). 
 a world of agents, which we describe by means of intentional 
concepts (e.g. thoughts, wishes, belief, will, and effort). 
 
There is, of course, a long-standing problem in philosophy over how 
these two descriptions relate to each other which DNA does not 
directly aim to resolve.55 The research project started as a joint 
programme between three Dutch technical universities (Delft 
University of Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, and 
the University of Twente), and three U.S. universities (University of 
                                                          
55 It parallels, for instance, the mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind. 
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Buffalo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Virginia Tech) at 
the beginning of the third millennium. It has since produced a large 
amount of theoretical and empirical research into engineering practice 
and described an analytic approach to the philosophy of technology 
and engineering which is sorely lacking. This work includes treatises on 
the nature of design (Houkes, Vermaas, Dorst & de Vries 2002); 
function and planning in engineering (Vermaas & Houkes 2002, 2003, 
and 2004; Houkes 2006; Franssen 2006; Vermaas 2006); research into 
engineering knowledge and practice; and an ontological framework 
which respects the place and significance of technical artefacts (see the 
special issue of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 2006 vol. 37, 
especially Houkes & Meijers 2006 and L. R. Baker 2006).  
 
Following from this research, we might propose the following five-fold 
necessary criteria for a technical artefact: 
 
a) Physical: has a structural (physical) component; 
b) Social: has an intentional (social) component; 
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c) Design: is purposefully designed; 
d) Function: is designed for a correct, proper or appropriate function; 
and 
e) Normative: its use is constrained by normative factors 
 
In summary, technical artefacts are physical objects that are described 
by physical concepts (e.g. the transistor has a length of 10mm) and by 
intentional concepts (e.g. the transistor has the function of amplifying 
electronic signals). These conceptualizations are indispensable for fully 
describing technical artefacts. If an artefact is described by only 
physical concepts, it is usually unclear what functions it has, and if it is 
described only functionally, it is usually unclear what physical 
properties it has. The artefact must also be designed for a particular 
function depending on normative considerations (e.g. the electric kettle 
is designed for boiling water for domestic use and has an overload cut-
out switch for reasons of safety). 
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It should be clear from this that technical artefacts are not simply 
physical objects. They are not known purely through ‗reading off‘ their 
empirical characteristics. (See §3.1.5) One cannot know, for example, 
what a turbine engine is simply by listening to a description of its 
physical characteristics.56 This would suggest that artefacts are a kind of 
social thing. (Barnes 1983) However, neither are artefacts known 
purely through social, normative, functional properties since the 
realization of their function depends crucially on their physical 
structure (unlike, for example, money, which serves the same function 
in a number of different physical forms).  
 
4.1.3 DNA and technical knowledge 
 
Houkes outlines the DNA approach to knowledge of technical 
artefacts (technical knowledge). (Houkes 2006) He claims that 
                                                          
56 Although it is not possible to work this out simply on the basis of a description of physical 
characteristics, one may be able to work out the social, functional and design aspect of an 
artefact through an understanding of particular cultures, histories, needs, requirements, 
predilections, the function of other similar artefacts, and so on. This is done frequently in 
archaeology and reverse engineering as discussed in Vaesen and van Amerongen 2008. 
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knowledge of the function of an artefact is not provided exclusively by 
beliefs about its physical characteristics but is primarily provided by 
what he calls ‗know-how related to its use.‘ (Houkes 2006, p. 102) 
Second, knowledge of the proper function of an artefact is ‗primarily 
based on testimony and a social division of labour with respect to 
rational artefact use.‘ (Houkes 2006, p. 102) Knowledge of artefact 
functions includes, for example, knowing that a tin opener is for 
opening tins; a computer technician‘s knowledge of how to recover 
damaged data from a hard-disk drive; the proposition ‗S knows which 
wire is earth,‘ and so on. He states that knowledge of artefact functions 
may be expressed thus, 
 
[T]he best evidence for the claim that an artefact can be used to f, or has 
the possible function to f, is that you have use know-how, that is, that 
you know how to use it to f successfully. (Houkes 2006, p. 103) 
 
Use know-how has three distinctive components: 
i. Not only observation of physical characteristics, including 
dispositions. 
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ii. ‗Procedural knowledge‘ that a sequence of actions leads to the 
realization of a goal. 
iii. ‗Operational knowledge‘ (skills) needed to take these actions. 
 
In summary, use know-how is knowledge of functions and other non-
physical properties as well as the relevant physical characteristics; 
knowledge that executing a use plan for the artefact in a certain range 
of circumstances and employing a set of skills and auxiliary items 
realizes the goal state of the plan; and/or operational knowledge or the 
requisite skill to perform the actions in the use plan. 57 Procedural and 
operational knowledge are often complementary. Typically, use know-
how is based on both and only in special cases on either one alone. 
Houkes wishes to make a general epistemic claim about how we 
acquire knowledge but for our purposes here it is enough to note that 
in almost all cases users acquire use know-how from sources beyond 
                                                          
57  That is, a ‗use-plan.‘ (Houkes & Vermaas, 2004) ‗That a bicycle can be used for cycling may 
to some extent be explained by appealing to the mechanical principles on which its use plan is 
based, but actually showing someone how to ride a bicycle may be a necessity rather than a 
merely convenient alternative.‘ (Houkes 2006, p. 105) It has also been shown that Galileo was 
able to prevent others from replicating his experiments by withholding information about how to 
carry out the experiment and that replication of Boyle‘s experiments with the air-pump depended 
on the replicant directly witnessing the experiment and not in his published accounts. (Biagioli 
2000; and Shapin & Schaffer 1985, p. 225-82) 
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their personal experience and set of beliefs. It would be an enormous 
amount of personal work to consistently do otherwise. Hence, social 
knowledge is the norm when it comes to use know-how. 
 
Much of the work done by DNA researchers involves describing the 
apparent tensions between our knowledge of the empirical characteris-
tics of an object and our social use know-how. However, these 
problems are created from conceptualizing this dual nature as 
analytically separate. This misrepresents how we come to acquire use 
know-how. We do not acquire use know-how, for instance, from first 
encountering the physical structure and then learning or deducing the 
artefact‘s function or use plan. Rather, knowledge of both are acquired 
co-temporally. Compare this with the way that a child will not first 
learn that an arm is a long cylindrical part of their body and then learn 
how to use it to pick up objects but will learn both the physical 
features of the arm and how it is used together. In the next section I 
introduce what may be seen as a tweak to the general DNA approach 
which I‘ve called the Collectivist Account of Technical Artefacts 
(CAT). This account aims also to deliver epistemological and 
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ontological respect for technical artefacts but does not require the 
dualism of the DNA.  
 
We have discussed how DNA conceives of the world as given by two 
kinds of description: one using physical concepts and one using social 
or personal concepts. Most readily, this duality calls to mind the 
Cartesian dualism of mind and body. This correlation between how we 
conceive of ourselves and how we conceive of our technology should 
not be surprising. Recent work in cognitive science indicates that 
complex tool use is accomplished in macaque monkey brains by 
treating the tool as simply an extension of existing limbs and capacities. 
(Rizzolatti et al. 2002; Johnson-Frey 2004) Thus, when we use a tool, it 
may be that our brains learn that the tool is a kind of arm or hand 
which is connected to us and belongs to our bodies. In the study, 
monkeys were given three tasks involving grasping for food: one where 
a set of pliers is used, one where a set of reverse pliers is used—pliers 
which require the user to ‗open‘ their hand grasp in order to grasp with 
the pliers, and one where only the hand is used). In all three tasks, the 
same sequence of neuron-firings was observed within the monkey 
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brains. This suggests that the way we conceptualize technical artefacts 
is often very similar to the way we conceptualize our own bodies. If, 
further, we acknowledge what is now common knowledge amongst 
cognitive scientists – that minds are embodied things – we might 
conclude that the project to separate physical and intentional 
descriptions is somewhat moot. A better account would include both 
these descriptions within an extended system of tool-plus-body-plus-
mind. This is what CAT aims to do. 
 
4.1.4 The collectivist account of technical artefacts 
 
Before outlining CAT, we must answer a recent objection to the 
category of ‗artificial‘ as marking a distinctive kind of thing. As stated 
earlier in this chapter, recent work on the ontology of technical 
artefacts has staked a claim for the ‗shrinking difference between 
artefacts and natural objects.‘ (Baker 2008; Preston 2008) Criticisms of 
long-standing distinctions are commonplace in philosophy and often 
have argumentative support. However, in this case, and specifically in 
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engineering, I wish to argue that the distinction does have heuristic 
value and it is this value that is often omitted from philosophical 
arguments which find counter-examples to the distinction and, on this 
basis, conclude that the distinction is invalid. In the following sections 
I outline the collectivist account; its distinction between natural, social, 
and artificial kinds; its merits and demerits. In Ch. 5 I show that this 
distinction is very useful within petroleum engineering. Whether or not 
there are counter-examples in some domains is not a knock-down 
argument to whether or not there are contexts in which the distinction 
is valid, properly used, and heuristically valuable. The case study 
demonstrates how – beyond the intuitive way in which we might divide 
natural, social, and artificial classes – the uses of ‗tool‘ are quite specific 
to particular kinds of objects. This warrants classifying them as 
particular kinds of things which cannot be reduced to either natural or 
social categories or subsumed beneath one un-blurred but less useful 
metaphysics. 
 
Instead I draw on the collectivist epistemologies and ontologies of 
Martin Kusch and the Strong Programme outlined in Ch. 3 to describe 
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the dynamic and inseparable manner in which physical and social 
components combine. Instead of two separate components which 
inscrutably and inexplicably hold together, there is a single description 
which constructs or co-produces both components co-temporally and 
co-dependently. The project to somehow separately analyse the two 
components is perhaps the one objection I have to the DNA 
approach. Once this is jettisoned we will have a more robust and 
flexible model of technical artefacts. CAT also places greater emphasis 
on the social, institutional and historical aspects of technical artefacts 
and, with this in mind, §5.1.1, §5.1.2, and §7.2.1 provide historical 
accounts of why tools developed in the form they did and how this 
changed knowledge production. 
 
In §2.2.2 I said that this chapter will argue on behalf of social 
constructivism about ontology. DNA is not a constructivist approach. 
In the following I will outline a method for analysing ontological 
categories as socially-constructed whilst preserving the valuable 
insights of DNA. First of all, we ought to consider what kinds of 
objects we can have knowledge of. It is now widely accepted that there 
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is a conventional aspect to how we classify objects. The ‗arbitrary‘ 
decisions we make to classify this element as a gas and this as a metal is 
partly ‗interest-relative‘ or ‗constructed‘ (Searle, 2002; Smith & Welty 
2001) When thinking about what kinds of objects exist in the world it 
is easy to suppose that these objects belong necessarily to a particular 
group: hydrogen is necessarily a kind of gas as opposed to a kind of 
metal; fruit flies necessarily belong to a group called ‗invertebrates‘ as 
opposed to frogs who necessarily are ‗vertebrates‘. That is, features of 
structures in nature determine as a matter of necessity that hydrogen is 
a gas. However, over time our supposedly necessary classifications 
diversify and change. New and more precise distinctions are made and 
occasionally the whole system of classification changes. This variation 
is a feature not just of our lay classifications of things (such as fences, 
games, and fruit) but of the most precise scientific classifications. It is 
often hard to imagine that scientific classifications are subject to 
change as we change our interpretation of phenomena but all could 
theoretically change if the paradigm in which they are postulated 
changes.58 
                                                          
58 See Kuhn 1962. All scientific classifications, if they have been around for long enough, 
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Classifications can only be made sense of within a structure of 
classification and we call this ontology. By studying rare or extinct 
languages, researchers have illustrated the remarkable diversity in 
ontologies. One example is the Australian aboriginal language, Dyirbal. 
Whenever a Dyribal speaker uses a noun in a sentence, the noun must 
be preceded by a variant of one of four words: bayi, balan, balam, bala. 
These four grammatical categories organize the Dyirbal speaker‘s 
world into four ontological groups: 
 
 Bayi: men, kangaroos, opossums, bats, most snakes, most fishes, 
some birds, most insects, the moon, storms, rainbows, boomerangs, 
some spears, etc. 
 Balan: women, anything connected with water or fire, bandicoots, 
dogs, platypus, echidna, some snakes, some fishes, most birds, fire-
                                                                                                                                     
change and the definition of what set of things they describe mutates just as the definition of 
what set of things are described by ‘game’ changes. The gravitational force, for instance, has 
changed its boundaries and referents significantly from the early formulations of Galileo, through 
Robert Hooke, Isaac Newton, to Albert Einstein. The point is even more stark if one includes the 
physics and astronomy of Aristotle, Plato, Aristarchos (perhaps the first to claim that the Earth 
orbits the Sun), Ptolemy, and so on. 
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flies, scorpions, crickets, the stars, shields, some spears, some trees, 
etc. 
 Balam: all edible fruit and the plants that bear them, tubers, ferns, 
honey, cigarettes, wine, cake, etc. 
 Bala: parts of the body, meat, bees, wind, yam-sticks, some spears, 
most trees, grass, mud, stones, noises, language, etc. (Lakoff 1987, p. 
92) 
 
As Ian Hacking notes, it is difficult for us to know how to interpret the 
‗etc.‘s in passages such as these, although it would be fair to assume 
that the categories seem wholly natural to native speakers. (Lange 2007, 
p. 382) This is because we belong to a culture which has its own, 
different, ontologies which likewise feel wholly natural to us. The more 
we are used to seeing a category used in a definite way, the more it 
seems like a feature of reality and not merely one of our classificatory 
system. Familiarity breeds convention, one might say. Hacking 
concludes that no single taxonomy is privileged by the world (i.e. the 
world does not offer or provide a substantial normative constraint on 
our classificatory systems), but different kinds are natural for different 
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purposes. (Hacking 1991a, 1991b) With different purposes in mind, we 
must take an interest in predicting different facts; recognize different 
contrast classes in explanations; and so on. Different classifications are 
best for induction and explanation. 
 
That no classification is best for all purposes is no mere contingent 
matter. There is no such thing as all properties, Hacking says, so there 
is no such thing as a taxonomy‘s being best for arriving at reliable 
generalizations regarding all properties. Interests must limit the 
relevant properties before there can be a best taxonomy. What 
distinguishes natural kinds is that they characterize kinds about which 
numerous generalizations can be made. (Boyd 1991, Hacking 1991a) 
This is not an anti-realist position though it may be, in Dupré‘s terms, a 
―promiscuous realism‖. (Dupré 1996) Further, you do not need an 
entire grammatical structure of language to create a distinctive 
ontology. As §5.2 demonstrates, professions such as petroleum 
engineering have created their own taxonomy of technical artefacts 
that may or may not be commensurable with taxonomies in the natural 
sciences. 
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One problem with the promiscuous and relativist accounts is the 
possibility of an explosion in the sheer volume of kinds. If ontology is 
always indexed to a community or discipline, then communities and 
disciplines may potentially ‗invent‘ kinds without much constraint from 
non-human factors. This would be an undesirable result for 
philosophers interested in identifying the basic constituents of the 
world. One way to rein in this unconstrained promiscuity is through 
ascribing authority to certain communities or agents. Another is to 
abandon the search altogether. CAT suggests that analysis can be 
conducted at the level of the community and the influence of non-
collective factors will be felt in the practices of that community. Issues 
such as authority and consensus are relevant but issues such as whether 
classifications truly reflect the world are not. This is not to suggest that 
there can be no cross-pollination from one community to another (for 
example, from the classifications of natural scientists to laypersons) but 
it is to suggest that there is no ontology that adequately fits all 
communities. CAT stipulates that these ontologies are created as 
‗working oppositions‘ which are heuristically valuable. (§4.2.5) Whether 
or not they reflect the ‗joints‘ of nature is moot. 
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4.1.5 Reference and referencing practices 
 
CAT analyses technical artefacts from a sociophilosophical perspective 
and takes its inspiration and methodology from theoretical and 
empirical research in SP. The application of SP‘s theory of reference 
and meaning finitism to technical artefacts is drawn from Martin 
Kusch's tripartite ontology of natural, social, and artificial kinds and 
Pablo Schyfter‘s critique of DNA. (Kusch 1999, Schyfter 2009) It 
focuses on practices of reference or what I will call ‗reference-talk‘. 
This is based on a methodological commitment that studying ontology 
is best done by studying reference-talk which contributes to 
classification. As Bloor describes, SP should not be concerned with the 
‗furniture of the world‘ conceived of as basic constituents entirely 
separate from sociological practices such as science and engineering. 
(Bloor 2007) 
 
Absolutist ontologies – those that attempt to define the objects of the 
world separate from sociology – are methodologically unsound in that 
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they can show no systematic method from progressing from intuitive 
hypothesis to the claim that the hypothesis is true absolutely. CAT 
purports, therefore, to offer a better methodology for approaching 
ontological questions; one which approaches the classifications of 
communities as having as stable and ‗foundational‘ a justification as any 
ontology can ever have. Larry Bucciarelli and Peter Kroes have recently 
demonstrated how careful study of the rhetorical output of engineering 
can provide fruitful insights to those interested in classifications of 
entities both inside and outside of the profession. (Bucciarelli 2009; 
Kroes 2010) Recall Barnes‘ distinction between natural kind and social 
kind terms. (§3.1.5) The distinction Kusch makes between three kind 
terms (natural, social and artificial) will be discussed in detail in §4.2. 
Kusch suggests that these three kind terms are distinguishable by virtue 
of the type of references made in conjunction with their use. 
 
To provide a brief summary, consider what would happen to the 
classification ‗rock‘ if we were to cease to use it to refer to objects as 
we currently do. The answer is that ‗rocks‘ (although not so called) will 
continue to exist however we choose to refer to them. Their basic 
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properties are not changed by a change in our referencing practices. 
These are natural kind terms. On the other hand, a social kind term 
such as ‗marriage‘ depends entirely on our continuing to refer to it in a 
particular way. If we all ceased to treat the couple next door as 
‗married‘ then they would quite simply cease to be married. Likewise, 
we can destroy certain physical markers of marriage – wedding rings, 
signed documents – and yet the marriage endures. Artificial kind terms 
are of particular interest to Kusch and CAT researchers because they 
appear to contain qualities of both these types of kind term. In one 
sense, a pair of scissors does not vanish if we stop talking about it (the 
object will still exist in space-time). But in another sense it no longer 
seems to have many of the basic properties it once had and needs to 
have in order to be a pair of scissors. Something is lost when we stop 
treating an artefact as an artefact and CAT researchers believe that we 
can gain insight into what is lost by examining the community of users 
that take it to be an artefact. 
 
The distinction is designed to be intuitive but empirically accessible. Its 
intuitiveness is exemplified if one considers how frequently the N/S/A 
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distinction appears in innocuous and philosophically light situations: 
Most of us are familiar with the children‘s game ‗rock, paper, scissors‘. 
Here natural, social, and artificial objects are taken to be opposed to 
each other (opposition here means that one object ‗defeats‘ the other 
in the context of the game). Another example is how we tend to think 
of the oil and gas industry. Here, natural kinds are extracted from the 
Earth using artificial kinds to satisfy social kinds (needs). In our case 
we compare acts of taking-to-be with acts of reference. Just how one 
studies reference-talk empirically (and even what an act of reference is), 
however, has been less explicit and so §5.2 offers one example in the 
form of an analysis of the textual output of a particular community and 
the kinds of references made to a key class of objects in this industry: 
tools.  
 
There is, of course, more to reference than writing or talking about 
something (there is gesture, behaviour, signs, signals, and so on). Much 
of the practical or tacit knowledge involved in using and physically 
manipulating a tool, for example, is not encoded even in detailed 
instruction manuals but learnt, as it were, on-the-job. Further, a 
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collectivist account of reference is not so much focused on the 
references of individuals but with how these compare with others 
within the community and with how incompatibilities are ironed out 
and agreement over usage is settled. Remember that correct application 
consists in matching a pattern to a previously established prototype. 
 
The practice of explicitly classifying objects is familiar to many 
engineers. Many companies today employ ‗engineering ontologists‘ 
who are given the specific task of constructing an, often quite blunt, 
system for organizing and ranking objects such as tools within the 
company. These are often arranged according to a type and given serial 
numbers or names which reflect a designed hierarchy. Similarly many 
company manuals and reference documents will contain ordered tables 
of, for instance, what each tool is called and what it does. It is evident 
that such practices have great practical value for the efficient workings 
of a company. The collectivist account hopes to develop engineering 
ontologies based on sociophilosophical work rather than those created 
in systems engineering. (See Garbacz 2012; Vermaas & Garbacz 2009) 
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4.2 The (N/S/A) kind terms distinction 
4.2.1 Artificial kinds 
 
Let us now consider the N/S/A kind terms distinction developed by 
Kusch and Barnes in more detail. Barnes distinguishes natural and 
social kind terms by virtue of the ways in which they are referenced. 
(Barnes 1983) Reference here is conceived quite broadly as the talk or 
behaviour of agents taking an entity to be a certain kind of thing. 
Subsequently, Martin Kusch added a third kind term – artificial – 
whose nature lies between the natural and social, combining as it does 
types of reference from both kinds. It would appear that artificial 
objects are a peculiar type of object in the world of petroleum 
engineering and that there is something specific to them which cannot 
be reduced to either natural or social kind terms. The arguments for 
this are presented in §5.2.  
 
Recall what was said about Barnes‘ natural and social kind terms and 
the non-necessity (contingency) of classification. (§3.1.5, §3.1.7, §4.1.4, 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   203 
 
§4.1.5) Kusch (1997; 1999) presented an augmented version of Barnes‘ 
account that added artificial kind terms to the natural and social. The 
reason for doing this is that artificial kind terms (terms that refer 
mostly to made things) are not wholly identified by their empirical 
characteristics but nor can they be reduced to an entirely social system 
of fiat and consensus. The referent of a social kind term, for Kusch, is 
entirely constituted by the references themselves. Talk (and behaviour 
which takes the referent, R, as an R) actually creates the referent and so, 
in the final analysis, the referent is the talk (and behaviour) itself.  
 
The reference… is, as it were, ‗exhausted‘ by the self-reference. 
(Kusch 1999, p. 245) 
 
Consequently, if the references cease, the referent drops out of the 
ontological framework. Natural kind terms, on the other hand, have an 
‗alter-reference‘. Here the term refers away from the talk towards 
something in the physical world; things that exist independently of the 
talk. There are still central patterns, models, norms, prototypes, 
exemplars, and so on, for what constitutes, say, an igneous rock, and so 
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even natural kind terms have a self-referential collectivist component. 
However, the pattern, etc. is not the thing itself.  
 
Artificial kind terms are odd cases in this framework. ‗Scissors‘, for 
example, does not just refer to talk (and behaviour) about scissors. 
However, nor can they be properly identified solely through reading 
off their empirical characteristics. The term has an alter-reference to 
the physical composition and structure of the object. For example, the 
reference to a gyroscope is partly a reference to a system or community 
in which the gyroscope functions and partly a reference to the physical 
materials that make it up. However, if all we had were these physical 
materials with no function or instrumental component to back it up, 
then we would not, strictly speaking, have gyroscopes (even though we 
would have physical, natural objects which look identical). 
 
One might call to mind the aftermath of the knowledge ‗cull‘ imagined 
by Alasdair MacIntyre in After virtue. (MacIntyre 1984) MacIntyre 
imagines a post-apocalyptic world in which all scientific artefacts and 
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texts are completely or partly destroyed and all that is left of a previous 
scientific culture (ours) is fragments and remnants. None of the 
survivors‘ descendants attempting to piece together the forgotten 
knowledge understands what the things are for. It is this element that is 
missing in an account that describes artefacts without reference to a 
community of users. In order to be more than just a collection of 
useless materials, a technical artefact requires a performative social 
institution referring to the artefact qua artefact. Part of the task of 
collectivist studies is to identify just what ‗referring to an artefact qua 
artefact‘ is: does it involve design, purpose, functionality, instrumentali-
ty, normativity? What do the referencing practices of the community 
reveal about these questions? 
 
4.2.2 A shrinking/blurry distinction? 
 
As I pointed out at the start of this chapter, the blurred line between 
the natural and the artificial is not a consequence of modern 
technology. However, it also seems a persistent distinction across a 
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wide timeframe. There are countless references to this in Western 
culture from Hippocrates‘ distinction between physics and techné, to 
Plato and Aristotle‘s definition of the mimetic arts, to modern science 
and Bacon‘s image of the natural philosopher‘s ‗rape of nature‘. In the 
same way, the natural/social divide pervades much of our contempo-
rary thinking but it is easy to spot tensions: human psychology is a rich 
example with its tug-of-war between so-called natural instincts and 
social conditioning. In petroleum engineering we can picture a 
tripartite world of oil rigs (artificial) extracting hydrocarbons (natural) 
from the Earth (natural) by means of sociotechnical systems (artificial 
and social) to satisfy social needs and demands. 
 
On the other hand, it is not difficult to think of plausible counter-
examples to a sharp dividing line between natural, social and artificial 
kind terms: a rock being used as a crude hammering device; the 
artificial canals of Amsterdam; engineered biological organisms and 
genetically-modified crops. And we have recently witnessed the 
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creation of a ―synthetic‖ cell.59 It is clear that, if there is a divide at all, it 
is a blurred one. Blurriness is only worrying, however, if one rejects the 
picture of classification given above. Since these classifications are 
constructed by our communities, it would be more surprising if they 
did divide the world perfectly into two hemispheres. Blurriness is a 
likely condition of all non-logical oppositions. With this in mind, it is 
important to remember that, although such tensions and imperfections 
may exist, the distinctions and boundaries we invent serve or have 
served a purpose. Recall Hacking‘s platitude that we make concepts for 
a reason (at least in the first place). If there is nothing new about these 
problematic cases there is less reason to suppose that a once useful 
distinction has fallen into desuetude. Most entities, states, events and 
processes do not pose a problem for the N/S/A framework and, 
although some challenges may prove fatal to the framework in the 
future, they retain their current heuristic value. 
 
 
                                                          
59 The New York Times, 21st May 2010, p. 17. 
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4.2.3 Re-engineering the distinction as a working opposition 
 
We should not read the N/S/A distinction as a report on facts about 
how the world is but on facts about how we have often framed how 
we see the world. This is not something that cannot be overturned but 
is what I have termed a ‗working opposition‘. It is important to 
remember that these distinctions are not the way they are because they 
have to be but because we have built them (probably unwittingly) to be 
incompatible. The world does not come ‗pre-carved‘, as Plato had it. 
At least, it requires some effort on our part to decide where to draw 
the boundaries and the question of whether or not it is pre-carved 
serves no immediate practical use. The reason why the British 
discoverers of the platypus had such difficulty believing that such an 
animal could exist was because they could not make it fit into their 
current taxonomy for classifying animals. This taxonomy had worked 
superbly for every animal encountered up to that point and so, they 
reasoned, this alien creature must surely be an artificial invention. Just 
as we decide which kinds of things qualify as mammals and which 
qualify as fish, every other object in our world is (metaphorically) 
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placed into a particular box with its own criteria for entry. Invariably, 
these boxes are multiple with an object going in either one box or 
another depending on the reasons for classification. Plants are living 
organisms which produce energy through photosynthesis whereas 
animals are living organisms which are motile; elements are molecular 
compounds whereas elementary particles are sub-atomic particles that 
do not have a substructure.60  
 
The way in which I propose we look at such distinctions is not as 
logical-binary oppositions but as working oppositions. The activity of 
making distinctions is not meant to preclude counter-examples. It is 
meant to be a useful way to split up referents that are spoken about in 
very different terms. We should not expect all references to be 
reducible to entirely natural, social or artificial descriptions. Working 
oppositions do not comprise an airtight ontology but a pragmatic 
solution to picking objects out of an increasingly populous world – as 
we should expect from the product of communities working over time 
                                                          
60 These particular distinctions I have invented based on my own limited knowledge and, no 
doubt, there are more and less precise distinctions that could be made. 
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to reiterate and evolve classifications. Nevertheless, I hope to 
demonstrate that there is uniformity in artificial kind term use which is 
markedly opposed to typical natural and social kind references. 
4.2.4 Virtues and vices of the CAT of the N/S/A distinction 
 
The Kusch-Barnes approach is perhaps more esoteric than the 
methods used by engineering companies but has a number of virtues. 
For one thing, it explains very well why and how referents change over 
time and classifications become unworkable. If Marco Polo used the 
term ‗Madagascar‘ to refer to the island and not, as was normal then, 
part of the African mainland, then he would likely have been ignored 
or corrected by his contemporaries.61 This single out-of-place use 
would not change the proper application of the term. However, over 
time, others did begin to adopt this application and so the reference 
changed. One vice that may be lodged against the account is that, by 
                                                          
61 The example of Madagascar as a case of reference-switching is taken from Evans. (Evans 
1973) Evans‘ suggestion is that when Marco Polo used the term to refer to the island we now call 
Madagascar, he intended to use it as it had been used by others, not introduce a new usage. The 
lesson I illustrate here is that once Polo did use it to refer to the island, and this stuck, the proper 
usage subsequently switches. (See also Kripke 1982) 
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focusing on referencing practices, it is overly superficial whereas 
traditional metaphysicians have looked for something more robust and 
fundamental. 
 
Perhaps Kusch or Barnes would respond that this search is wrong-
headed but, even if it is not, the accusation of superficiality is, I submit, 
unjustified. For instance, a traditional realist metaphysician might state, 
as Hilary Putnam did, that the ‗essence‘ of water is H2O. That is, the 
true referent is not based on identifying a string of empirical 
characteristics but it is the molecular composition of water, H2O. 
However, there seems to be no principled distinction here. We might 
ask how the molecular composition is identified. It is through various 
tests all of which are empirical investigations. There is no principled 
method for distinguishing between ‗is wet‘, ‗flows in lakes‘, or ‗is 
tasteless, odourless and transparent‘ and passing a scientific test for 
having the molecular composition H2O or, as is more common, for 
identifying water in a scientific setting, testing neutral under a pH test 
or boiling at 100°C at sea level. In each of these cases, proper 
application of the reference is determined by comparing a set of 
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empirical characteristics and behaviours with previous exemplars. At 
this level of abstraction the analysis of lay and scientific reference can 
be the same. 
4.2.5 Robinson Crusoe‘s ‗tool‘ 
 
The common counter-example to collectivist approaches such as CAT 
is a variation on a theme which I will call ‗Robinson Crusoe‘ examples. 
The relevant variety here is ‗Robinson Crusoe‘s tool‘. Consider the 
following remark from Amie Thomasson, 
 
[I]t makes perfect sense to suppose that a solitary human could create a 
knife, but not a government or money. Thus artefacts don‘t seem to be 
essentially social objects at all. (Thomasson 2007, p. 52. Original 
emphasis.) 
 
Suppose Thomasson‘s solitary human was trying to create the first ever 
knife. Is it still intuitive to say that this person can do that but not 
create the first ever government or money? It seems that Thomasson‘s 
statement only makes sense if one first supposes that there exists a 
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community of tool-users (knife-users, etc.) and that this solitary human 
is creating a tool of a kind which is recognized and established within 
the community; a kind of which it makes sense to say that it is an 
artefact only within the system that defines what counts as an artefact. 
 
Crusoe’s tool 
Robinson Crusoe is a man stranded on a desert island. He was stranded 
there as a young child and all he has ever known are natural objects – 
trees, plants, fruit, sand, and so on. Nevertheless, he uses what he has 
around him to fashion a rudimentary axe, knife and various other useful 
things. He uses them to accomplish various tasks, and makes other 
similar objects, gradually improving them each time. 
 
Has Crusoe created tools? Some people will say, ‗Yes, of course he has 
created tools. As you say, he has created axes and knives. What are 
these if they are not tools?‘ Note that I said he has created a 
‗rudimentary axe.‘ Alternatively, I might say that he has created a 
proto-axe or an axe-like object. This would minimize any preconcep-
tion about whether or not he has created a tool. Now let us consider 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   214 
 
what it would mean to say that he has created a tool. Would we also 
have to say that you can create a tool even if no one else recognizes it 
as a tool? Perhaps we can say that they would recognize it were they to 
see it. But both DNA and CAT hold that one cannot recognize a tool 
just by looking at it. One must also know the context in which it is a 
tool. That seems to be missing here since only Crusoe knows of the 
object‘s existence. Beth Preston has argued that tools are typically 
identifiable regardless of our witnessing anyone using the tool, 
 
[U]nlike naturally occurring objects, manufactured tools are designed 
for a specific use, and normally have a standardized form. More 
importantly, they are identifiable as tools—indeed often as specific 
kinds of tools apart from any actual occasions of use. (Preston 1998, p. 
6. Original emphasis.) 
  
Whilst this may often be the case it seems anthropologically-flawed. 
The only reason why we would ever be able to identify what a tool is 
for would be on the basis of either a) witnessing actual use, or b) prior 
knowledge as to the proper function of similar tools. (Vaesen and 
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Amerongen 2008; and Dennett 1990) Consider a variation on Crusoe‘s 
tool, 
 
Crusoe and the coconut 
Robinson Crusoe is lonely on the island and decides to create a friend. 
He draws a face onto a coconut, places it on a stick, and begins to talk 
to it. Since Crusoe has been on the island since he was a young child he 
has never learnt to speak English and so he makes up his own noises to 
talk to (or, rather, at, for it cannot respond) the coconut. 
 
The scenario is the same as Crusoe‘s tool although in this case the 
question is over whether Crusoe has created a language rather than a 
tool. I think in this case we are unlikely to say that Crusoe has created a 
language, especially those of us who are familiar with Wittgenstein‘s 
later work. As Wittgenstein said in his Philosophical Investigations, 
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The words of this [private] language are to refer to what can be known 
only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another 
cannot understand the language. (Wittgenstein 1953, para. 243) 
 
Just as Crusoe cannot create a language by himself (since a language 
requires communication) he cannot create a tool by himself (since tools 
require proper functions). Crusoe may construct something that looks 
like a tool, functions as a tool, and is intended to fulfil a specific 
function. Crusoe cases are rare but they highlight a specific issue that is 
underplayed in Thomasson‘s and Preston‘s account. We require a 
background of tool use in order to know what the proper function of a 
particular kind of tool is and, once established, that background 
knowledge can be extremely powerful. However, none of that implies 
that we can separate our analysis of what the proper function of a tool 
is from the actual occasions of use. The individual causal history of the 
artefact and the non-individual normal use history, to borrow Preston‘s 
phraseology, do not ‗come apart‘ but are both vital to any understand-
ing of that particular tool and its function within a community. This 
point is more evident when we consider not simple or basic tools such 
as hammers and screwdrivers but with complex technological artefacts 
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such as aeroplane engines or hadron colliders since the background 
knowledge of tools of that kind may be quite limited and weak (since 
there are fewer and their occurrence is limited to specialized zones). 
Crusoe‘s makeshift tool cannot be properly referred to as a tool 
because it exists in isolation from a community, and is consequently 
without proper function.  
 
Consider the idea of tool-appropriation. Appropriation occurs when an 
object (either purely physical or artificial) is used as a tool. For example, 
suppose that I am unfamiliar with surgeon‘s scalpels and, on finding 
one in a colleague‘s desk drawer, I use it as a letter-opener. In so doing, 
it seems we should say that I have not instantly changed the scalpel 
into a letter-opener but am using a scalpel as a letter-opener. In other 
terms, I am taking the scalpel to be a letter-opener; referring to it as 
such. But this is just one instance among a whole classificatory system 
and, what is more, I have no particular authority in the community 
when it comes to decided what surgeon‘s scalpels are for. 
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Consider instead a more mundane example where you walk into the 
forest and construct a rudimentary lever using a branch. The 
collectivist account analyses this as using a branch as a lever, not as 
creating a lever (since it is an individual action). This is an extension of 
the principle discussed earlier that technical artefacts must be 
purposefully designed for a particular function or functions. It is not 
enough to pick up a palm leaf and use it to fan yourself for that palm 
leaf to stop being a natural kind and become a technical artefact (i.e. an 
artificial kind). For this to be the case, social structures of proper use 
would have to be implausibly flexible and quick to pop in and out of 
existence. Secondly, the function (of fanning) is incidental to its 
physical structure; it was not purposefully designed for this function. 
 
Further, referring back again to the five criteria outlined in §4.1.2, there 
are no normative constraints on the palm leaf. No one is saying that 
the palm leaf ought to be used to fan. There might be occasions where 
someone would do this but the whole point of appropriation is that 
there is not this complex normative structure already in place. It is a 
fleeting moment of innovation. If, on the other hand, there exists a 
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community who routinely appropriates palm leaves for the function of 
fanning; who amends their physical characteristics (or, at least, executes 
some design decision upon them); and who collectively says ‗You 
should use palm leaves for fanning‘; then the cut palm leaves may 
change their ontological status from natural to artificial kind; from 
simple leaf to tool. There is undoubtedly a grey area concerning this 
transition and whether it is right to call the object natural or artificial is 
a contingent, not an absolute, matter. Any analysis of the transition has 
to pay close attention to the reference-talk of the community, its design 
choices, and the development and use of the putative tool. 
 
4.2.6 Tool use in animals 
 
We may gain insight into the nature of tools if we do not confine our 
analysis to how humans use and describe tools and ask instead whether 
animals create and use tools. The question was first given serious 
attention in the 1960s when behaviour was observed in some non-
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human primates that resembled tool use: using a stick to sweep food, 
using bones to crack nuts, washing fruit and vegetables, and so on. 
(Hall 1963; Kortlandt & Kooij 1963; Vevers & Weiner 1963) Today 
much more has been learned about the capacity of some non-human 
animals to use objects in their environment to accomplish tasks.62 Is 
this mere appropriation or is it tool use? Much of the debate has been 
around whether or not animals propagate culture – pass on knowledge 
to others – or whether these uses are spontaneous. Given the account 
of tool use that CAT provides researchers are right to focus on this 
aspect. Consider the following cases of animals using objects in a way 
which has been described as tool use, 
 
 Boxer crabs pick up poisonous anemones to wield off attackers; 
(Karplus et al. 1998) 
 Woodpecker finches and New Caledonian crows use sticks to winkle 
grubs from rotting wood. In fact, the latter travel with a tool kit of 
                                                          
62 See, for example, the huge collection of research collected in McFarland  B sser 1993, and 
Shumaker et al. 2011. 
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implements proven to be useful; (Bluff et al. 2010; Shumaker et al. 
2011; Tebbich & Bshary 2004) 
 Ground squirrels kick sand into the faces of venomous snakes to 
deter attacks; (Shumaker et al. 2011, p. ix) 
 Macaque monkeys use pliers to grasp food; (Rizzolatti et al. 2002) 
 Mice set out markers to serve as a reference point in exploration; 
(Stopka & Macdonald 2003) 
 Gombe chimpanzees use captured meat as a political tool, withhold-
ing it from rivals and doling it out to allies. (Nishida et al. 1991) 
 Beavers build dams so that a pool is created suitable for den 
construction; 
 Egyptian vultures open eggs by dropping them onto stones from a 
height. (Shumaker et al. 2011, p. 37) 
I have selected these examples more or less at random from various 
studies on animal behaviour.63 How many of these examples would we 
                                                          
63 Beck 1980 provides a large list of studies from the time that purported to show tool use in 
animals. Shumaker et al. 2011 list 53 thought-provoking examples. (Shumaker et al. 2011, p. 1-
2) 
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say are examples of tool use? The sources given all describe or suggest 
the possibility that each behaviour is a form of tool use but is this 
philosophically sound? Animal researchers have developed many 
definitions of what they mean by tool use, 
[T]he use of physical objects other than the animals‘ own body or 
appendages as a means to extend the physical influence realized by the 
animal. (Jones & Kamil 1973) 
 
[T]he use of an external object as a functional extension of mouth or 
beak, hand or claw, in the attainment of an immediate goal. (Van 
Lawick-Goodall 1970, p. 195) 
 
[T]he active external manipulation of a moveable or structurally 
modified inanimate environmental object, not internally manufactured 
for this use, which, when oriented effectively, alters more efficiently the 
form, position, or condition of another object, another organism, or the 
user itself. (Pierce 1986, p. 96) 
 
[T]he external employment of an unattached environmental object to 
alter more efficiently the form, position, or condition of another object, 
another organism, or the user itself, when the user holds or carries the 
tool during or just prior to use and is responsible for the proper and 
effective orientation of the tool. (Beck 1980, p. 10) 
 
 
Jones and Kamil‘s definition is very broad. If we were to accept a 
definition such as this we would also have to countenance a 
chimpanzee climbing a tree to reach fruit as tool use (i.e. using the ‗tree 
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tool‘ to reach fruit). The tree is not part of the animal‘s body or 
appendages (it is not clear whether Jones and Kamil wish to make a 
distinction here) but it extends the physical influence realized by the 
animal. If we want the definition to be this broad then it is so 
meaningless that it becomes a matter of animal behaviour in general; 
behaviour that inevitably interacts with non-animal objects at some 
point. Van Lawick-Goodall‘s definition may also be liable to admit too 
much a lot depends on what is meant by a ‗functional extension‘. 
Would it include, for example, the last example on our list? McFarland 
and Bösser argue that, under van Lawick-Goodall‘s definition, tool use 
would not include the vulture dropping an egg onto stones – since the 
stone is not an extension of the vulture‘s body. (McFarland & Bo  sser 
1993, p. 195) However, Egyptian vultures are also known to carry 
stones into the air and drop them onto nests or pick stones up in their 
beaks and throw them at eggs. These behaviours would count as tool 
use because the stone is a functional extension of the vulture‘s body. 
The research in Rizzolatti et al. (2002) suggests also that extensions of 
existing appendages and capacities are closely linked to brain function 
when using putative tools. 
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Pierce and Beck‘s definition comes closest to the CAT definition 
although they do exclude the design element. If we want a definition of 
tool use that applies to both human and non-human animals – and I 
think there are sound reasons for wanting so – then we ought to 
include some element of design choice. This could involve altering the 
physical or social structure of the object in some form or it could 
involve simply choosing the particular object as good for a particular 
job. This is the normative condition described in §4.1.2. For example, 
CAT may be able to accommodate the behaviour of the Indonesian 
octopuses which collect and adapt shells for use as hiding places as a 
form of tool use. (Finn, Tergenza, & Norman 2009) The behaviour 
was reported as being the first evidence of tool use in an invertebrate 
animal.64 It was discovered that the octopus Amphioctopus marginatus 
would select halved coconut shells from the sea floor, empty them of 
detritus, carry them for up to 20m, and assemble two shells together in 
a clam shape to make a defensive fortress. 
 
                                                          
64 Henderson, M. 2009. Indonesia‘s veined octopus ‗stilt walks‘ to collect coconut shells.‘ The 
Times, 15
th
 December 2009. 
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It is in fact well-known that octopuses of various genuses will use 
external objects as a form of shelter, this behaviour is much more 
complex and worthy of the name ―tool use‖. The way the animal 
selects appropriate materials for the job, carries them to an appropriate 
location, and then assembles them, is well-accommodated under our 
definition of tool design, manufacture, and use.  Animal behaviour 
researchers often define tool use as being the activity of keeping and 
maintaining an object for future use. (Finn, Tregenza, & Norman 2009; 
Mulcahy & Call 2006) I would suggest that when we talk about design 
as a central component of tool manufacture and use, the kind of 
behaviour displayed by A. marginatus is, if the reader will excuse the 
pun, on the margins of a definition of tool use.  
 
CAT can accommodate tool use amongst non-human animals in the 
same way as tool use amongst humans. Whether DNA can so 
accommodate tool use amongst non-human animals is not clear.65 The 
                                                          
65 Although Ted Cavanagh does say the following:  Design describes intellectual activity that 
differs across disciplines. This chapter argues for differentiation into engineering, architecture, or 
other types of design before any general conceptualization. Studies about the ‘dual nature of 
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examples in the literature are all drawn from human tools and focus on 
elements of design and normative constraints that could only plausibly 
be said to apply to humans. (See §4.1.2, §4.1.3) There are sound 
reasons for wanting an account that accommodates both groups, 
besides parsimony and the lack of a clear historical or evolutionary 
separation between the two groups. We may, for example, want to ask 
whether the animal behaviour studies referenced above have any 
implications for human behaviour. Certainly they should, but we 
cannot draw many conclusions without an understanding of tool use 
that is pan-specific. 
4.2.7 Conclusions on the collectivist and dual nature 
accounts of technical artefacts 
 
This chapter focused on accounts of technical artefacts, tools, and tool 
use. I outlined an existing theory (DNA) and a fledgling one (CAT). 
                                                                                                                                     
artefacts’ concern engineering design. The transferability of philosophical concepts from these 
studies to other fields of design is questionable. (Cavanagh 2008, p. 301) 
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From this discussion we can create the following conditions for being a 
tool, 
 
1. Must use both structural and social terms in order to be comprehen-
sively described; 
2. Is designed (or chosen) to meet a need; 
3. Has a proper function; 
4. Has proper conditions of use; 
5. Is not appropriated as part of a single unorthodox instance of use 
but is part of a systematic structure of tool use of that kind which 
determines 1-4. 
 
Tool use is simply the use of one of these objects in an attempt to 
attain the end specified in the design plan. In Ch. 5 we will see whether 
these conditions fit those of the reference-talk in petroleum 
engineering by conducting an empirical study. In Ch. 7 and 8 I discuss 
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whether this definition leaves open the possibility of tool use in 
artificial systems, extended epistemic systems, and groups. 
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Chapter 5 
Case study observations and a textual analysis of 
reference to ‘tools’ in directional drilling and production 
logging analysis 
5.1 Introduction: The case study disciplines 
Like trying to measure the force of a fly lifting its leg. (Donald H. van 
Steenwyk, engineer) 66 
 
Nothing is known. (Engineer BK during interview on production 
logging analysis) 
 
This chapter provides an empirical basis for CAT. The results of a 
fieldwork study indicate that technical knowledge is distinguishable 
from other types of knowledge and that the definition of tool use given 
in §4.2.7 is, partly, justified. In the first section I provide a non-
                                                          
66 Van Steenwyk died during the writing of my dissertation. He was the owner and CEO of the 
company with which I conducted my fieldwork research. I will always be grateful for that 
opportunity to gain an insight into the workings of an engineering office. This quote captures the 
idea of precision but also uncertainty and verisimilitude involved in gyroscopic surveying. 
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technical description of two ‗epistemic cultures‘ of petroleum 
engineering: borehole surveying (including directional drilling and 
wellbore navigation); and well logging analysis (specifically production 
logging analysis). I present a history of these fields and the evolution of 
their technical artefacts. Finally, I provide an illustration of what is 
done on an oil rig and how engineers problem-solve. This resonates 
with the outline of the engineering method given in §2.3.3 and §2.3.4. 
The second section provides a statistical analysis of textbooks in the 
two epistemic cultures with a view to analysing reference-talk therein. 
This analysis gives a possible definition of ‗tool‘ and what is taken-to-
be a tool within the epistemic culture. The final, third, section 
diagnoses what this definition means for technical knowledge. 
 
Wellbore navigation, directional drilling, and borehole surveying are 
some of the specialist fields involved in drilling the well towards a 
predetermined target. Production logging provides techniques and 
heuristics for optimizing production by measuring various properties 
of fluids in the well. In short, these two disciplines use tools to 
measure properties of a well (be it the orientation and inclination of the 
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well or the properties of fluids such as velocity, density, temperature, 
and so on). The artificial kinds such as the pipe or an oilrig are of 
interest probably only to those specifically tasked with manufacturing, 
maintaining and using them (unless, of course, they malfunction). As 
with most social kinds, they are not the primary focus of most textual 
output from the disciplines of wellbore navigation and production 
logging. The artificial kinds most engineers have to have functional 
knowledge of in these disciplines are tools. More specifically they are 
measuring instruments, sensors, and so on, which provide data for 
drilling engineers and analysts. This can then be made into meaningful 
information.  
5.1.1 A brief history of borehole surveying technology 
 
Today, the task of borehole surveying is to direct a wellbore towards a 
specific subterranean target area (typically an area of about 50m2 or a 
volume of 50m3) which is predicted to contain a hydrocarbon-bearing 
reservoir. Most of the time the drilling team will not aim to penetrate 
the target directly (‗as the crow flies‘, so to speak) but will have to 
avoid other wells and obstacles (‗fish‘) as well as consider the rate of 
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build acceptable to the pipe (it is not possible to drill a perfectly 
vertical well). This is done through modern sciences of geology and 
engineering, however its epistemic roots extend back much further. 
According to the Greek historian Herodotus, humans have been 
exploiting the Earth‘s oil reserves for over four thousand years. 
Herodotus wrote that Babylonians were using bitumen (a substance 
found in crude petroleum) to build walls and towers. (Macaulay 1890, 
Bk. 1 Para. 179) The earliest oil wells were drilled in China in 347 
AD.67 These wells were drilled using bamboo poles and plunged to an 
impressive depth of about 800ft (240m). In the following millennium 
petroleum was used for numerous purposes—to evaporate brine and 
produce salt; to produce kerosene for lighting and heating or simply to 
burn; for paving roads; and for military weapon. 
 
However, up until the middle of the 19th century, it was assumed that 
crude oil was something which seeped in small amounts from coal. A 
Christian missionary named Laurent-Marie-Joseph Imbert (now Saint 
                                                          
67
 From Geo-Help Inc. 2011. History of the world petroleum industry (key dates). 
http://www.geohelp.net/world.html. 
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Imbert) had returned from China with news of their drilling techniques 
but the information could not be put to use. It is often stated in history 
books that the first commercial oil well was drilled by Edwin Drake in 
1859 but in fact the first appeared in Poland six years previous and a 
second in Romania in 1857. (Howarth 1997, p. 12) It was the Russian 
empire, rather than North America which led world crude oil 
production at the end of the 19th century. (Arkiner & Aldis 2004) 
 
Surveying actually dates back to Euclidean geometry and some 
archaeologists suggest that ancient Egyptians used surveying methods. 
(Paulson 2005) Herodotus recounts how surveying techniques were 
used to settle boundaries for tax rate purposes. (Macaulay 1890, Bk. II 
Para. 109) As an industry, however, borehole surveying did not 
develop much until the late 19th century. The first tool developed for 
this purpose was a simple wax cylinder used for the first time in the 
African diamond mines in 1882. The engineer‘s experience of drilling 
in those days would, of course, have been much different from the 
contemporary industry. 
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And yet, the epistemological questions central to the enterprise—by 
how many degrees is the hole oriented; what is the depth of the hole; 
where is the target area in relation to the current drill position; what is 
the likelihood of penetrating the target area; what is the current 
inclination of the pipe?—have not much changed. To measure 
inclination in 1882, engineers would lower the cylinder to the bottom 
of the hole and allow the wax to solidify at a particular inclination.68 
Once the cylinder was removed from the hole, engineers could simply 
read off the degree of inclination. We will come to appreciate, 
however, if it was not already apparent, that every new technology 
brings limitations along with the new possibilities and knowledge it 
opens up. For one thing, the wax would not solidify properly at lower 
depths (due to the high temperature) and this would affect its structure 
as it was removed from the hole to be examined. Acid was put in the 
wax solution which would etch a line around the circumference of the 
cylinder but even this was a sticking plaster over a deeper wound: a 
                                                          
68 Nothing more than the simple laws of gravity are exploited, although the philosopher in me 
wants to ask if, like Descartes, they wondered whether the wax is the same as it comes out as it 
was when it went in. Indeed, in many ways, it is not: It is now a communicator, a potential 
source of knowledge. 
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more reliable, more mechanical, more precise instrument for 
measuring hole orientation was required. 
5.1.2 Modern surveying techniques 
 
The first answer to this was the development of clockwork instruments 
in 1899. These were specifically designed for measuring the orientation 
of core samples from the wellbore. Then, in 1910, devices began to 
appear which used the exciting developments in photography at the 
time. One device would record traces on a smoked glass plate. A later 
device took photographs of compass plates. Despite the advantages of 
these devices over the very crude early methods, they lacked 
mechanical precision. Many tools were subsequently developed in the 
1920s and 1930s to plug this gap. Some of these tools are still in use 
today, albeit in an updated form. The TOTCO tool is the more basic 
of these. It consists of a pendulum with a stylus attached and a paper 
disc which the stylus penetrates each time a survey is taken. This paper 
is marked with concentric rings indicating hole inclinations. Obviously, 
the paper must be then removed from the hole before it can be read by 
engineers. 
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The Teledrift tool uses mud-pulse telemetry to communicate its 
reports. Like the TOTCO tool, it uses a pendulum but this is 
connected to a plunger. Inclination is derived from the number of 
restrictions through which the plunger passes. Telemetric systems of 
communication will be of interest when I later discuss the temporality 
of data communication as well as the textuality of these systems. The 
former involves a distinction between continuous versus single-survey 
reports; and near-instantaneous communication versus data stored in 
the unit‘s memory and recovered at a later time. The later involves an 
argument I will make, following the work of several contemporary 
philosophers of technology, that this communication may best be 
interpreted as a form of writing, marking, inscription, or narrative. This 
is linked to the point about temporality which makes this more 
precisely the writing of a history. 
 
These three tools – the wax cylinder, TOTCO and Teledrift – are 
called ‗inclination only tools‘. That is, they measure only inclination and 
not, for example, orientation. They also produce physical 
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representations of the data they aim to represent (although it is 
debatable that the pressure pulses produced by mud-pulse telemetry 
should be so included). 
 
The final significant development in surveying techniques is the use of 
gyroscopes. Gyroscopes were first developed as a pedagogic aid and 
demonstration tool at the start of the 19th century. By the 1860s, 
electric motors allowed the gyroscope to spin for long periods of time 
and could be used in navigation on ships and, later, on aircraft. Since 
then they have been used in racing cars, motorbikes, gyrocompasses, as 
stabilisers on mono-trains and ships, robotics, computer mice, and 
much more besides. In the last few years we have seen gyroscopes 
extend into the world of consumer electronics and are used in devices 
such as virtual headsets, the iPhone and the Nintendo Wii. Modern 
gyroscopes in directional drilling are expensive and highly-sensitive 
instruments, far removed from their pedagogical ancestors.69 This gyro 
spins at 4200rpm and senses a single second of movement of rotation 
                                                          
69 Estimates are between $250,000 and $850,000. There are currently as few as 600 tools in the 
world. 
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of the Earth on its axis. This works by exploiting the reactive torque 
caused by a spinning Earth. The gyro tool will be held stationary (i.e. at 
a set angle) in a well and the rotation of the Earth is sensed as a torque. 
The magnitude of this torque is a measure of the alignment of the gyro 
spin axis with True North.70 Quite how precise the instrument is 
depends on what we might call social factors—cost, mobilization, 
contracts, etc.—and this has a knock-on effect on what knowledge can 
be gained from the instrument. 
5.1.3 An overview of well (production) logging analysis 
 
A second source of knowledge I will examine is well logging analysis. 
Essentially, this is the science and engineering used in ascertaining the 
nature and behaviour of fluids at particular depths or ‗zones‘ of the 
well. One reason for doing this is to acquire information about the 
surrounding rock composition. This need not be done using PLT and 
                                                          
70 In fact, only the horizontal component of the Earth’s spin vector is relevant. This dependency 
on latitude means that different corroborating data applies in different regions and the accuracy 
of north-seeking gyros diminishes near the North and South poles. 
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until recent history it was predominantly accomplished by examining 
‗cuttings‘, rock removed from the drilled hole. Geological tests of 
cuttings would be an example from PL of what I am calling direct 
instrumental information. Other reasons are to analyse the productivity 
or injectivity or different zones, diagnose problem wells, and to 
monitor the results of a stimulation (e.g. hydraulic fracturing 
treatments) or completion (bringing a wellbore into production once 
drilling operations have been concluded). 
 
Production logging is the term used for well logging done during 
production or injection. Production logging analysis is the analysis of 
data acquired from configurations of tools sent down the wellbore to 
monitor and record the properties of fluids. This includes spinners 
(fans which indicate fluid velocity), temperature sensors, and sensors 
for resistance, density, and so on. The records from these instruments 
configured within the tool are recorded in a well log such as that 
pictured in fig. 7. 
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Figure 7 A production log from a well in Thailand 
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5.1.4 Case study observations from an engineering office and 
Sirikit oil field, Thailand 
 
As described in §2.3.3, just as social epistemology has criticized the 
privilege and focus given to individual epistemic agents in epistemolo-
gy, social research in the philosophy of science and PET has criticized 
the ‗myth of the lone scientist/engineer‘. It is rarely the case in 
scientific laboratories that individuals define the limits of their research 
to their own experiments and results and this is especially true of 
engineers. Aside from the obvious multi-personal cooperation that is 
involved in drilling and extraction on oil and gas rigs, today much of 
the work of analysing production rates and planning future 
developments takes place in large office blocks with hundreds, 
sometimes thousands, of employees. Every company is structured in its 
own way, although there are of course many near-universal practices 
and standard modus operandi. The company I worked with to produce 
the case studies and research in this thesis is a multinational company 
with 17 offices in the U.S. and Canada and further 17 throughout the 
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Eastern hemisphere. The first foray into South-East Asia by the 
company was in 1978 when an office opened in the Phillipines (48 
employees, 26 field engineers).  
 
It was not until two decades later that the company moved into 
Thailand and established a head office in Bangkok and warehouse and 
shipping in the coastal districts of Sattahip and Songkhla (42 
employees, 23 field). Finally, a smaller Indonesian office was set-up in 
2004 (22 employees, 11 field). A small office in China was opened in 
2009 (4 employees, 2 field). One company ‗unique selling point‘ is that 
it employees predominantly local staff with a small number of 
managers and more experienced engineers coming from abroad 
(primarily the U.S., U.K. and Australia). The split is approximately 95% 
local staff to 5% foreign. Field engineers are exclusively local (and 
locally trained excepting a number of compulsory training programmes 
in the US). There are small offices and staff-houses in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia and Seria, Brunei. The company also sends employees and 
equipment to Cambodia, Japan, Korea, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea 
and Vietnam. Clients are split equally between those requiring logging 
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services and those involved in drilling and exploration. These clients 
include Chevron, PTTEP, EDC, Shell, Total, Petronas Carigali and 
Schlumberger. Minor clients include Pearl Oil, Salamander, CEC, Pan 
Orient, APICO, amongst others. The reader will recognize some of 
these as major multinational corporations and others have a smaller 
global profile or are local, national companies. Contracts are typically 
six months to three years with renewals at term or retenders. This latter 
information is important as, in contradistinction to other industries, 
companies in the oil and gas industry have a strong motivation to work 
cooperatively with their competitors on a regular basis as contracts are 
quite long and it is necessary to keep good relationships with others. 
This may be contrasted, for instance, with some scientific research 
laboratories who are often motivated against sharing information and 
knowledge and competing with other laboratories for research funding, 
personnel, and so on. (See, e.g., Collins 2001 and de Roure & Frey 
2007) 
 
Before we begin our analysis of the finer details of these areas, and 
how decisions are arrived at and judgments made, it would be 
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instructive to consider, albeit in very general terms, their place in the 
industry as a whole, its style of business, character and temperament, as 
well as the petroleum engineer streotype, his ways of working and 
habits. This, above all, is a conservative industry, protective of its 
knowledge (rather than, say, academic scientific institutions which may 
be seen to be quite magnanimous in the spread of information), stuck 
in its ways, traditional. Units are measured by the same tokens with 
which they have always been measured, known as Standard Industry 
Units (SIU), for example, measuring fluid quantities in barrels per day 
rather than metric litres. Much like philosophy or religion, things take a 
long time to change. Even on a daily basis, decisions are rarely made in 
haste and careful, reflective caution is encouraged (partly because 
safety concerns are made ‗paramount‘, partly because the results of bad 
decisions may be so costly, and partly because time is not as pressing as 
it might be in, say, the London Stock Exchange). 
 
Practical restrictions add to this impression of an anachronistic world: 
many instruments and equipment till recently ran on clockwork 
mechanisms though modern electronics has replaced many of these 
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systems from 80 years ago. No electricity or other sources of ignition 
can be near an onshore location hence the liking of mechanical 
instruments as below; consequently there are no cell phones and as few 
vehicles as practically possible. A typical engineer is, perhaps counter-
intuitively, reluctant to call upon technology to solve every problem 
that might occur. He—for the profession is still predominantly male—
carries a pencil and some paper at all times and likes to sketch out 
schematics, formula or graphs to describe and work through problems 
or just to gain an impression of the situation. Mental calculations are 
not strictly necessary in the digital age but valued because simple errors 
are easy to miss if one does not know the formula and likely range of 
results a calculation ought to produce.  
5.1.5 Corroboration of evidence 
 
PLA is an excellent example of the multi-heuristic character to 
technical knowledge and great emphasis is placed on the importance of 
corroboration or comparison of results, especially with results from 
other tools. (BP Amoco Upstream Technology Group 1999, p. 88) 
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Generally, engineers seek to maintain consistency of results between all 
tools (within the limits of an approved error model). It might seem 
from a cursory examination of fig 5.1 that the data contained therein 
would lead a skilled analyst inexorably towards one conclusion. By 
comparison, if I were an expert in reading tax documents I could 
relatively easily and conclusively discover the total taxable profits for a 
chosen corporation. There is only one method for doing this and there 
would be little doubt about the figure I arrived at. Similarly, in some 
aspects of petroleum engineering, such as gyroscopic surveying 
(discussed above and in §7.2.2) the results recorded from the tool are 
precise, relatively accurate, and it is not a question of expert judgment 
how to read them. 
 
In PLA, the methods used to interpret well logs are various and non-
standardized. Some analysts will favour the results of the ‗down-pass‘ 
(i.e. taken whilst the tool is travelling down the wellbore) whilst others 
will favour ‗up-pass‘ data). Some analysts will place a lot of trust in 
their ‗intuitive‘ judgment or in raw, unprocessed data whilst others will 
rely on the processes and algorithms computed by proprietary PLA 
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software. I observed analysts using a wide variety of individual 
techniques for analysing data, particularly when identifying ‗good‘ data. 
For instance, there is no quantified standard for deleting outlying data 
points in a correlation curve. Some analysts will have a tendency to 
leave most data points in even if they are far away from the curve 
whilst others will remove points which are far away and even ones 
which are closer than others from the original curve, thus transforming 
the curve. Often, explanations and rationalizations for why a data point 
was removed appeal not just to the raw data available for those 
particular records but to prior knowledge about the well and other data 
records. Other explanations conceded that it was questionable whether 
the data point should have been removed and that I could leave it in if 
I wished (whilst relying presumably not merely on whim but on prior 
experience). This was referred to by one participant as the ‗fudge 
factor‘. 
 
In general, it is good practice to corroborate one‘s results with other 
data. Therefore, if an analyst concludes from the temperature log (the 
log from the part of the tool measuring velocity) that there is x oil 
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‗thieving‘ at zone 5 (i.e. leaking from inside the wellbore to the 
reservoir either through a perforation or through a hole in the well 
casing at a particular depth), then she should seek to corroborate this 
figure, x, with another piece of data. However, there is no particular 
single data set with which one can always corroborate one‘s analysis. 
One must rely on judgment and experience to decide whether the 
spinner log or the derived density is a reliable indicator of fluid 
properties and there is little in the way of a generalized law for 
supporting those judgments. 
 
In other words, PLA is an instantiation of Hudson‘s Wittgensteinian 
‗river-bed‘ analogy: the idea that there are no universal rules regarding 
what information counts as foundational but only rules that some 
information is foundational in certain cases and that what is 
foundational (read: axiomatic) in some cases may be a corollary in 
others. Recall that Hudson argued against the idea that some 
propositions are invariably fundamental by appeal to Wittgenstein‘s 
anti-skeptical analysis of belief. (Hudson 1986, p. 124; and Plant 2005, 
p. 54) Wittgenstein had observed that there is nothing in our 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   249 
 
experience that allows us to know how we should interpret our 
experience (whilst making the anti-skeptical argument that one only 
asks skeptical questions once one has grounds for doubt). 
 
If a blind man were to ask me ‗Have you got two hands?‘ I should make 
sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don‘t know 
why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn‘t I test my eyes by looking 
to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? 
(Wittgenstein 1979, §125) 
 
If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any 
reason, in order to play safe, why doesn‘t he have to investigate the 
investigation? …Here all psychological terms merely lead us away from 
the main thing. (Wittgenstein 1979, §459) 
 
Hudson suggests that we should give up the search for universal 
foundational propositions (such as Descartes‘ cogito or that there is an 
external world) whilst retaining the idea that some propositions are 
foundational in some cases. Thus, some propositions are like the 
shifting sands of a riverbed: they are derived from other axiomatic 
principles or based on other knowledge. Others resemble the 
immovable bedrock beneath: they are foundational and support the 
sands above. However, even at the deepest bedrock level, there is a 
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certain amount of shift and that which was bedrock may become sand. 
(Hudson 1986, p. 125) This renders the distinction almost meaningless 
but we shall preserve the distinction on case-by-case bases. Similarly, 
PLA is full of ‗bedrock‘ and ‗sandy‘ data. In one case, participant SK 
had to analyse the reliability of the well log data based on the surface 
water (i.e. water production) data. This is quite a routine process but 
involves a certain amount of judgment in how one handles the various 
data records. The analyst decided to make the temperature and density 
curves match the results for the surface water. However, about a week 
later the office received a report which stated that the surface water 
value was wrong. Consequently, the temperature and density curves 
had been corroborated and adjusted to fit false data and were no 
longer reliable themselves.  
 
There are, however, exceptions to the ‗bedrock‘ analogy and we ought 
not presume that all analysis involves this kind of corroboratory work. 
Data from gyroscopic tools, for example, must also be corroborated 
but are always corroborated with the same data. Gyro data, such as that 
acquired through MWD (measurement while drilling) must pass a 
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‗comparison test‘ with external data. (BP Amoco Upstream 
Technology Group 1999, p. 147) Nevertheless, it will often be 
necessary still to compare the results with results from independent 
surveys from other tools. Any error in the gyro reference survey will 
likely be propagated down the remainder of the well and this error will 
not be detectable from a comparison with previous corrected data. 
 
The gyro tool was made up at the surface and a time delay set (it will 
start taking surveys at a predetermined time). It was dropped down the 
drill string prior to a trip (i.e. the PLT survey). In high angle holes, the 
tool could have been pumped to the bottom but this was not 
necessary. The tool landed on a baffle plate (a ‗TOTCO ring‘) in the 
bottom hole assembly (BHA). As the drill string is tripped out of the 
hole, the survey engineer keeps a tally of bit depth against time, which 
will later be used to assign a measured depth to each timed survey. 
When the tool is recovered at surface it is plugged into the engineer‘s 
surface computer, which reads the tool‘s memory and computes the 
survey. To give the reader an impression of the distances involved, the 
well at Sirikit is an injection well approximately 6-7000ft deep (about 
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half as deep as a typical offshore well). There are six valves or 
‗Christmas trees‘ which lead to points in the reservoir over a distance 
of a few hundred yards squared. The reservoir itself is approximately 
one square mile. 
 
One engineer stated one of the working principles of the team: ‗If 
something can go wrong it will.‘ During the trip, one significant 
problem occurred. The PLT is configured with a number of tools and 
sensors for recording various measurements. One of these tools, called 
a ‗spinner‘, measures velocity. The spinner looks like a fan and, 
unsurprisingly, spins as fluid passes through it. It will take two surveys: 
one when being dropped down the drill string (the ‗down-pass‘) and 
one when being recovered (the ‗up-pass‘). On this occasion it was the 
spinner that jammed the PLT in the wellbore and it became difficult to 
extract it. When recovered, some discussion ensued as to what caused 
the problem. A number of possibilities were considered such as sand 
or heavy oil blocking the blades. The spinner was tested by laying it on 
the ground. The first solution was to physically force the sides of the 
spinner in so that it took up less space in the narrow pipe. After this 
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failed, the ‗collar‘ of the spinner was moved up. The engineers 
discussed whether this would prevent the spinner from spinning due to 
it being too tight. Finally, a solution was proposed where the blades 
were replaced with shorter ones. This involved a judgment call that the 
shorter blades could accurately record fluid velocities at various points. 
It was decided that, since the well had quite a strong injection point 
(approx.. 5,000ft) they could ‗get away with shorter blades‘.  
 
This problem and its solutions demonstrated a number of things about 
the engineering method for these engineers. Rather than following 
codes of practice or well-established procedures, problems such as 
these require ingenuity and creativity regarding the physical nature of 
the problem as well as consideration of what would produce reliable 
data. The combination of these two factors, with no set procedure for 
action, means that there is a significant reliance on the engineers‘ 
experience and their cooperation to handle the problem and talk each 
other into a solution. 
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5.2 Textual analysis of referencing practices 
5.2.1 What do the texts say about engineering knowledge? 
 
So far, there has been little constructive interaction between 
epistemology and engineering, in stark contrast to the multiple 
interfaces between epistemology and the natural sciences. The reasons 
for this seem based largely in institutional and historical contingency 
rather than academic utility. A quick search in the Blackwell Companion to 
Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) reveals no mention of 
‗engineering‘, ‗technology‘, ‗technical‘, ‗tool‘, or even ‗design‘. 
‗Function‘, another crucial engineering term does appear but those 
sections contain no discussion of the use of the term in engineering or 
even with those philosophers who have drawn on engineering 
resources (see §4.1.4). The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 2000) contains four entries on ‗technology‘ and 
‗engineering‘ although only in relation to ethics. If philosophers strive 
for completeness in a general account of knowledge it does not seem 
adequate that they do not, typically, mention or think about such a 
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ubiquitous influence on our behaviour and inquiry. Unsurprisingly, a 
search of several hundred engineering textbooks revealed no mention 
at all of ‗epistemology‘ and mentioned ‗philosophy‘ only in the 
colloquial, non-technical sense i.e.: 
The philosophy of LDM [low-dimensional modeling] is to develop very 
simple physics-based simulation models that contain sufficient 
information for implementing flow control and insight into the 
dynamics of the large eddies (coherent structures). 
 
This is the philosophy behind the time-delay networks and the so-called 
delayed decision making approach. 
 
Significantly, for us, the words ‗knowledge‘ and ‗know(s)‘ were used 
frequently: 
 
Accurate knowledge of the course of a wellbore is necessary. 
 
With sufficient local knowledge results may be quantified at higher 
water hold-ups but otherwise it should only be used as a qualitative 
device. 
 
Knowledge is clearly central to what engineers do but they use the 
word vaguely and to mean different things. Walter Vincenti, who we 
have spoken about before wrote, 
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‗Engineers use knowledge primarily to design, produce, and operate 
artifacts…. Scientists, by contrast, use knowledge primarily to generate 
more knowledge.‘ (Vincenti 1990) 
 
Here Vincenti is making a distinction between engineering knowledge 
and scientific knowledge. We have previously seen that such 
distinctions are problematic (§2.3). Nevertheless, there is a kind of 
knowledge, whether it is unique to any one profession, which primarily 
aims to ‗design, produce and operate artefacts.‘ To substantiate 
Vincenti‘s claim, I analysed some textbooks from my fieldwork to 
assess how they intend their readers to use technology and engineering 
to generate knowledge. 
 
5.2.2 The method 
 
The best way to explain CAT‘s method is through example. Five large 
texts related to these techniques and professions were selected: two 
generic textbooks, one on well logging (Darling 2005) and one on 
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production logging (Scientific Drilling International, Inc. 2010); one 
handbook for surveyors and directional drillers at BP Amoco (1999); 
and two operations manuals for specific tools used by Scientific 
Drilling International, Inc. (Kaulback 2009; Hawkinson 2000). It is not 
my purpose here to parse the complex hierarchies of authority present 
in the communities under investigation but I will assume that a widely-
read textbook or manual will have been accorded a significant role in 
classifying the objects of its subject (although never an absolute one). 
(See §3.1.7) Each reference to ‗tool‘ was selected and defined according 
to what else was mentioned in that sentence. In consultation with 
engineers and production logging analysts at the companies 
acknowledged at the end of the thesis, these mentions were broken 
down into five categories: Informational, proper function, reliability, 
societal, and other. ‗Informational‘ was broken down into three further 
categories: measurement, transmission and interpretation. Each of 
these three was thought to be related in that they referred to the 
capacity of a tool to provide information about the natural (and 
sometimes artificial or social) world. 
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Category I. ‗Measurement‘ mentions are those which refer to the 
capacity of the tool to measure some property. ‗Transmission‘ 
mentions refer to how, why, in what form or for what purpose (and so 
on) the tool transmits its information. ‗Interpretation‘ mentions include 
those which describe how an analyst or engineer receives, interprets, 
analyzes and uses this information, formulae used, and so on. For 
example,71 
 
The Dresser Atlas Spectralog tool measures the counting rates in a 
number of ―windows‖, each of which spans a certain energy band (Serra 
1984, p. 114). 
 
This would be counted twice: once as a tool-reference to what the tool 
measures; once to the proper function (see below) of the tool. The 
following is an example of transmission, 
 
Tool will take a set of data, and display output on screen (Hawkinson 
2000, p. 16). 
 
                                                          
71 (Serra 1984) is not one of the texts analyzed. 
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Category II. ‗Proper function‘ is a more straightforward category relating 
to what the tool is for and how to use it in order to achieve that 
function. In other words, the ‗proper function‘ of the tool. We also 
decided to include in these references to how the tool works, 
references to the structure, calibration, or alternative features of the 
tool. For example,72 
 
The Teledrift tool comprises of a pendulum that moves along a series 
of graduated stop shoulders and a signaling plunger at the top that 
traverses a series of annular restrictions to produce pressure pulses in 
the mud flow (Scientific Drilling International, Inc. 2009, p. 6). 
 
An example of a reference to an alternative calibration or feature 
would be, 
 
A second mode of operation, known as High Speed, allows the tool to 
survey on-the-fly once inclination reaches 15 degrees or more 
(Hawkinson 2000, p. 6).  
 
Category III. ‗Reliability‘ is, perhaps surprisingly to laypeople and of 
particular interest to reliabilist epistemologists (possibly the most 
                                                          
72 Scientific Drilling International, Inc. 2009 is not one of the texts analyzed. 
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common breed in epistemology), a frequent and persistent concern on 
a par with the previous types of reference. We include here a broad 
definition of reliability comprising statistical and probabilistic 
uncertainty in data provided by the tool as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages of employing particular tools over others in different 
geographical locations, rock formations and situations. The following 
would be an example of a tool-reference to advantages a tool has over 
another and to the uncertainty or error possibilities in the measure-
ment. 
 
The Schlumberger Natural Gamma ray Spectrometry tool uses five 
windows, making fuller use of the information in the spectrum so as to 
reduce the statistical uncertainty on the analysis of Th, U and K 
[thorium, uranium and potassium]‖ (Serra 1984, p. 114). 
 
An example of advantages/disadvantages may include references to 
current recommendations or histories of the tool. 
 
…[T]he FDP [fluid density differential pressure] is maintenance 
intensive and involves the use of mercury, so this tool is being phased 
out & will be replaced the fluid density delta-p (FDD) tool. (sic) 
(Scientific Drilling International, Inc. 2010, p. 10). 
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Category VI. Whilst accepting that, from an SP and CAT perspective, it 
is methodologically unsound to disentangle social interests from 
ontological and epistemological claims, we reserved a category for what 
we have called ‗societal‘ references. This is taken from a plausible 
insight into the petroleum engineering world that certain issues are 
isolated and often precedent to other concerns. Safety and risk are two 
such issues which are given high prominence in the education, 
instruction and day-to-day life of engineers in this field. This is 
unsurprising especially when one considers the catastrophic, 
sometimes fatal, effects accidents, as witnessed in the recent 
Deepwater Horizon blowout.73 Reference to hiring costs of equipment, 
the organization and hierarchy of personnel, who to speak to in order 
to obtain a particular tool, and so on, where also termed ‗societal‘. For 
example, 
 
All non-essential personnel will not be allowed to be in the direct 
vicinity of the source as it is being loaded into the tool. (Kaulback 2009, 
p. 130). 
 
                                                          
73 A timeline of which incident is currently available online at http://www.offshore-
technology.com/features/feature84446/. 2010. Deepwater Horizon: A Timeline of Events. 
Offshore Technology (Net Resources International). 
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As can be seen from the diagram below the ―hottest‖ point at the 
surface of the tool gives 2. 10Sv/hr so it would not be possible to 
reach anything like a classified workers exposure limit in a week! 
(Scientific Drilling International, Inc. 2010, p. 15) 
 
Category V. ‗Other‘ references include those to naming conventions, 
references to other documents, and so on. 
 
References that purely served the format of the text (for example, in 
indexes or tables of contents) and those in discussions of what follows 
or of the layout of the chapter were excluded. It was not clear at the 
time how these five categories would be proportioned but it was clear 
that the first four would cover the vast majority of tool-references in 
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5.2.3 Analysis of results 
 
The word ‗tool‘ features throughout these texts as a catch-all term for 
technical artefacts which exclude semi-permanent artefacts such as rigs, 
pipes, and so on. In total 1708 tool-references were found in the five 
texts.74 The results reveal one part of the big picture of how production 
loggers and directional drillers (and surveyors, wellbore navigators, etc.) 
refer to tools. It should be noted that technical operations manuals are 
likely to contain many mentions of the word ‗tool‘ because it will 
contain repeat and precise instructions for what to do with the tool and 
each of its configurations or variants. One textbook (Kaulback 2009) 
was unusual among the selection in having almost 60% of its total tool-
references refer to how to use the tool or how the tool works – in 
other words, the proper function of the tool. The other four textbooks 
displayed a statistically even spread across three types of reference: 
informational, functional and reliability. 3-11% of references to a ‗tool‘ 
were of societal or other type. 
                                                          
74 The results are compiled in Table #.1 in the Appendix. 
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If we exclude the operations manual mentioned above (which I suggest 
skews the significance of each reference by repeating very similar 
mentions), 32-38% of references were informational and 22-31% were 
to proper function. Finally, 24-37% of tool-references are to do with 
the uncertainty, error, or ‗corruption‘ of the data provided by 
instruments. The average proportion in that case calculates as follows. 
Approximately one third (34%) of tool-references to what the tool 
measures/communicates or how these communications are 
interpreted. Approximately one third (32%) to the uncertainty of data, 
etc. Approximately one quarter (26%) to proper function. The 
remainder (8%) to ‗societal‘ and other things. 
5.2.4 Extrapolating results to a conceptual sketch of 
technical artefacts 
 
These results indicate that the texts use three basic types of reference 
in a full description: they are functional instruments that measure 
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certain properties within a certain range of accuracy. These three 
elements seem indispensable for describing a ‗tool‘ to a sufficient 
degree of detail. So far the case study does not, in itself, support a 
collectivist account. In fact, all case studies such as this are able to do is 
build up a body of research which can be given a collectivist analysis 
and from which analysis fruitful insights may be drawn. Future 
research may be able to generalize the results of this study or perhaps 
adapt the criteria in order to make it more generalizable. 
5.2.5 Proper function 
 
It would seem that one of the key distinguishing features of our 
reference to tools and reference to other kinds of things is that tools 
have proper functions. How does CAT conceive of this notion? Before 
we turn to a consideration of proper function of artefacts let us first 
discuss the normative aspect of tool use. As we shall see, the former 
requires the latter. The concept of normativity is a recurring theme in 
Strong Programme research and Schyfter presents it as a key 
component in how we conceptualize technical artefacts. (Schyfter 
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2009) Normativity is here conceived as statements of properness, 
appropriateness, correctness, etc. and their antonyms. 
 
David Bloor has previously made an argument for such judgments 
being community-dependent. According to Bloor, if we wish to judge 
the properness, for example, of an instance of use we must look at the 
standards of the relevant community. Bloor argued, based on Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‘s private language argument, that the distinction between 
‗is right‘ and ‗seems right to me‘ could only be made sense of with a 
community to provide what is right (Bloor 1997).75 For example, 
assuming no direct access to a judgmental God, we can only make 
sense of what a ‗proper function‘ or a ‗mistake‘ is by asking what our 
peers would agree is proper or mistaken. Consequently, the community 
is prior to the individual in the order of explanation of proper function 
and a collectivist account is required.76 MacIntyre made the same point 
                                                          
75 For a discussion of Wittgenstein‘s argument and its connection to the Robinson Crusoe 
example discussed later in this paper see, for example, Blackburn (1984), Misak (1995, p. 54), 
Wright (1986, p. 235). 
76 
Here I appropriate Kusch‘s (2002) claim that the existence of knowledge is dependent on the 
existence of communities. Consequently, in order to know the proper function of an artefact 
within a community, one must explain the normative standards of the community. For an 
extended discussion of knowledge of artefact function see Houkes (2006). 
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when asserting the need to index the notion of ‗mistakes‘ to a culture 
(1967). MacIntyre was responding to Peter Winch, a significant 
influence on the Strong Programme, and on Bloor in particular. 
(Winch 1958, 1964) Normative judgments are indispensable to any 
textbook or manual on a tool. Sometimes the normative judgment is 
explicit: 
 
From surface until an inclination of 10°-15° is reached, surveys must be 
taken with the tool stationary. (BP Amoco 1999, p. 155. Emphasis 
added) 
 
Other times it is implicit and hidden: 
 
The scope is then sighted up on the pre-determined reference point and 
confirmation given to the surveyor in the wireline unit that the tool is 
aligned (give thumbs up). (Hawkinson 2000, p. 75) 
 
Although this appears like a pure description of what happens, in fact 
we can see that it contains a normative imperative equivalent to, ―Sight 
up the scope on the pre-determined reference point…!‖ Any 
imperative or injunction of this kind is a recommendation of what 
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ought to be done and we cannot make sense of such judgments 
individualistically but must consider the standards of the community. A 
description of a technical artefact is rarely just a description. In most 
cases it is also a judgment on what the artefact is supposed to do or, to 
put it another way, what it is for. The collectivist enterprise is tasked 
with analysing these judgments, how they arise and how they operate. 
That is not to say that CAT must make normative claims about how 
the artefacts ought to be used, just as SP researchers typically claim not 
to make presuppositions about the scientific knowledge under 
investigation. It is to say that the practice of making normative 
judgments itself cannot be absent from a comprehensive analysis. The 
same cannot be said of natural kinds: there is no such thing as a ‗good 
stone‘ per se. A stone can only be so referred if it has been 
appropriated for a tool-like purpose e.g. ‗a good stone for grinding 
food‘. 
 
In the Cratylus, Plato argues (390b-d) that the user of an artefact 
knows it better than its maker. Although the answer to whether Plato 
was right probably varies depending on what kind of artefact and what 
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kind of design and manufacturing process you have in mind, for most 
artefacts, it seems he is just wrong. Designers and manufacturers must 
be able to second-guess the user‘s intentions for an artefact and the 
user must, in most cases, have some idea of the blueprint or ‗use-plan‘ 
(Houkes & Vermaas 2004) in order to use the artefact properly or qua 
artefact. Use is central to any study of technical artefacts. Consequent-
ly, I am sympathetic with Plato‘s argument, despite what is said above 
but would like to extend the group of ‗users‘ to those designers and 
makers who engage in using the artefact when they imagine how their 
consumers will behave. Thus, they contribute to the community use-
plan, that is how the proper function of the artefact is perceived by the 
relevant community of designers, manufacturers and users. 
5.2.6 Conclusions 
 
Despite the above counter-intuitive consequence, CAT provides a 
rigorous methodology for approaching the ontology of tools. Non-
collectivist accounts may also succeed by detailed analysis of individual 
behaviours but this seems an unnecessarily myopic approach akin to 
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using molecular chemical models to analyse the dynamics of fluids in 
the engineering sciences. Just as the latter has developed macroscopic 
models for the analysis of structures and properties that suit that scale 
of analysis, so should sociophilosophers take the community as the 
primary unit of analysis when investigating ontologies of natural, social 
and artificial kinds. In this chapter I have presented the framework for 
a collectivist analysis of N/S/A kinds. I have focused on technical 
artefacts as the locus for an interesting study into this framework and 
described one element of how that study can be conducted: a textual 
analysis of referencing practices in petroleum engineering. I have 
discussed criticisms of Barnes and Kusch‘s tripartite ontological 
framework and problems for the collectivist approach (which, 
unsurprisingly, are comparable to the problems faced by collectivist 
approaches in epistemology, moral philosophy, and elsewhere). I have 
suggested that we look at distinctions, oppositions and dichotomies as 
working oppositions rather than logical binaries and look to the 
heuristic value they have for those who employ those distinctions. I 
have described how one community of petroleum engineers refers to 
tools and given reasons why understanding the normative judgments 
of the community are vital for understanding these referencing 
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practices. The outcome supports further research using the collectivist 
account to analyse classifications of artificial kinds.  
 
5.3 Technical knowledge 
5.3.1 Do you know how your radio works? 
 
§5.2 described how engineers have created a distinctive ontology 
regarding technical artefacts which may or may not be commensurable 
with a natural scientific taxonomy. We also discussed and investigated 
Vincenti‘s claim that engineering knowledge aims primarily to ‗design, 
produce and operate artefacts‘. This chapter describes the implications 
of this for a contextual social account of knowledge. In other words, it 
describes how different ontologies lead to different kinds of 
knowledge. 
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Do you know, for instance, how your radio, a technical artefact, works? 
What would be required in order for you to know this? Presumably, 
the answer to this varies according to the context in which the question 
is asked. Suppose that you are visiting an elderly relative who is quite 
technophobic and does not know, for example, how to use a mobile 
phone or personal computer. You might bring them a radio so that 
they can listen to it when they are otherwise unoccupied. You might 
ask them, ‗Do you know how the radio works?‘ Here, you are not 
asking if they know how electromagnetic waves are transmitted 
through the air by a radio station and the antenna on your radio picks 
up the signal by tuning its current to the same frequency as the radio 
waves sent out by the station. The mechanics or physics, as it were, of 
how the radio works. Rather, you are asking if the elderly person 
knows how to use and control the radio in order to pick up the 
particular channel they wish to listen to; if they know how to adjust the 
volume; and if they know how to store particular channels in the 
radio‘s memory. The same question, asked in a school electronics 
classroom might elicit a response similar to that given above. 
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5.3.2 Knowledge of artificial kinds: ―Not a library, but a 
museum‖ 
 
We have seen that several authors claim that artificial kinds are 
rightfully considered as a separate kind of thing from natural and social 
kinds given that we refer to them in a different manner. Specifically, 
artificial kind terms refer both to the alter-reference, the physical, 
structural, corporeal item out there and to the self-referential talk that 
constitutes them. Intuitively, there would be no such thing as a 
hammer if there were not both a) a hammer-shaped object with the 
structural composition of a hammer out there in the world, and b) a 
community part of whose referential practices is to talk about 
hammers. A second peculiarity about artificial kinds is that they 
provide an epistemic value that natural and social kinds typically do 
not. Rocks and marriages, significant as they are to the world that we 
live in, seem epistemically ‗inert‘. That is, the knowledge that we have 
due to their existence, is simply knowledge about them: knowledge that 
limestone is a sedimentary rock, knowing how to get married, 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   274 
 
knowledge that Fred and Wilma are married, knowledge of geology, 
and so on. They do provide new knowledge that we would not have 
were it not for their presence.  
 
However, this is different from the way that, say, a microscope 
provides new knowledge. The new knowledge in this latter case is not 
merely knowledge about microscopes but is a new area of knowledge 
that we did not have available to us before, which we call microscopy: 
knowledge of all the microscopic things which are now visible to us 
and which we were not sure before whether they existed. Surprisingly, 
even within the specialist disciplines of epistemology and philosophy 
of science, very little attention has been paid to this distinct role of 
technical artefacts in the acquisition of knowledge. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to construct systematically a 
framework for epistemic systems that includes human agents, of 
course, but also instruments, tools, technical artefacts. Davis Baird has 
developed what he calls a ‗materialist epistemology for instrumenta-
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tion‘. (Baird 2004). This is conceived of as another kind of knowledge 
alongside the traditional propositional kind, a language-centred kind. 
The problem as he understands it is that the study of instruments in 
the history and philosophy of science has been blocked by our interest 
in language. Language has been assumed to be the main mode of 
communication and thus if we wish to reflect on the history and 
philosophy of science, we must look to publications, primary sources, 
textbooks, and so on. Instruments are not linguistic objects and so 
their role in science is demoted to a machinic, servile capacity.  
 
Of course, described in such terms, this is extremely reductive. 
Instruments and their history has had a formative role on the particular 
knowledge we have acquired. The subtitle for this chapter comes from 
Mike Mahoney‘s evocative proposal to replace the history and 
philosophy of science as a history of literature with a history of things. 
(Mahoney 1999) Inspired by Mahoney, Baird‘s approach is to articulate 
a history and philosophy by taking apart instruments and exposing the 
tacit and visual kind of knowledge which he calls ‗thing knowledge‘. 
According to Baird, technical artefacts are ‗constitutive of scientific 
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knowledge in a manner different from theory, and not simple 
―instrumental to‖ theory.‘ (Baird 1999, p. 1) The collectivist approach 
also considers ‗thing knowledge‘ to be a particular kind of knowledge 
but I do not wish to say, with Baird, that it is non-propositional. On 
the contrary, the tools described in the case study are fundamentally 
data-centric (see §5.1). They provide analysts with information which 
they then turn into knowledge claims. Instead of abandoning 
traditional propositional epistemology, I hope to preserve that same 
format but bring technology into that account in a formative role. In 
particular, I wish to say that the analysts develop perceptual skills 
which they can use to interpret the data log images that the tools 
provide. 
 
A functional account of tools may lead us to adopt a functional 
account of the knowledge of tools. Bird (2010) develops precisely such 
an epistemology in more general terms. He seeks to provide a social 
analogue for individual knowledge by analysing social organizations as 
analogous to an individual organism. 
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5.3.3 Reliability and error 
 
One third of the references in the textual analysis are to reliability 
issues. Knorr Cetina notes that at CERN, what is done primarily 
depends on problems which need to be resolved (be it problems of 
technology or problems of reliability). Similarly, work in the company 
on the ground and at the office is often about solving particular 
problems as they arise.  
 
Much of the well positioning process is concerned with the avoidance 
of mistakes. Put another way, it ensures the delivery of objectives which 
most people involved in the upstream business take for granted. (BP 
Amoco Upstream Technology Group 1999, p. 19) 
 
This quote encapsulates the emphasis on error. Analysts are counselled 
against relying on data as accurate. They must always corroborate, 
compare, contrast, correct, calibrate, and coordinate. This in itself 
suggests a different kind of knowledge from the kind we are used to in 
other areas of inquiry. Compare the petroleum engineer reading a well 
log with, say, a lawyer pronouncing on a matter of law. In the latter 
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case, the lawyer can say, in most instances, with a high degree of 
confidence, that her assertion is accurate. If she needs to check, she 
can look up the relevant statute or case law. If she has doubts, she can 
ask a colleague. At some point, they will come to an assertion that very 
closely resembles the truth. This is because truths in law are matters of 
convention. They have been stipulated by the community and have 
been stipulated in such a way as to make accurate interpretations likely, 
in so far as this is possible. Any debates can be quite easily settled by 
referring to relevant texts. Truth, insofar as it may said to come into 
the picture here, is decidedly pragmatic. The aim of inquiry is not to 
acquire unassailable facts but to get knowledge good enough that it works. 
 
5.3.4 Conclusions of a textual analysis of reference to ‗tools‘ 
in directional drilling and production logging analysis 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion in chapter 4 and the results of §5.2 
we have the following summary of technical knowledge: 
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1. Technical knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge. 
2.  It includes use know-how as well as knowledge of how to 
design, produce, and operate artefacts. 
3. This knowledge is a central component of engineering and 
provides a distinction between the knowledge possessed by 
engineers and that possessed by natural scientists (although 
there is undoubtedly a great deal of cross-over between the 
disciplines). 
4. Technical artefacts have a proper function. Comprehensive 
knowledge requires knowledge both of this proper function 
and its empirical characteristics. 
5. Proper function is constrained by normative considerations 
which are collectively and performatively sustained. 
6. Technical artefacts are an artificial kind. 
7. Artificial kinds are social institutions (due to self-reference) 
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8. Technical knowledge (knowledge of technical artefacts) is 
knowledge of a social institution. 
9. Proper function is known, in the main, through testimony. 
10. This substantiates Kusch‘s claim at least in this case that the 
community is prior to the individual in the order of explana-
tion. 
11. Engineering knowledge is social. 
 
If the findings of the textual analysis alone hold more widely, 
Crusoe‘s construction cannot be accurately referred to as a tool as 
we cannot refer to it in similar enough terms. We cannot compare 
Crusoe‘s use with an accepted code of use (whether written as 
instructions or embedded in a community of users); we cannot 
know if it has achieved successful results as the success conditions 
are community-relative. Instead, because Crusoe has no communi-
ty of his own by which to make these comparisons, the collectivist 
analyst has to compare Crusoe‘s usage to that of an existing type of 
artefact in another community to make sense of the artefact qua 
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artefact. In other words, we must say ‗Crusoe is using a knife‘ and 
adopt Crusoe temporarily into our own community in order to 
make sense of what he is doing. The counter-intuitive conclusion is 
that Crusoe can only make tools if we posit him as part of another 
community. The advantage here is that the category of tool does 
not collapse into anything a person happens to use to fulfill a 
purpose, a conclusion that would be incompatible with the 
outcome of my analysis of tools used in engineering.  
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Chapter 6 
Seeing (and knowing) with technical artefacts 
6.1 Extended epistemic systems in action 
 
6.1.1 Introduction to extended epistemic systems 
Insofar as theoretical epistemology gets naturalised into a chapter of 
theoretical science, so normative epistemology gets naturalised into a 
chapter of engineering: the technology of anticipating sensory 
stimulation. (Quine 1990, p. 19) 
 
In previous chapters I have emphasized the need for a social analysis 
of knowledge. I argued that we should examine the textual reference-
talk within communities to understand what is meant by a variety of 
concepts. This provides an empirical method for analysing knowledge 
attributions. However, this alone would not be enough to characterize 
the epistemic practices of engineers. It would not capture the reference 
to the non-social world that their epistemic practices inevitably involve. 
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As we saw in Ch. 4, technology is not a purely social matter. What is 
required is a combination of social and physical components akin to 
that outlined in the DNA and CAT approaches. The next two chapters 
attempt to give due attention to the non-social (or perhaps I should say 
less social) elements of knowledge in petroleum engineering. In this 
chapter I look at the processes of perception involved in analysing well 
logs and other problem-solving and in Ch. 7 I consider whether the 
best fit for the analysing this knowledge would be an informational 
approach. 
 
I focus here on perceptual knowledge. It may be the case that what I 
say about the sociotechnical nature of perceptual knowledge is 
generalizable to other kinds of knowledge but the strongest case I can 
find is that of perceptual knowledge. I introduce the philosophy of 
engineering problem of unobservables and discuss issues that arise 
from this problem. I discuss perceptual knowledge in epistemology and 
cognitive science and assess the merits of a model based on Bayesian 
inference to production logging analysis and gyroscopic surveying. I 
further argue that knowledge of this kind is acquired by an extended 
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epistemic system. Extended epistemic systems are, put simply, human 
agents plus x.77 This x could be a technical artefact that provides 
information and extends ordinary human epistemic capacities (such as 
an altimeter, microscope, or pair of spectacles); or it could be another 
human agent (such as in cases of testimony or joint inquiry). In these 
cases, the human agent alone does not produce knowledge, nor does 
the x produce knowledge but the system as a whole co-produces 
knowledge. I then explore in more detail the sociotechnical structure of 
one institution and its practices. In this chapter I will look at three ways 
in which information is carried by instruments in production logging 
analysis and wellbore navigation, two niche fields of petroleum 
engineering. I consider how fruitfully each can be seen as sources of 
perceptual knowledge.  
 
Such is the extent to which technology encroaches upon the processes 
we think of as entirely mental that the closer one analyses what is 
                                                          
77 The idea that certain cognitive processes extend beyond the boundaries of the human 
skull has been discussed extensively in research in extended mind theory (Clark 2000, 
2001; Clark & Chalmers 1998) and in relation to epistemic processes in Goldberg 2007, 
2012; Hetherington 2012; Marsh & Onof 2008; Pritchard 2010b; Roberts 2012; and 
Vaesen 2011a. 
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occurring in, let us say, an engineering analyst‘s professional work, the 
less clear the natural-artificial distinction becomes. Indeed, when one 
introduces the element of socialization which is undeniably relevant to 
most instances of knowledge it is not possible to draw this fine 
distinction between skin-and-skull perceivers and extended social 
corporate agents. If the reader is not convinced of this point at present 
I hope they will be more sympathetic to why I have taken this 
approach by the end of the chapter. To illustrate this claim, consider a 
typical case of perception: an individual agent sees that an object is 
blue. She does this without the aid of any technology (she does not 
use, say, a microscope or colourimeter to acquire knowledge of the 
object‘s colour).78 In another case the agent is still acting alone but 
wearing spectacles or contact lenses. Clearly this does not normally 
affect the epistemic status of her belief. 
 
In another case she is underwater in a swimming pool and seeing 
through an artificial solution of water, chlorine and perhaps some 
                                                          
78 A colourimeter is a device that measures the absorbance of wavelengths of light by a solution 
and hence can be used to determine colour. 
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other compounds such as cyanuric acid or bromide. Again, it would be 
churlish to say that now she does not perceive the colour directly but 
her perception is mediated through the artificial substance in some way 
which does not occur when there is only air between the eyes and the 
object. In yet another case the agent is looking through a video 
recorder at the object. Yes, this is technological extension of a time but 
to suggest that her epistemic status with respect to the colour of the 
object is in any significant sense compromised or dependent on the 
technology seems tenuous. As a counter-point, apparent cases of 
perception where technology is involved are similarly opaque. In many 
cases, the processes involved are substantially similar. 
 
As shall be demonstrated in 6.2, it looks increasingly unlikely that 
sound, stable, non-stipulative, non-arbitrary grounds for distinguishing 
between a natural organism‘s eyes and cognitive processes and the 
processes of an extended organism such as a microscopist or a data 
analyst (meaning the combination of a person and an instrument or 
instruments of technology) can be provided. In §6.1.5 I look at the 
particular technologies in my fieldwork research, how they are used, 
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and how the transmit information to the analyst. Before doing so, 
however, there is another step that must be made. Even if both 
extended epistemic systems and individual agents perceive in 
comparable ways, there remains a difference, namely, the apparent 
immediateness of the latter as compared with the more elongated, 
separated transmissions of the former. This is the question I now turn 
to. 
6.1.2 Is perception immediate or inferential? 
 
I have phrased the question above as I have because it may mark a 
difference in approach between some analytic philosophical theories of 
perception and a growing research programme in cognitive science. I 
would like to suggest that the distinction between what we phenome-
nologically describe as ‗immediate‘ experiences and the more 
deliberative reflective experiences is tenuous and we should treat all 
perceptual experiences as belonging to the one spectrum of inferential 
cognitive processes. Some epistemologists have argued that perception 
can be immediate and have appealed to the phenomenological 
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experience of seeing what something is without any noticeable 
reflective awareness. (McDermid 2001, Millar 2000) Alan Millar, for 
instance, writes that, 
 
[Perceptual knowledge] is phenomenologically immediate, in the sense 
that it is not acquired via inference from prior assumptions. If you 
know perceptually that something is a bottle of milk then it simply 
strikes you that this is so on seeing it. (Millar 2000, p. 73) 
 
Millar adds that this non-inferential kind of knowledge is not limited to 
that which is perceptually manifest either (that is, facts concerning the 
way things appear). Millar expands on this position elsewhere thus,79 
 
What makes sense of the perceptualist model is a conception of 
perceptual knowledge as non-inferential knowledge acquired by suitably equipped 
subjects from what they perceive. Perceptual knowledge is the kind of 
knowledge we acquire when we tell from its look that a bird is a magpie 
or that a flower is an orchid. It is non-inferential knowledge in that it is 
not acquired by reasoning from prior assumptions. It is 
phenomenologically immediate in that what is known simply strikes the 
subject as being so. (Millar 2008a, p. 591. Original emphasis.) 
 
                                                          
79 To put the following quote in context, Millar is here arguing that knowledge of other minds is 
a kind of perceptual knowledge. See also Millar 2008b. 
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I wish to argue in this chapter that Millar‘s position mischaracterizes 
perceptual knowledge. Not only is it incorrect to say that perceptual 
knowledge is non-inferential but it is unduly restrictive as inferential 
perceptual processes can confer the same epistemic credit upon beliefs 
as more ‗immediate‘ processes such as the everyday perceptual cases 
Millar cites. 
 
In §2.2.2 I alluded to the acceptance of constructivism within the 
biological study of the eye. I remarked that perceptions have been 
shown to be constructs in the sense that they are fabricated by the 
perceiver‘s perceptual apparatus in various ways and not invariable 
representations of visual stimuli. Let us now expand on that starting 
point. It would be naïve to assume that we are all equally good 
perceivers. For example, some people are excellent at recognizing 
faces; who are sometimes referred to as ‗super-recognizers‘. (Russell, 
Duchaine, & Nakayama 2009) Others have cognitive disorders that 
prevent them from recognizing the faces of even their own family. 
Researchers have discovered that people will ‗hone in‘ on different 
clues in order to match a face to a name. Sufferers of prosopagnosia 
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lack most of these clue-identifying abilities and some have learnt to 
cope by, for instance, remembering the colour of someone‘s shirt or 
the kind of shoes they wear. None of this variation in the way the eye 
and the brain construct images puts into jeopardy their epistemological 
standing and we frequently and uncontroversially attribute knowledge 
on the basis of beliefs formed on the basis of perception. Now, 
constructivism about ‗higher order‘ cognitive processes does not easily 
fall out of this fact. Constructivism about knowledge and social 
constructivism do not have the same empirical scientific backing that 
constructivist perception and psychology do. 
 
We know a great deal about how the eye perceives. Some of the more 
elementary details of this I have outlined in the following chapter. We 
accept that merely because these tasks are inferential, this does not put 
their epistemic standing in jeopardy. There is generally no problem 
with attributing knowledge on the basis that the knower has seen the 
thing in question (indeed, some cultures will only attribute knowledge 
on the basis that the speaker has seen the thing in question). However, 
when we make the move from saying that an eye perceiving is 
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unproblematically constructive to a whole person inquiring, the thesis 
becomes much harder to accept. 
 
One of the key findings of my fieldwork research is that the more 
familiarity, skill, and prior knowledge we have in a particular perceptual 
task, the more it begins to feel like an immediate experience. Our 
minds, I suggest, are so familiar and practised in perceiving common 
everyday objects that we never engage in any reflection upon whether 
or not what we are doing is perceptual. Millar‘s argument and mine are 
both based on intuitive or phenomenal grounds: for Millar, it seems like 
we have immediate perception; and for me I note the phenomenologi-
cal experiences of analysts working in the field. 
 
Granted, it takes a great deal of additional skill and practice to do what 
I observed many data analysts such as the logging analysts in an 
engineering office doing: that is, to feel like those data analyses are also 
perceptual. When we examine the differences between what our eyes 
are doing and what our eyes-plus-glasses or eyes-plus-microscopes or 
eyes-plus-computers are doing it may no longer be surprising that 
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sufficient practice in any one of these tasks will lead to very similar 
phenomenological experiences. That means that most cases of seeing 
ordinary objects will appear to require no cognitive effort at all. We just 
see that the tool is on the table. Some authors conflate this phenomeno-
logical ‗immediacy‘ with an epistemological privilege or priority. 
However, there does not appear to be anything in the timeliness of an 
experience that confers upon it a particular epistemic privilege. By way 
of example, we do not think that the first belief that comes to mind 
when considering a mathematical equation is more reliable or more 
likely to be true than one that is formed later. 
 
Jerry Fodor hints at the inferential character of perception when he 
writes that, 
 
Perception must involve hypothesis formation and confirmation 
because the organism must somehow manage to infer the appropriate 
task-relevant description of the environment from its physical 
description together with whatever background information about the 
structure of the environment it has available. (Fodor 1975, p. 50) 
 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   293 
 
The connection between this characterization of perception and the 
characterization of PLA I have given is brought into relief in the 
following statement when Fodor compares perception to learning, 
 
Perception is essentially a matter of problem solving, where the form of 
the problem is to predict the character of future sensory experience 
given the character of past and current sensations as data. Conceived 
this way, models of perception have the same general structure as 
models of concept learning: one needs a canonical form for the 
representation of the data, one needs a source of hypotheses for the 
extrapolation of the data, and one needs a confirmation metric to select 
among the hypotheses. (Fodor 1975, p. 42) 
 
§6.2.2 details a cognitive scientific interpretation of perception which 
echoes Fodor‘s account above. It is not known whether this Bayesian 
approach is a true reflection of our cognitive faculties but it provides 
an example of how an inferential process might work. (Wolpert & 
Ghahramani 2006) At the very least there is a case to answer here as to 
why we ought to accept the intuition-based arguments in favour of the 
immediateness of perception over an empirically-based argument that 
perception is inferential. It is likely that some form of inferential 
perception such as this does more accurately model the visual system 
and, more importantly, will allow us to make better predictions. 
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6.1.3 The engineering problem of unobservables 
 
Production logging analysis is a range of practices for acquiring 
knowledge about the properties and composition of fluids at various 
depths of a well. This is done primarily to derive the following: 
 
i. The percentages of hydrocarbons (oil, gas and water) at 
different depths or ‗zones,‘ 
ii. Which zones are producing (i.e. have one or more type of 
fluid entering the zone from perforations made in the pipe 
or by other means) and in what composition, 
iii. Which zones are thieving (i.e. have one or more type of 
fluid leaving the zone). 
 
Nowadays, this is most frequently a sophisticated procedure involving 
teams of analysts discussing amongst themselves well-logs such as that 
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pictured in fig. 7. One aspect of this discipline which is epistemologi-
cally interesting is that it concerns knowledge about things which are 
outside our ordinary unaided field of vision but also look similar to 
perceptual knowledge as described above. Once one has acquired a 
certain skill in perceiving, discriminating and interpreting images such 
it is common to describe ones experiences in perceptual terms. The 
problem of unobservables has been a longstanding research project in 
the philosophy of science. (van Fraasen 1980; Muller & van Fraasen 
2007) I would like to introduce here a new problem that is related but 
creates its own philosophical issues and questions. The problem of 
unobservables in the philosophy of engineering is distinctive in that it 
arises not because entities, events or states are imperceptibly small but 
because they are deep under the ground. The principle problem is the 
same: how can we see something which is outside an ordinary unaided 
human field of vision? 
 
However, unlike in philosophy of science, no one doubts the existence 
of, for example, a sedimentary rock formation or a volume of water or 
considers such entities mere theoretical postulates. It is, at least in 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   296 
 
principle, logically possible to perceive the rock composition outside 
zone 6. It would even be technologically conceivable even though 
modern cameras would be expensive and ineffective (light would tend 
to reflect off bubbles in the fluid and produce blurry images, and so 
on). The practical solution is also the same in engineering as in science. 
We are given the opportunity to acquire knowledge about these 
unobservables because technical artefacts stand-in for human 
perceptual capacities and enable knowledge of entities, events, and 
states which would be otherwise unavailable with ordinary unaided 
human visual capacities. Since we are talking about things which 
cannot be perceived (which is more general than things which cannot 
be observed) we might more properly call such knowledge, knowledge 
of imperceivables. 
6.1.4 The Enactive Torch 
 
I wish to submit that technology bridges this epistemological gap 
between that which is inaccessible to us and knowledge of it, and thus 
that technology is a formative element in a comprehensive epistemolo-
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gy of this type of knowledge. Take for example a device developed in 
England known as the Enactive Torch. (Froese et al. 2012) The 
Enactive Torch is an ultrasonic sensor with a vibro-tactile motor that 
generates feedback to someone holding the handle, the intensity of 
which varies according to the sensor‘s proximity to an object (like a 
cross between a rumblepad and a bat). Blindfolded participants are 
asked to use the Torch to perceive the position of a nearby object. The 
researchers aim towards developing what they call a ‗phenomenological 
pragmatics of enactive perception‘ which involves considering the 
strategies developed by users of this device to navigate their 
environment or detect nearby objects as either extensions of existing 
or constitutions of new percepts of perceiving or new ways of 
perceiving. You can imagine that once users become skilled and 
practiced at manipulating the device that they can accomplish quite 
adept and sophisticated tasks easily. In this case the instrument 
produces a signal that carries the information that replaces the 
information sought by the eyes and hands in ordinary unaided 
perception. 
 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   298 
 
The developers of the Enactive Torch describe three kinds of strategy 
adopted by users to accomplish their tasks: cognitive, intuitive and 
unknown. The cognitive strategy involves something like panning the 
room until they detect an object. Unknown strategies are where the 
user was unable to provide any coherent account of their method; 
these strategies were not successful. The intuitive strategies are those 
where the user described their process in terms of ‗feeling their way 
around‘ or words to that effect. In these cases, the torch has become a 
new set of eyes or, alternatively, a new perceptual apparatus. In such 
cases the instrument has begun to disappear as an addition or 
supplement. As Polanyi poetically put it: 
 
We may say that when we learn [a] probe, or a tool, and thus make 
ourselves aware of these things as we are of our body, we interiorize 
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6.1.5 Three sources of perception in petroleum engineering 
 
Production logging analysis is a messy business. PLTs provide us with 
well-logs which are open to interpretation in a way that reading a 
compass card inscription is not. There are many values coming in and 
they often do not easily fit into a single interpretation. One cannot 
isolate any one of these values and draw reliable conclusions. Put two 
analysts in a room with the same well-log and there is no guarantee 
they will answer questions in the same way (particularly if they have 
differing levels of experience) and it is very likely that they will differ 
over the specifics.80 
 
As such, an issue arises over how judgments are made. Issues are 
common where a training manual cannot provide the answer, a 
software package will not provide reliable results, there is no articulable 
                                                          
80 The effects of standardization and regulation of industry practices, training exercises, together 
with professional and social influences, instead of optimizing strategies, in practice can hide the 
lack of clarity of interpretation. 
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algorithm for solving the problem, and analysts disagree. A judgment 
has to be made. Occasionally, an analyst will refer to this practice in 
perceptual terms: ‗I can just see that zone 6 is thieving water‘. Certainly 
a lot of background processing is going on in his mind before he 
makes that kind of assertion involving corroborating data, past 
experiences, and so on but nevertheless it feels like a perceptual activity. 
Some of us will know the example from the film The Matrix where a 
computer programmer is viewing what looks to us to be a screen of 
green binary code but in his mind seeing a woman in a red dress walk 
through a busy metropolis. With familiarity and practice comes the 
immediateness of experience that Millar describes. And instantaneous-
ness at least feels like perception.81  
 
Now I wish to return in the light of this discussion to photographs and 
the camera that produce them. First let us be clear about the perceptual 
nature of the camera. If we are looking down the barrel of a telescope 
we would, I think, have no problem in saying that we see the Moon 
                                                          
81 I am making a claim here about how knowledge is perceived by the community and so how 
knowledge acquisition feels is significant. 
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eclipse the Sun, for instance. There is no reason to think this simple 
reflection of light and configuration of lenses should be a barrier to 
genuine perception, any more than is a pair of contact lenses. A digital 
camera, however, may be different. Common sense intuits two 
differences: 
 
1. The image produced appears fuzzier, grainier, you might say ‗less 
real‘ having been translated into the ‗blocky‘ texture of digital pixels. 
 
2. If we are not watching the event in real-time but as a recording, 
this fact may lead us to conclude that we are not really seeing the event. 
 
Does either of these intuitive differences provide a clear distinction 
between seeing with a telescope and not-seeing with a camera? Take 
the first: Does the fuzziness of a photograph mean that it is not seen? 
Imagine you are in a swimming pool with your eyes open. You see a 
crab crawl along the floor of the pool and into a toy castle. Now, in the 
second case the water has been drained from the pool. Again you see a 
crab crawling along the floor and into a castle. In the second case, the 
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image you receive is much clearer than in the former case. The 
situation is similar to what would be seen if a camera were to be 
dropped into an oil well (and is the reason why this is not used in 
production logging as a means for seeing what is going on down 
there).82 
 
However, as long as the image is still interpretable, as it clearly is in the 
case of underwater perception or acclimatizing oneself to an unfamiliar 
perceptual situation (such as a trainee cricket umpire might have to do 
to spot the minuscule actions and events that an experienced umpire 
would), then we can confidently call this a case of seeing. One 
drawback of the film-based system is that when the drill-pipe is bent 
there is reactive torque. A photograph taken under these conditions 
appears blurry, like the photographs someone might take of a jogger in 
a park. Secondly, one needs to keep taking photographs to check the 
                                                          
82 
Oil and water mixed together are not easy to see through: not for human eyes and not for 
cameras. Light does not penetrate the flowing emulsion and reflects off the bubbles. In any case, 
cameras are temperature sensitive and would not cope well with subsurface conditions. 
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drilling is proceeding in the correct direction. This is plainly impractical 
and readings such as these are made by resolvers on the instrument 
(compass face) that makes an electrical signal that is memorised or sent 
uphole rather than a picture to be photographed. For example, the 
magnetic single-shot is one of the earliest camera-based surveying tools 
developed by Eastman-Christensen. The instrument barrel has a small 
photographic disc and camera unit which can take a photograph of an 
angle-measuring unit. The camera captures an image of a pendulum 
superimposed over a compass card.  
 
What about the issue with recorded images? One can look through the 
viewer of a digital camera and see an event in real time in much the 
same way as one looks through it to see a recording of the event. Does 
the difference that this event happened in the past preclude it from 
counting as perception? Presumably not, since all acts of perception are 
temporally delayed. If we are seeing a lion chase and catch a gazelle the 
excitement of the live event causes us to agree eagerly that we are 
seeing the lion chase and catch the gazelle. But we are not in fact 
seeing the event at exactly the moment it occurs. All acts of perception 
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must be received and interpreted by the perceiver‘s visual apparatus 
and neural cortex. It is near-instantaneous but it is not quite and some 
animals will perceive it that bit quicker (others slower). 
 
The reports produced by surveying instruments are necessarily delayed. 
What we receive are images of what has happened rather than what is 
happening. Would that be reason enough to deny that it is seeing? On 
the basis of the previous arguments the answer must be no. An appeal 
to ordinary language, though never conclusive, provides further 
support. Certainly, the following interchange seems perfectly natural: 
 
A: Did you see the football match last night? 
B: Yes, I saw it this morning on the later showing. 
 
Would it be appropriate here for A to respond ‗So you didn‘t see the 
match‘? It seems not. Thus, temporality is not central to perception. 
Then what is? I would argue one part of that answer would include the 
processing of information. This, after all, is what our eyes and brains 
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do every waking moment. It is also what electron microscopes do 
when they receive input stimuli and process them to produce a 
meaningful image. And it is what gyroscopes do when they sense the 
rotation of the Earth and produce from this a measurement of their 
orientation.  
 
To return to our issue of perception knowledge in logging analysis, my 
submission was that there are stable, non-stipulative, non-arbitrary 
grounds for distinguishing between perception in the ‗ordinary‘ case 
and in the ‗analysis‘ case. This is important from an epistemological 
standpoint as perception is generally taken to be a primary source of 
knowledge together with memory, innate ideas, introspection, 
testimony, perhaps, and so on. That is not to say that each of these are 
equally reliable—in fact, it is quite difficult to ascertain the reliability of 
logging analysis for reasons that will become clear—but that they are 
sufficient justifications in and of themselves for belief. In other words, 
a reliable perceptual system is an epistemic virtue and a perceiver can 
be held epistemically responsible for beliefs formed as a result of 
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perceptual processes. This conclusion will have consequences for the 
second half of this section. 
 
What is being perceived, however, does differ from ordinary cases of 
seeing bottles on tables, and so on. We can ‗see‘ using film-based 
systems such as these but they do not record images, only values. 
There is a problem of how we can see subterranean and submarine 
events and entities and whether this is different from, for instance, 
seeing with a camera or seeing with a microscope. I call this the 
engineering problem of unobservables. The problem of unobservables 
usually relates to a problem in the philosophy of science about the 
ontological status of microscopic entities such as electrons or quarks or 
Higgs Bosons. Given that we cannot see these entities directly – as we 
see what Austin called ‗medium-sized dry goods‘ – then can we be 
justified in saying that they do really exist in the same sense as fridges 
and persons exist or should we say that they are at best theoretical 
postulates?  
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Now, there is no question that the hydrocarbons and rock formations, 
and so on, do really exist. And yet we cannot make, with the same 
confidence, assertions about their nature as we do with regard to 
bottles on tables or the colour of the sea. The solutions we use to 
improve the reliability of our assertions, however, are the same: 
technological. With regard to microscopic entities, we use, naturally, 
microscopes and such like to see the entities (or at least, the traces they 
leave). With regard to subterranean entities, we use gyroscopes, sensors 
and other measuring tools. In logging analysis, for example, it would be 
possible to send cameras down to record and transmit real-time images 
of the surrounding rock formations or of the fluids themselves. But it 
would also be impractical, expensive and ineffective. Likewise, we used 
to examine physical cuttings from the rock formation recovered from 
the drilling process i.e. directly perceive the rock particles. However, 
this is now largely superseded by the more useful methods of logging 
analysis. 
 
Let us split this technological history into three parts. We have in the 
first instance what we might call direct examples of perceptual 
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surveying. These involved perhaps simply looking at samples of the 
rock formation or, slightly more obtusely, a physical wax form of the 
inclination drawn out of the well. Any knowledge derived from these 
methods is unarguably perceptual. Secondly, we have methods one 
step abstracted from the direct methods. I will call these inscription 
methods. They involve a tool which makes a physical mark (a stylus 
point, pen or photograph) referring to a state of the well. Thirdly and 
lastly, we have what I will call inferential methods. These involve digital 
data records which are then interpreted and inferred as referring to 
states of the well. These inferential methods are the latest in a 
progression towards more abstracted and more sophisticated 
techniques for acquiring knowledge about oil wells but, as I have 
argued, we can still analyse them as perceptually-sourced, if the agents 
involved possess sufficient perceptual and professional capacities.83 
 
                                                          
83 The history as I have written it pertains directly to the oil and gas industry. However, the 
reader should be aware that these methods are put to use in other industries such as drilling 
underground pipelines, tapping geothermal resources, exploration of other kinds of mineral 
deposits (such as coal, phosphates, and potassium), drilling underground chambers for nuclear 
tests, and others. Whilst we are interested in how sociotechnical systems in the oil industry 
shaped the development of this technology we ought to keep in mind that it was not the only 
relevant industry and that other actors have played a significant role. 
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Suppose that you accept that the users of the Enactive Torch acquire a 
new way of perceiving or a new percept of a way of perceiving or 
extend an existing capacity. Compare this with the following three 
cases in petroleum engineering. I will present three putative sources of 
perceptual knowledge which I will call, for want of better terms in each 
case direct, inscribed, and inferred. These sources follow roughly 
chronological order of their introduction to the industry. 
 
Category I Direct. We have already seen some direct forms of 
instrumental information in Ch. 5. In this chapter I discussed the early 
tools of borehole surveying and drilling such as the wax cylinders used 
in African diamond mines. Similarly, geological methods which 
examine rock cuttings are called here ‗direct‘. Both involve ‗face-to-
face‘ encounters with a physical (not a representational) product of the 
rock formation. I would include it in what I am calling direct 
instrumental information about the well inclination for reasons that I 
hope will become clear. There are no great philosophical quandaries 
here. A camera sent down to look at the fluid would also be direct 
information if it were practical.  
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Category II Inscribed. The inscribed source is exemplified by the 
Teledrift and TOTCO tools, developed as a significant advance over 
wax cylinders. These tools communicate their information through 
physical imprints in the environment or in their own system. The 
Teledrift tool communicates its results using mud-pulse telemetry, a 
process that exploits pressure differences to carry binary signals to a 
surface reader. A pendulum is connected to a plunger and inclination is 
derived from the number of restrictions through which the plunger 
passes. The TOTCO tool also uses a pendulum with a stylus attached 
which penetrates a paper disc marked with concentric rings indicating 
hole inclinations. As with Dretske‘s argument that tree rings carry a 
signal (bits of information) to a receiver – viz. the information that the 
tree is a certain number of years old – the markings on this disc carry 
bits of information about the wellbore inclination to the receiver at the 
surface. (Dretske 1983) The disc is recovered and the marks provide a 
physical representation of the wellbore inclination. Cameras were used 
in early wellbore navigation but they do not film or take pictures of the 
well but of a pendulum and compass card unit.  
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Category III Inferential. Inferential sources communicate their 
information not through direct perception of their states or through 
physical inscriptions but through encoded data. I would not be 
surprised if this was the most contentious example of a perceptual 
source. I will argue that this contentiousness derives primarily from a 
lack of familiarity with the perceptual capacity. That is, if we were more 
familiar with the capacity it would seem more like perception (see my 
earlier argument for the immediatacy of experienced perception).  
 
6.2 Senses and sensors: The extension of perceptual 
capacities with technical artefacts 
 
6.2.1 Seeing with microscopes vs. seeing with gyroscopes 
 
Fortunately, a similar argument to the one I am making has been made 
by Elisabeth Pacherie. (Pacherie 1995) She argues that there are no 
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stable criteria for distinguishing between the natural perceptual 
instruments in the skull and artefactual perceptual instruments such as 
those developed by micro-biologists, petroleum engineers, and so on 
(other than the arguably tenuous and stipulative distinction between 
the natural and the artificial.)84 Here I argue that the images generated 
by PL tools are perceptual sources of information of the fluid in the 
well just as the images generated by electron microscopes are 
perceptual sources of information of electrons. 
 
Pacherie refers to instruments used in generating knowledge as 
―epistemic artefacts‖ and compares their contribution to the one made 
by our naturally-endowed epistemic organs or systems. In particular, 
she focuses on microscopes and compares these with the visual organs 
and systems. She notes that all perception is indirect in that it involves 
acquired skills and learned knowledge beyond the innate abilities we 
are born with. Since both microscope and ordinary images ―carry 
information about the spatial properties of distal layouts‖ there are no 
                                                          
84 See Ch. 4 for discussion of this distinction. 
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stable, non-stipulative grounds for distinguishing between ―seeing with 
eyes‖ and ―seeing with microscopes‖. However, with practice comes 
the appearance of instantaneousness. I have argued that there is no 
difference either between ‗seeing with microscopes‘ and ‗seeing with 
gyroscopes‘ (so named by Laplace because they ‗see‘ the rotation of the 
Earth) and we eliminate the one at the expense of the other. I and the 
engineers I worked with are not the only ones to make the allusion to 
inferential perception. Here is Oberto Serra, a geologist, in his 
textbook on well-log analysis: 
 
More recently, however, there has been an increasing appreciation of 
the value of log data as a source of more general geological information. 
Geologists have realized, in fact, that well-logs can be to the subsurface 
rock what the eyes and geological instruments are to the surface outcrop. 
(Serra 1984, p. 2. Emphasis added.) 
 
And a quote from the BP Amoco handbook: 
 
Since both well and geological target are invisible from the surface, we 
can never really know whether the one passes through the other. We 
can only infer it from survey tool measurements and well results. (BP 
Amoco Upstream Technology Group 1999, p. 3) 
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In fact, it is not hard to find descriptions of inferential perception in 
what one would assume to contain descriptions purely of procedural 
instructions and data-processing.  
 
We have so far discussed four non-biological putative instrumental 
sources of perceptual knowledge. That is, instruments which 
communicate signals which carry information that can provide 
perceptual knowledge: the Enactive Torch; direct instruments such as 
the wax cylinder and those used in geological tests; inscribed 
instruments such as the TOTCO and Teledrift tools; and inferential 
instruments such as the Gyro tool. Of the three classifications of tools 
in petroleum engineering, the Gyro most readily gives itself to 
perceptual descriptions of the information it carries. That is, engineers 
and analysts using the Gyro are more likely to say ‗it just looks like…‘ 
than someone reading a compass card where the phrase ‗looks like‘ 
refers to the state of affairs underground and not a measurement of the 
state of affairs. Why is this? I would suggest that it is because whether 
something seems like perception is a factor of two things: complexity 
of information and familiarity. When we are born our eyes are open 
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but we lack the experience to tell things apart, to select from our 
environment what is relevant and ignore the rest, to become skilled 
perceivers. The situation is the same for any form of perception. 
Consequently, any skilled processing of spatial or distal layouts will not 
seem like perception if it is easier than the ‗basic‘ perception that it 
supervenes on.  
 
6.2.2 The Bayesian approach 
 
What might an inferential theory of perception look like? In this 
section I will outline an approach to perception from cognitive science 
which provides an example. Let us say that a state (or a situation) is a 
set of variables in a process that generates sensory data or inputs. 
States, that is, cause sensory inputs. Typically those variables vary 
rapidly and continuously over time. Hence, states of the world change 
rapidly and continuously over time. However, some variables (in 
processes generating sensory inputs) change discretely and on a slower 
time scale. Sets of these discrete and slowly changing variables can be 
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taken as contexts. The distinction between state and context is 
important, but for my argument it won‘t make a significant difference. 
So, for ease of discussion, if not otherwise specified, I shall use ‗state‘ 
to refer to both states and contexts. The only access we have to the 
world is through our senses which can be viewed as sources of 
information about the states of the world. This information is generally 
corrupted by random fluctuations, noise, and ambiguity. The same 
sensory information can be caused by many different states and the 
same states may cause different types of sensory information. When we 
act in the world, moreover, our motor signals are also corrupted by 
noise. Since intelligent and adaptive behaviour is tied to the ability to 
survive in a changing and uncertain environment, our cognitive system 
must handle this sensory and motor uncertainty in order to extract 
information about which state obtains in the world. The Bayesian 
framework provides one principled way this sensory and motor 
uncertainty can be handled in order for us to behave adaptively in our 
world. 
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Bayesian inference is a type of statistical inference where data (or new 
information) are used to update the probability that a hypothesis is 
true. To say that a system performs Bayesian inference is to say that it 
updates the probability that a hypothesis H is true given some data D 
by executing Bayes‘ rule, 
 
[1]      Prob (H|D) = Prob (D|H)Prob (H) / Prob (D) 
 
In other words, ‗the probability of the hypothesis given the data 
(P(H|D)) is the probability of the data given the hypothesis (P(D|H)) 
times the prior probability of the hypothesis (P(H)) divided by the 
probability of the data (P(D)).‘ 
 
In the case of our cognitive system, hypotheses consist of states of the 
world, and data to sensory inputs. As our cognitive system receives 
sensory information, the probability distribution over the possible 
states of the world is updated via [1]. There are in fact accumulating 
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pieces of evidence that suggest that our cognitive systems might 
implement Bayesian inference. (Doya et al 2007; Knill & Richards 
1996; Rao, Olshausen, & Lewicki 2002) Even though the main type of 
evidence comes from psychophysical tasks where people‘s perfor-
mance is shown to approximate the Bayesian optimum, broad features 
of biological sensory systems can be explained in a Bayesian 
framework. Prior knowledge about the causal structure of the 
environment would be encoded in the backward connections. Forward 
connections would provide feedback by transmitting sensory 
prediction-error up to higher levels. Perception would arise from 
mutually informed top-down and bottom-up transformations 
distributed along the hierarchy. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusions on seeing (and knowing) with technical 
artefacts 
 
Notoriously, this inference is non-demonstrative: there is typically no 
conceptual connection between a perceptual category and its sensory 
indicants; an indefinite number of perceptual analyses will, in principle, 
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by compatible with any given specification of sensory input. On this 
account, then, perceptual integrations are most plausibly viewed as 
species of inferences-to-the-best-explanation, the computational 
problem in perceptual integration being that of choosing the best 
hypothesis about the distal source of proximal stimulations. (Fodor 
1975, p. 50) 
 
The Bayesian method is an example of a physical description of 
knowledge attribution – the agent has perceptual knowledge when her 
sensory apparatus have performed the appropriate Bayesian inference 
on the informational state – which can accompany our social 
description. Hence we have a sociotechnical description, one that 
combines reference-talk about both the empirical and the social 
phenomena at play. As with technical artefacts, this is essential to fully 
characterizing the nature of technical knowledge. A purely social 
description would not be comprehensive, since it omits the relation 
between the social consensus and the physical processes in the 
epistemic system. It is not typically the case that knowledge attributions 
depend for the truth solely on other social conditions being present. 
The knowledge must be transmitted through a physical relation 
between the referent and the epistemic system. Likewise, a purely 
physical description would not be comprehensive for practical 
purposes since we need a method whereby we can determine whether 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   320 
 
this person or this group is right to attribute knowledge. In this thesis I 
have favoured a collectivist approach where knowledge attributions are 
correct by virtue of the social interactions within the epistemic system. 
Other approaches may also be proposed but, in any case, we need 
some way to characterize the social element of knowledge which gives 
that epistemology a practical application. 
 
In the next chapter I pursue further the idea that epistemic systems can 
be analysed as information-processing systems. I argue that an 
informational approach provides a great deal of heuristic value when 
analysing epistemic systems and that as long as we give due 
consideration to the social element of knowledge attribution, we can 
have a comprehensive, practically useful account. 
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Chapter 7 
Data interpretation and information 
7.1 Philosophy of information 
Evans had the idea that there is a much cruder and more fundamental 
concept than that of knowledge on which philosophers have 
concentrated so much, namely the concept of information. Information 
is conveyed by perception, and retained by memory, though also 
transmitted by means of language. One needs to concentrate on that 
concept before one approaches that of knowledge in the proper sense. 
(Dummett 1993, p. 186) 
 
Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge 
or information. (Goldman 2006) 
 
7.1.1 Information overload, the need for epistemic virtue in 
the Information Society 
We can think of each instance of knowledge in informational terms.85 
This allows us to draw analogy between ordinary cases of perception 
                                                          
85 Parts of this chapter are adapted from Kerr & Pritchard 2011. 
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and data analysis. Philosophers of information, according to Floridi, 
study how information should be ―adequately created processed, 
managed, and used.‖86 (Floridi 2010c, p. 32) One question which 
epistemologists routinely ask is what is the purpose or function of 
inquiry? (Kvanvig 1998; Owens 2003; Rorty 1995) 
 
We have previously discussed how inquiry is closely linked to 
answering questions. Consider a simple case: If I visit the doctor to be 
told that I am suffering from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) I will 
probably be given rafts of information, in the form of leaflets, 
documents, verbal explanations and so on. Perhaps this will be a lot for 
me to take in at once. On a much grander scale, corporate offices are 
increasingly becoming enormous databases, collecting, disseminating, 
and processing untold amounts of information. One of the, perhaps 
unsurprising, discoveries of my fieldwork research was that the 
majority of analysis of well-log data was not done in-the-field, so to 
speak, but was conveyed back to large office computer networks and 
                                                          
86 Informative summaries of the philosophy of information are available in Allo 2010; Allo et al. 
2012; Floridi 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008a, 2010a, p. 16-44, and 2010b. 
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teams of analysts who then process and interpret this data. In 2003, 
researchers estimated that approximately 12 exabytes of data had been 
amassed throughout human history up until the advent of computers. 
They also calculated that print, film, magnetic, and optical storage 
media produced more than 5 exabytes of data in 2002 alone.87 (Floridi 
2010c, p. 11) In August 2008, a company that manages supply chains 
for retailers processed 100 gigabytes of information per day. By early 
2010 this number had increased by a factor of ten. (Stenzel 2011, p. 
172) In 1991, research has showed that the name of every US citizen is 
processed by computers forty times per day. (Shaw 1991, p. 35) This 
number is likely to be significantly larger today. 
 
This vast growth of information without a concomitant growth in data 
management tools has been called a ‗data deluge‘ and ‗information 
overload‘.88 It is part of our daily negotiations that we must sift through 
                                                          
87 1 exabyte = 1018 bytes.  
88 For a philosophical description of information overload and its negative consequences see 
Himma 2007. For more on the data deluge see The Economist, 25th February 2010, 394/8671. 
London: 11. 
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the overload and select the most relevant information to us. Almost 
two centuries ago Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wrote, 
 
The modern world has a false sense of security because of the great 
mass of data at its disposal. But the valid criterion of distinction is 
rather the extent to which man knows how to perform and master the 
material at his command. (quoted in Friman 2003, p. 19) 
 
Here Goethe is expressing the, now common-sensical, view that 
information (and, indeed knowledge) alone is quite useless if there is 
not a) the tools to organize and filter it; and b) the necessary time and 
resources to process it.89 
 
                                                          
89 I say that it is ‘common-sensical’ that the superabundance of data is a problem if we do not 
have the ability and tools to use it, but this view has been challenged. It is, for example, quite 
orthodox within information and communications technology to state that ‘the data outperforms 
the algorithm’. See, for example, Anand Rajaraman’s study with his Stanford Data Mining 
students discussed at http://anand.typepad.com/datawocky/2008/03/more-data-usual.html and 
also at http://anand.typepad.com/datawocky/2008/04/more-data-beats.html. In other words, to 
state that for any given problem, the quality of the procedure you use to solve the problem is not 
as important as the amount of data you have at your disposal. One can think of many examples 
where sheer weight of data can provide statistically better solutions to a problem than a high-
quality algorithm. The amount of data simply overwhelms and disables any imperfections that 
the algorithm might have. The question is debatable and important but cannot be solved in this 
dissertation. I will rest on the assumption that, however we decide the algorithm vs. data 
question, it will be important to have heuristics and tools for sorting and identifying high quality 
information. 
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We rarely attend to information for its own sake. The joint purpose of 
my doctor and I is that I will come to have at least some useful 
knowledge about the disease. I may be informed that CJD is a rare but 
fatal brain disorder; it affects about one person in every one million 
people per year worldwide; symptoms typically occur at about age 60; 
about 90% of patients die within a year; and so on. I want this 
information because it is relevant to the knowledge I wish to acquire 
about CJD. In other words, the information is epistemically valuable to 
me in the situation I am in. 
 
What do we mean by information? It is a polymorphous word and is 
used idiomatically with increasing variety in phrases such as the 
Information Age; information overload; the Information Superhigh-
way; freedom of information; information technology; information 
science; the Information Society; and so on. ‗Information‘ and 
‗knowledge‘ appear together frequently both in popular writing and 
scientific disciplines either as conflated terms for the same phenomena 
or related terms in some way involved in practices of inquiry, 
discovery, knowledge acquisition, and so forth. Whole academic 
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disciplines are devoted to the study and management of information 
and it is often tasked with responsibility for various cultural ills and 
developments.  
 
One curious phenomenon surrounding the ubiquity of technology, 
software and algorithms in our everyday and professional lives is that 
the more complex this equipment becomes, the more control we 
surrender to it in return for what we perceive to be increased efficiency 
and utility. The assumption that computer software and the algorithms 
are nothing more than time-savers and powerful calculators is coming 
under increasing scrutiny as they outstretch our ability to read and 
understand what they do. This is not a Luddite proposal. Instead I 
propose in this chapter that we understand what it is that the algorithm 
is capable of by appraising it as an epistemic agent. 
 
We can separate our analysis into four distinct concepts: data, 
algorithms, information, and knowledge: 
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Datum The representation of a concept or entity in a form suitable for 
communication, interpretation, or processing by human beings or by 
automated systems. (Zins 2007) This may be sensory stimuli that is 
perceived through human sensory organs. Or, alternatively, it may be 
coded symbols organized according to an algorithm, readable by an 
automated computational system. 
 
Algorithm A procedure or finite list of instructions for calculating a 
function. (Rogers 1987) This may be, e.g., the Bayesian, or other, 
inferential procedures involved in sensory perception in humans or the 
heuristics, arithmetical, and computational procedures involved in, e.g., 
PLA. 
 
Information A meaningful, well-formed instance of one or more data. 
Well-formed means that the data are clustered together correctly 
according to the rules or syntax that govern the system. Meaningful 
means that the data complies with the semantics of the system. (Floridi 
2011a) 
 
Knowledge What someone (or an automated system) knows. To know 
something requires that the epistemic agent a) has access to the 
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information required under the chosen system and b) has been 
appropriately attributed with knowledge by the chosen epistemic 
community. (Kusch 2002) 
 
Before detailing the implications of this quadripartite system, let us 
review the relatively small cadre of information-based epistemologists.90 
7.1.2 Information-based epistemology 
 
The quote at the head of this chapter repeats Dummett‘s assertion that 
the philosophy of information is analytically prior to epistemology. 
Information is, as it were, more basic than knowledge. He continues, 
 
Information is acquired, for example, without one‘s necessarily having a 
grasp of the proposition which embodies it; the flow of information 
operates at a much more basic level than the acquisition and 
transmission of knowledge. I think that this conception deserves to be 
explored. (Dummett 1993, p. 186) 
                                                          
90 By information-based epistemology I mean an epistemology which takes as a central 
component the concept of information; one which holds that an epistemic agent has knowledge if 
and only if she possesses the requisite information. 
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Dummett is not the only prominent epistemologist who has sought to 
position information as a core concept of epistemology. Fred Dretske 
and Luciano Floridi have developed sophisticated epistemological 
accounts which speak of information, data, signals and receivers, 
transmission, and the like, rather than belief, concepts, ideas, speakers 
and hearers, communication, and the like. Consequently, their 
philosophy is appropriate for studying the inquiries of extended 
epistemic agents such as analyst-plus-PLT or autonomous computa-
tional systems. Dretske suggests we connect knowledge with an 
ordinary dictionary definition of ‗information‘: 
 
[By information] I mean nothing very technical or abstract. In fact, I 
mean pretty much what (I think) we all mean in talking of some 
event, signal or structure carrying (or embodying) information about 
another state of affairs. A message (i.e., some event, stimulus or sig-
nal) carries information about X to the extent to which one could 
learn (come to know) something about X from the message. 
(Dretske 1983, p. 10)  
 
Speaking of information in this way, Dretske aims to relate 
information-based epistemology to the relevant alternatives theory 
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discussed in §3.2. Why does information overload pose a problem for 
epistemologists? Philosophers such as Fred Dretske and David Lewis 
have argued that in order to know, one must be in a position to rule 
out certain relevant alternatives. For example, in order to know that 
what you see in the garden is a goldfinch you must know that it is not a 
chaffinch. If you are unable to make this distinction, they argue, then it 
is not appropriate to say that you know as you may quite easily have 
been looking at a chaffinch and called that a goldfinch also. Similarly, 
we can imagine Goldman‘s ‗fake barn‘ case. Goldman, borrowing from 
Carl Ginet, asks us to imagine driving through a countryside populated 
by many barn façades. That is, there are only the front walls of barns 
but they appear from the roadside to be ordinary barns. It is just that 
we cannot see what is behind the façade. There is however, one barn 
that is real. It just so happens that I point to this one and call it a barn.  
 
In this case it seems odd to say that I knew it was a barn as I could just 
as easily have been pointing to any one of the fake barns surrounding 
it. I just got lucky. And knowledge, as is now platitudinous in 
epistemology, cannot be lucky. (Pritchard 2007) The rule of relevant 
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alternatives does not require that we rule out possibilities that no 
reasonable person would entertain, of course. We do not have to rule 
out that the bird is a giraffe or that the barn is in fact the square root of 
three or the concept of pathos. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate that 
any knower worthy of the title be able to rule out obvious falsehoods. 
 
This poses a problem in a world where there is so much relevant 
information that we often do not have the necessary expertise to rule 
much of it out. Even if we did, we do not have the time to be able to 
do so. Consequently, our hand has been forced. We need to rely on 
computers which are able to process this information and, crucially, 
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7.1.3 The reason for creating new epistemic agents: not 
extended but external 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I described a scenario in which a 
patient may seek information as a means to gaining knowledge about a 
medical matter. If information such as this were always susceptible to 
skeptical challenges then this susceptibility would be uncomfortably 
passed on to the knowledge claims based upon the evidence it carries. 
Such worries caused Dretske to abandon a key principle explaining 
how we reliably expand our knowledge: epistemic closure. I have 
presented an alternative epistemological picture here which does not 
have such drastic consequences. However, this informational story 
cannot be the whole story for collectivists. Return to perceptual 
knowledge and consider how we discussed that perception can be 
viewed in information terms.91  
                                                          
91 For an extended discussion of the goal of information collection and dissemination see Fallis 
(2002). Note that even those who deny that the goal of information services is for users to 
acquire knowledge grant that in a large range of contexts our goal in collection and disseminating 
information is to acquire knowledge. For example, the information management scholar Chun 
Wei Choo expresses, albeit in different terms, a widely held view when he states that the primary 
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The problem I deal with in this section is this: Today, algorithms are 
replacing humans as data miners and knowledge producers. This is a 
response to an increasingly complex world in which individual humans 
do not have the processing power to make sense of it or compete with 
the efficiency of a computer. But are algorithms able to cope with 
information overload in a reliable and epistemically virtuous way? The 
answer I submit is that we do not currently know for certain but that 
there are systems we could put in place that would keep them better in 
line with the traditional picture of a virtuous epistemic agent. This 
section outlines the ideas of information overload and the various 
industries which use algorithmic methods to deal with it. I will pose the 
problem that a computer lacks the human ability – necessary for 
epistemic virtue – to understand and reflect on the data it receives and 
the action it takes. Consequently, as things stand, unsupervised 
algorithms have the potential to make wild knowledge claims that will 
                                                                                                                                     
goal of information management is to ‗harness the information resources and information 
capabilities of the organization in order to enable the organization to learn and adapt to its 
changing environment.‘ (Choo 2002, xv) Later, Choo writes that the ‗transfiguration of 
information into knowledge is the goal of information management.‘ (Choo 2002, xiv)  
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go under the radar of the rest of us or be subsumed within a larger 
technical system. I will argue that an information-based epistemology 
would approach this problem by appraising the algorithm just as any 
other epistemic agent.  
 
Consider one tool we have developed to combat the problem of 
information overload. If we take traits like curiosity, open-mindedness, 
and inventiveness to be epistemic virtues then Google‘s page rank is 
not conducive to a flourishing epistemic life. Instead of having my 
filter quieten unpopular information, I should be trying to receive 
better quality information as well as searching for lesser known but 
potentially more useful information. What has now become an 
instinctive solution to solve many problems that pop up during our 
everyday lives, the internet search engine seems notably ill-equipped to 
return high-quality information, at least in this stage of their 
development. 
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Let me paint a second picture. Things are not getting any simpler and 
so greater computer power and computer influence is the direction of 
travel. Specifically unsupervised autonomous algorithms are left to 
their own accord because, seemingly, it is more efficient. Take the 
financial industry, for example. Here, algorithms are increasingly 
popular because they provide speed and the capacity to dissect an 
entire day‘s news instantaneously. Where once stock traders shared a 
single crowded room and shouted and gestured to try and get their 
signal out fastest; algorithms now compete with each other over 
timeframes shorter than that of a finger clicking a computer mouse. In 
September 2011, plans went ahead for the Hibernian Express, a six 
thousand km fibre-optic link connecting the New York and London 
stock exchanges. This link will shave six milliseconds off the 
transmission time between these cities. Whilst this doesn‘t seem very 
worthwhile to many of us, for the algorithms developed by high 
frequency trading firms this is an eternity and gives the computers a 
competitive edge.92 
                                                          
92 The £300m cable that will save traders milliseconds. The Telegraph, 11th September 2011. 
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Algorithms are replete throughout the financial world and not just for 
trading stocks. In fact high frequency trading accounts for 70% of US 
stock market transactions.93 In 2010 a study showed that algorithms 
running on twitter can be used to predict the stock markets. They 
search for patterns of language use and from this attempt to derive 
users‘ moods. If moods are good, the markets are predicted to be up 
and conversely if moods are low, the algorithm predicts a market fall. 
In addition, some hedge funds are now using this software and, 
perhaps most significantly, it appears to work (i.e. their fund is up over 
a period when pretty much everyone else was down). Outside of 
finance, a Scottish company called Epagogix predicts whether movies 
will make money using algorithms which compute variables to do with 
the script. For example, they might say that adding a woman in peril or 
moving the location to a desert island will add $20 million. Again, this 
is said to be accurate to an unnerving and, I find, quite dispiriting 
degree. Amazon marketplace, which is quickly forcing out high-street 
competitors, uses algorithms to set competitive prices.  
                                                          
93 The Guardian, September 16, 2012, p. 22. Ross, A. K. & Mathiason, N. ‗Britain opposes 
MEPs seeking ban on high-frequency trading.‘ 
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In my own fieldwork research I have seen algorithms which can be 
used to predict oil well blowouts such as the one that took place on 
Deepwater Horizon and manage risk. There is a tendency in the oil 
industry to replace software which is relatively simple and input-driven 
with software which takes much of that control away from the user 
and performs its own calculations which are not always transparent and 
not always traceable. In my training I was given instruction in three 
brands of software that follow this trajectory: PLWin, PLATO, and 
Emeraude. PLWin was one of the earliest pieces of logging analysis 
software developed by a German petroleum engineer working in 
Aberdeen, Scotland. Today, its interface and feature suite immediately 
strikes one as old-fashioned. However, when compared to the more 
sophisticated French-based software, Emeraude, it gives the user a lot 
more control over the variables used in calculations and other 
manipulating data curves and the like. 
 
The benefits of the modern approach to software development are that 
it provides a reliable general overview of the state of the well and 
requires much less in the way of technical proficiency and the training 
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to interpret logs accurately oneself. The benefits of the earlier approach 
were that analysts who were experienced with the ‗look‘ of well logs 
could more easily delve into the details of the data and make more 
accurate predictions and spot any significant outliers that the software 
may not. The results can sometimes be unpredictable and can go 
unnoticed either by those who are not interested in great accuracy 
(because they are only looking for a general overview) or who just do 
not understand what a reasonable prediction should look like. We will 
see the potential fall-out from some of these scenarios shortly. 
 
In the following I will compare algorithms like these with a human 
analyst. They are after all doing a very similar job. Traditionally, all 
these tasks I have described have been performed by humans and we 
can compare the kind of knowledge gathering that would ordinarily 
have been done by humans with the new algoepistemology done by 
high frequency trading algorithms or Epagogix, the movie valuators. 
Our algorithmic colleagues are similar to us in several of the respects 
needed for them to compare as epistemic agents. They behave and act 
autonomously (i.e. without supervision or control by a human). They 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   339 
 
search for information and inquire and then act on that information, 
normally, in a rational manner. They make knowledge claims. Many 
epistemologists would object to me even considering an algorithm to 
be worthy of the term ‗epistemic agent‘. One central objection they 
make is that algorithms, like thermostats, do not have belief states. In 
reply to this I will say two things:  
 
1. It is arguable whether an epistemic agent needs to have belief 
states. If you adhere to the information-based epistemology of 
Fred Dretske or Luciano Floridi, for example, it is not required. 
 
2. Even if you do want a belief-based epistemology, algorithms 
certainly approximate believers in some sense. They do inquire, 
gather, investigate, and are disposed to act in certain ways de-
pending on their environment and inputs.  
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This is not so dissimilar to a human inquiring into the shape of a rock, 
investigating and being disposed to call it a sheep given certain physical 
stimuli. Most importantly, they act independently of direct coercion. 
They are, in other words, agents. Of course, they are constrained by 
their coding and can certainly be stopped and started at will by a left 
mouse-click but we might as well point out that humans are also 
constrained by their biological and sociological determinations and can 
be stopped and started or otherwise coerced by a pointing finger or 
stern word. A belief-based epistemology that required absolute free 
agency would be skeptically strict.  
 
The algorithms work. Often they work not because they are very smart 
but simply by throwing a lot of information in. The old A.I. adage says 
‗data outperforms algorithms‘ or we might say ‗information 
outperforms intelligence‘. This is statistical fact for many A.I. 
researchers. Given their success in many industries we can imagine 
them spreading into other areas: We will use algorithms to assess the 
likelihood of epidemics and direct hospital resources accordingly; we 
will use them to predict voting patterns and our political climate will 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   341 
 
change; no one will make a film, book or work of art without first 
consulting the algoepistemologist. This all sounds quite optimistic 
when discussing hospital management or earthquakes but begins to 
sound quite dystopian when it moves into cultural terrain like art and 
politics. There are more worries to come. Earlier this year a book 
appeared on Amazon called ‗The Making of a Fly‘. It was priced at 
$23.7 million (plus $3.99 shipping). What had happened was that 
Amazon‘s pricing algorithms had fought to outbid each other and the 
price had gradually escalated until it became absurd. One can imagine 
what would happen if such algorithms become responsible for 
automated trading of goods or services. On a more serious note, in 
2010 9% of the US stock market just disappeared in 5 minutes.  
 
The confusion is perhaps most apparent in the stock markets. Nobody 
knows what happened to that 9% because no one authorized it and 
there‘s no way to trace it. Kevin Slavin described this at the 2011 TED 
conference in Edinburgh as ‗writing the unreadable‘. We have 
unwittingly coded and set free something which we do not even 
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understand.94 The algorithm will change the environment and 
sometimes we will notice that it has done something odd (like wipe 
9%) but be impotent to do anything about it and other times we will 
just not notice.  
 
This is exactly what happens in the petroleum industry with the various 
software used to analyse well data. As stated earlier, I looked at three 
pieces of software: PLWin, Emeraude and PLATO. PLWin, the 
earliest effort at creating software for logging analysis, requires quite a 
lot of training to use effectively but also allows engineers a reasonable 
amount of freedom in how they use the data. For example, one 
engineer might want to set a particular variable which describes the 
relationship between density and the ratio of oil to water or oil to gas. 
In another piece of software this variable would be predetermined. 
Developers generally do this to remove potentially fatal bugs and to 
protect their rights over the sophisticated algorithms the software 
makes use of. The result is that newer software potentially masks 
                                                          
94 There is actually a 100-year old novel by E.M. Forster called The Machine Stops that forecasts this 
very eventuality. 
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unusual or outlying data that would ordinarily have been removed in a 
manual process and judgment.  
 
7.1.4 What can computational systems know? 
 
Computational systems do not believe. This simple fact seems to 
provide a knock-down argument for saying that they cannot know. 
After all, it seems nonsensical for a person to say that they know p but 
they do not believe it.95 Consequently, an epistemology which wishes to 
incorporate computational systems as epistemic agents must forego the 
belief-condition for knowledge. That is not to say that when discussing 
the knowledge of human agents we can attribute them with knowledge 
even though they do not believe. It is to say, however, that some 
agents (e.g. computational systems) can have knowledge without belief. 
 
                                                          
95 This is known as a Moorean sentence after the first philosopher to formally acknowledge it. 
(Moore 1993) 
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The problem for algorithms is a problem of common sense. They 
cannot recognize an absurd variable of the kind that human operators 
would instantly spot. Take the Amazon pricing algorithm that kept 
outbidding other algorithms until the price became absurd. Any human 
store clerk or data inputter would have stopped such a bidding war 
very early on. The software behaves very much like a naïve inquirer or 
some trainee analysts, receiving and processing information without 
reflecting on whether the information makes sense in the context. 
 
The problem is related to the frame problem in computer science. It 
appears to be impossible to write a programme that can find whether 
solutions to quite simple equations are available as the computer will 
run through infinite iterations without noticing what any competent 
mathematician could notice just be looking at the formula. One of the 
most evocative illustrations was provided by Dan Dennett who 
described three robots with progressively incompetent solutions to a 
relatively (for us) simple problem. In the experiment, the robots are 
tasked with removing a precious battery which was in a room strapped 
to a wagon with a time bomb set to go off in the near future. The first 
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robot, R1, found the room, and the key to the door, and hypothesized 
that in order to remove the battery it must pull the battery out of the 
room. It succeeded in pulling the battery out of the room but not long 
after, of course, the bomb exploded. A second robot, R1D1 was built 
which would be designed to recognize ‗not just the intended 
implications of its acts, but also the implications about their side-
effects, by deducing these implications from the descriptions it uses in 
formulating its plans.‘ (Dennett 1984, p. 1) This robot was perhaps 
even less successful. R1D1 arrived at a similar plan to R1 and as it was 
working through the various implications, such as that pulling the 
wagon would not change the colour of the room‘s walls, the wagon 
exploded. The third robot, R2D1, was designed with something like a 
Dretske-Lewisian epistemology in mind. Dennett writes, ‗We must 
teach it the difference between relevant implications and irrelevant 
implications,‘ said the designers, ‗and teach it to ignore the irrelevant 
ones.‘ (Dennett 1984, p. 1) This robot spent some time running 
through thousands of implications which it then deemed to be 
irrelevant, keeping a list of irrelevant implications as it went, before the 
bomb went off. These are robots which suffer from the frame 
problem, a problem which AI research has to date failed to resolve. 
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The problem is not, of course, exclusive to algorithms (hence drawing 
further comparisons between human and artificial agents). In my own 
fieldwork I have observed the importance for analysts to know the 
practical meaning of the data they are using—and not just the 
procedure of entering it. Any experienced engineer familiar with what 
the data represent would see a value of, let‘s say, 2.74 and realize that 
cannot be right and there must be an error or false data earlier on. A 
novice who does not know what the calculations and information 
mean will not notice this. In such cases, we would say she has become 
robotic, merely following procedural rules and not stopping to reflect 
on the likelihood of that data being correct. Needless to say that I 
think this is a genuine problem as incoming trainees are trained more 
on how to use increasingly sophisticated software and less on the back-
of-an-envelope calculations and practical work that give that ability to 
spontaneously error-check.  
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The solution I propose comes from the philosophy of information, 
particularly that dealing with knowledge. I will follow a Dretske-Floridi 
line, as I think that is best suited for this kind of comparison. These 
two authors contend that knowledge is information-based. That is, that 
information is a basic component of knowledge. Recall Dretske‘s 
definition of information given in §7.1.2. Keep in mind that there is 
little in this definition that would preclude an algorithm as being the 
receiver of such a message. In fact talk of signals and receivers seems 
more suited to a computer than a person. By relating information to 
knowledge in this way, Dretske‘s information-based epistemology 
becomes allied to the relevant alternatives theory that he also endorses. 
You will recall that this view states that possessing knowledge depends 
on an agent‘s capacity to rule out a certain range of alternatives. This 
notion of relevancy has been notoriously difficult to pin down, as 
noted by Floridi (2010a), Schope (2002), inter alia. Duncan Pritchard 
defines the position as it applies to perceptual knowledge as follows: 
 
‗S has perceptual knowledge that p only if S can discriminate the target 
object at issue in p from the objects at issue in relevant alternative (not-
p) propositions, where a relevant alternative is an alternative that 
obtains in a near-by possible world. (Pritchard 2010a, p. 3) 
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According to this rendering of the relevant alternatives view, our 
capacity to possess perceptual knowledge is heavily affected by our 
environment. 
7.1.5 Friendly and unfriendly cognitive environments 
 
Pritchard makes the distinction between epistemically friendly and 
unfriendly environments. Most of the time, it will be very easy for us to 
make the necessary discriminations between, for example, hands and 
stubs, or canaries and crows. But epistemologists are always coming up 
with weird thought experiments which arrange our environment such 
that it will not be so easy, for instance in the fake barns example. It is 
because of the possibility of deceptive environments like this that 
Dretske denies that information alone could ever answer a skeptical 
doubt.  
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The argument for this is as follows: I have many defeasible reasons for 
thinking that I am writing this in Edinburgh, Scotland (memory, 
testimony, observation, etc.). This gives me an informational basis for 
believing that I am writing in Edinburgh. However, I do not have an 
informational basis for believing that I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV) 
on Alpha Centauri who is being fed the illusion that he is writing in 
Edinburgh. Even if the standards for knowledge are very low, and even 
if I know that were I in Edinburgh then I would not be a BIV on 
Alpha Centauri, this would not give me an informational basis for 
denying the skeptical hypothesis. The reason for this is my inability to 
discriminate between the scenario in which I am in Edinburgh and the 
skeptical BIV scenario in which I am on Alpha Centauri. Accordingly, 
argues Dretske, it follows that I receive exactly the same information in 
either scenario, and hence that I can have no informational basis to 
reject the alternative skeptical scenario.  
 
In general, Dretske argues that no signal can carry the information that 
a skeptical hypothesis—an hypothesis explicitly designed such that it is 
indiscriminable from normal circumstances, and yet involves a high 
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degree of error—is false. In his Knowledge and the Flow of Information, for 
example, Dretske writes, 
 
No signal can rule out all possibilities if possibilities are identified with 
what is consistently imaginable. No signal, for instance, can eliminate 
the possibility that it was generated, not by the normal means, but by 
some freak cosmic accident, by a deceptive demon, or by supernatural 
intervention. (Dretske 1981a, p. 130) 
 
And, more recently,  
 
This is true of all indicators, all sources of information. That is why 
there is nothing in the world…that indicates that there is a material 
world. (Dretske 2005b, p. 22) 
 
So on Dretske‘s view I can have an informational basis for believing 
that I am in Delft but I can have no informational basis for believing 
that I am not a BIV on Alpha Centauri (a skeptical hypothesis which 
entails that I am not in Delft), even whilst I know that if I am a BIV on 
Alpha Centauri then I am not in Delft. It is for this reason that Dretske 
denies epistemic closure.  You will recall that epistemic closure is the 
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principle that if an agent knows one proposition, and knows that it 
entails a second proposition, then that agent also knows the second 
proposition. So, for example, if one knows that one is presently in 
Delft, and one knows that this entails that one is not a BIV on Alpha 
Centauri, then one knows that one is not a BIV on Alpha Centauri. 
Although this principle has broad intuitive support, Dretske rejects it.   
 
But why is it that on Dretske‘s view I can acquire knowledge about a 
proposition but not about a proposition which I know full well is 
entailed by it? Dretske is led into this position through two closely 
related commitments: (i) that perceptual information is never relevant 
to skeptical hypotheses, and (ii) that information is essentially non-
factive evidence.  
7.1.6 Unfriendly environments, skepticism and algotrading 
 
Let us transpose this idea of an unfriendly environment into the world 
of algotrading. Let us say that an unfriendly or skeptical environment is 
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one that would deceive the algorithm just as it would deceive a human 
trader. The consequence is that the algorithm is misled into either 
declaring falsehoods or neglecting to sufficiently protect itself against 
being misled in the future. This would be epistemically vicious. The 
solution would be to somehow programme in the algorithm the ability 
to detect an unfriendly environment. In some cases this will be easy. 
Consider how a human detects an unfriendly environment. Take the 
barn façade case, for example. How would I check that I am not in 
that scenario? Fortunately, I have many ways. One way would be to 
inspect the barn more closely; walk round the back of it; or use a pair 
of binoculars; and so on. Alternatively, before I took the trip I could 
ask my friend if he knew of any fake barn countryside which we might 
be travelling through. I could watch the news for reports of fake barn 
areas around the country and estimate the likelihood that I will pass 
through one.  
 
In a previous example I talked about how a novice programmer might 
not recognize that the value of ‗2.74‘ she entered in a programme is 
absurd because she does not understand what it means. An expert 
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would not make that mistake because she would recognize the data as 
standing out. Essentially, what we are doing when we do this kind of 
investigation is induction: comparing our current experience with past 
ones and checking that nothing is out of the ordinary. The algorithm 
could be programmed to do the same thing. A trading algorithm could 
check with previous transactions of a similar type and restrict actions 
which did anything too unorthodox. Of course, this would be useless 
in practice as the extra milliseconds it took to do that would lose it the 
sale and further the very purpose of these algorithms is to break 
previous behaviours. The problems occur when you or I or the 
algorithm is in such an unfriendly environment that it cannot 
discriminate between the good cases in the past and the present bad 
case. 
 
Since, ex hypothesi, agents cannot discriminate between normal 
scenarios and skeptical alternatives, so it follows, according to Dretske, 
that agents lack an informational basis for dismissing skeptical 
alternatives. Another way out of this would be if information was 
factive. That is, some guarantee that a clue in the environment implied 
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some relevant truth. Dretske‘s second commitment (that information is 
non-factive) becomes clear once we reflect that if information could be 
factive evidence for what it is evidence for—if, that is, it could entail 
the truth of what it is evidence for—then it would follow that the 
information we have to support our beliefs in normal circumstances 
might well suffice to entail the denial of the target skeptical scenario. 
Clearly, however, Dretske does not think that we ever have evidence of 
this sort, and hence a non-factive view of the evidence provided by 
information is clearly implicit here.   
 
In order to more closely examine these commitments, consider the 
following local skeptical hypothesis: 
 
Zebrai 
Fred is at the zoo. If he perceives what he takes to be a zebra, Fred can 
have no informational basis for believing that what he perceives is not, 
in fact, a cleverly-disguised mule. In other words, the signal carrying this 
information does not allow him to discriminate between ‗a zebra in my 
perceptual field‘ and ‗a cleverly disguised mule in my perceptual field‘. 
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Fred may interpret the signal as evidence that there is a zebra in front 
of him as a matter of habit, or perhaps relying on other evidence such 
as the sign on the fence or assumptions about what kinds of animals 
are in a zoo. However, his information is, it seems, non-factive. Just 
because I receive a signal such as this does not entail that there is in 
fact a zebra in the pen. More generally, as Dretske claims, it appears 
that none of the information that the subject possesses which indicates 
that he is perceiving a zebra is information which offers him an 
adequate epistemic basis on which he can dismiss the ‗cleverly 
disguised mule‘ skeptical scenario.  
 
This way of thinking about our evidential position with regard to 
skeptical challenges has, however, been challenged. Ram Neta (Neta 
2002; 2003), for example, has argued that the scope of your evidence is 
affected by context. Under this account, there is a range of contexts in 
which evidence (for which read: information) is factive. Neta argues 
that the skeptic only appears to succeed by restricting what counts as 
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evidence. In normal contexts my evidence typically is factive, and it 
only becomes non-factive in skeptical contexts in which very 
demanding standards for what counts as evidence are in play. 
 
Hence, in the zebra case, my evidence for believing that there is a zebra 
before me could well be factive in normal contexts. For example, if my 
evidential state in normal contexts is that of seeing that there is a zebra 
before me, then, since seeing that p entails p, my evidential state 
actually entails that there is a zebra before me, and which hence entails 
that I am not currently being presented with a cleverly disguised mule. 
Relatedly, if my evidence, in normal contexts, for believing that I have 
two hands is that I can see them before me, then I have evidence 
which entails not only that I have two hands, but also that I‘m not a 
handless BIV on Alpha Centauri.  
 
According to Neta, however, the context can change in such a way as 
to restrict the scope of one‘s evidence. If I were to gain evidence that 
cast doubt upon my belief that I have hands—for example, if I were to 
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witness a room of BIVs—then this would make the possibility that I 
am a BIV a relevant alternative. This is effectively what the skeptic 
does: to describe such a scenario and cast doubt upon what was 
previously undoubted. There are two ways in which this may be done. 
Either the skeptic may simply suggest the possibility of a skeptical 
hypothesis that had previously been ignored or unexamined by the 
subject. This may place an onus on the subject to now eliminate that 
possibility in order to be correctly said to know the proposition. This 
intuition suggests that we cannot know a proposition until we have 
ruled out all relevant alternatives and that the range of relevant 
alternatives is determined by the conversational context. (Pritchard 
2010a, p. 19) In other words, being made aware of an alternative, 
however implausible or absurd, can make that alternative relevant.  
 
The second way in which the skeptic can make the alternative relevant 
is by actually offering evidence for thinking that a skeptical scenario 
has obtained. For example, consider an extension to the case of Zebrai: 
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Zebrai2 
Fred‘s friend and skeptic, Frank, mentions to Fred that he once read a 
science-fiction story in which all the world‘s zebras are replaced by 
hologram zebras and the real zebras are taken to a neighbouring planet. 
A little while later, Frank notices a pot of paint lying beside the animal 
and brings this to Fred‘s attention by gesturing towards it. He also tells 
Fred that the sign on the outside of the pen appears to have been 
written over an older sign, suggesting that a different message was once 
written there. 
 
In this example, Frank initially merely presents Fred with a radical 
skeptical hypothesis. In the view of some epistemologists, such 
pronouncements can change the conversational context in which 
evidence requirements and relevant alternatives are set. Frank‘s story 
may rob Fred of his knowledge that there is a zebra in the pen before 
him. In the subsequent details of the story, however, Frank presents 
Fred with perceptual information and testimonial evidence for calling 
into doubt Fred‘s knowledge of what is in the pen. 
 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   359 
 
According to Neta, in these skeptical contexts Fred‘s evidence is no 
longer factive. In particular, it is now no longer the case that one‘s 
evidence can entail the denials of skeptical hypotheses, given that they 
are in play and problematising our epistemic position. So although in 
normal contexts my evidence that I am seeing two hands could be that 
I see that I have two hands, in skeptical contexts where the skeptical 
hypothesis is at issue my evidence can at most be that I seem to see 
that I have two hands, where this evidential standing clearly does not 
entail the target proposition. It is, on the other hand, possible to gain 
evidence supporting local skeptical claims. In the case of Zebra, if I 
were to notice a pot of paint next to the animal or its flaking ‗skin‘, 
then this may provide an evidential or informational basis for believing 
that the animal is a cleverly disguised mule. If one subscribes to 
Dretske‘s relevant alternatives theory or Neta‘s contextualism, then the 
absence of such signals means, respectively, that either we are not 
required to rule out this possibility or that we are in an ordinary 
context in which the denials of skeptical hypotheses are known. 
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Consider O. K. Bouwsma‘s ‗adventures‘. (Bouwsma 1965) In the first 
of these, a demon has constructed a world to confuse a man called 
Tom. In this world everything is made out of paper, although it looks 
identical. However, the paper world does not deceive Tom for long. In 
a horrific telling of the story, when Tom peels away part of his face he 
receives, as Dretske would say, a signal carrying the information that he 
is in a world made of paper (i.e., that a skeptical hypothesis—viz., that 
the world he perceives is not what ‗real‘—is true). Of course, one could 
take this a stage further and ask if the perception of a paper world is 
also the victim of a skeptical trick but there the same test will apply. 
Whilst Tom is in the paper environment he has the capacity to 
discriminate and can come to know. Information, in these local 
skeptical scenarios, is relevant to what Tom knows. In Zebra, it 
appears, we have perceived signals that carry the information that the 
animal may be a painted mule.  
 
What is relevant information is constrained by skeptical or non-
skeptical environments. Just as the victim of CJD does not need to 
know about the controversies over the aetiology of CJD (because he is 
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a sufferer not a specialist doctor), he does not need to know the denials 
of skeptical hypotheses which may cast doubt upon what knowledge 
he possesses about CJD (because he is an epistemic agent and not an 
epistemologist). The upshot of this is that information not only has the 
function of providing a basis for knowledge but also a relevant 
alternatives or context-defining function. This gives pluralist 
epistemologies such as relevant alternatives theory and contextualism 
practical application as epistemic sorting-machines for information 
managers: in what contexts can we know what we want to know, what 
information is relevant, what information changes the contexts for 
knowledge, what are the epistemic limits of information?  
 
To return to our doctor‘s scenario that began this chapter, the 
knowledgeable specialist is one who can inform me of relevant 
information about CJD and also point me in the direction of reliable 
information sources elsewhere (and steer me away from dodgy 
websites and unsafe medical treatments). In most cases, these sources 
will not be denials of skeptical hypotheses but they will be sources of 
information which will increase the likelihood of my acquiring 
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knowledge about my condition and how to cope with it. It would be an 
odd special case if local skepticism were the only epistemological 
problem that can be affected by informational signals in a context. 
Information services such as libraries, databases and internet search 
engines can also make use of relevant alternatives in order to organize 
and structure their resources and content.  
 
Here are two apparent truisms.  
 
1. Our interest as inquirers in information is often motivated by 
our desire to gain knowledge about something.   
 
2. We are almost always faced with limited information about the 
target issue. At the very least, one can always think that it 
would be better if one had more information about this subject 
matter.  
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What falls out of these two statements? One might think that, as 
Aristotle claimed of knowledge (De Anima, 402a1), more information 
is always better than less and so we should endeavor to collect as much 
information as possible on the matter in question with the hope of, at 
some point, turning it into knowledge.96 Cursory reflection reveals that 
this is evidently false. (Himma 2007) Internet search engines are a good 
example. Type in a random search string and it will probably return 
hundreds of thousands of results. No human could sort through that 
amount of information and so the search engine is designed to return 
those results that are likely to be most beneficial to the user first. Thus, 
in order to deal with problems as they arise one needs to put 
constraints on what evidence and information is relevant. According to 
Neta, the skeptic unduly restricts evidence in certain contexts. What 
information management effectively does is make the same judgments 
about appropriate restrictions. 
 
                                                          
96 Another example of this thinking can be found in Bishop Berkeley’s Alciphron or the minute 
philosopher, where Berkeley’s spokesman for traditional Christianity, Euphranor, states: I love 
information upon all subjects that come in my way, and especially upon those that are most 
important. (Berkeley 1803, p. 25) 
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Dretske‘s account is primarily an account of perceptual knowledge and 
information. He therefore feels entitled to conclude that, since the 
mere appearance of an object cannot communicate its non-skeptical 
status, any signal which carries information about appearance cannot 
answer a skeptical doubt. However, we have provided examples (such 
as Bouwsma‘s adventures and Zebra) where perceptual information 
does justify a skeptical hypothesis or a non-skeptical proposition. It 
would seem that Dretske is wrong to think that information is 
irrelevant to combat local skeptical scenarios. Agents can receive 
information (even if we think of information as non-factive) for 
dismissing such scenarios (once we do not limit their information to 
the bare visual scene). (Pritchard 2010a) Whether Dretske is right 
about radical skeptical scenarios depends on whether information is 
ever factive. If it is always factive then Dretske has no need to deny 
closure. Even if information is only sometimes factive (i.e., in ordinary 
contexts, à la Neta) then Dretske is still wrong.  
 
Let us consider an argument that reasons (under which heading we 
may include perceptual evidence) are factive, which is from John 
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McDowell. (McDowell 1998) Earlier in the paper, I discussed Neta‘s 
comment that external world skepticism is not meant to cast doubt 
upon certain ‗inner‘ reasons such as ‗that I am not having a visual 
experience of a white expanse before me‘. McDowell argues against a 
tacit assumption throughout epistemology that these inner reflections 
can encompass factive empirical reasons. (Pritchard 2008a, p. 10, 2009)  
 
However, McDowell does not think that no empirical reasons are 
factive. In the case of veridical perception, we have a kind of 
perceptual evidence which is not present in cases of non-veridical 
perception such as illusion or hallucination. McDowellian epistemolog-
ical disjunctivism presents an option for Dretske which has so far been 
left unexplored but which may undermine his case against epistemic 
closure, with concomitant implications for his theory of information. 
In brief, if perceptual evidence is (sometimes) factive, then Dretske is 
wrong to say that there is no perceptual evidence which can serve as 
evidence against skeptical hypotheses. Dretske‘s view is that all 
perceptual evidence is defeasible when it comes to radical skeptical 
hypotheses. No matter how competently one receives and judges the 
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information one is presented with, these processes never amount to 
something which entails the denial of the target skeptical hypothesis. 
The view is intuitive and persuasive but the McDowellian view offers 
one alternative: that there is a disjunct between cases of factive and 
non-factive reasons. That is, there is some reason or warrant or a kind 
of support missing in cases of radical skepticism that is present in so-
called ‗ordinary‘ cases.  
 
Dretske takes it for granted that any given knowledge claim can be 
subject to a skeptical rebuttal. Such rebuttals challenge the upgrading 
of an information-based belief (that something appears to be the case) 
to information-based knowledge (knowledge that something is the 
case). In the case of Zebrai there is information that carries the signal 
to Fred that what is in the pen is a painted mule. Dretske might insist 
that this does not undermine his thesis as these pieces of information 
may themselves be subject to skeptical hypotheses and are providing 
only non-factive evidence. However, if one follows McDowell down 
his disjunctivist path then it is not inevitable that Dretske takes such a 
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position and consequently not inevitable that he is led to reject the 
principle of epistemic closure.  
 
Neta presents a contextualist account of evidence or reasons in which 
the evidential requirements for knowledge are affected by context. 
Dretske closely links information to non-factive evidence but under 
the contextualist account there are cases of factive evidence which 
would provide information-based knowledge of the denials of skeptical 
hypotheses in some cases. Additionally, McDowell provides a non-
contextualist account of evidence or reasons in which there is an 
epistemic component present in some cases, not present in others 
(such as cases of hallucination or illusion—the hallmark of skeptical 
hypothesizing), and in which factive evidence warrants the denial of 
skeptical hypotheses. 
 
 As a consequence, these distinctions between skeptical and ordinary 
contexts or between factive and non-factive evidence present 
alternatives to Dretske‘s inference that perceptual information can 
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never give us evidence or reasons to refute skeptical hypotheses. I 
described a scenario in which a patient may seek information as a 
means to gaining knowledge about a medical matter. If information 
such as this were always susceptible to skeptical challenges then this 
susceptibility would be uncomfortably passed on to the knowledge 
claims based upon the evidence it carries. Such worries caused Dretske 
to abandon a key principle explaining how we reliably expand our 
knowledge: epistemic closure. I have presented an alternative 
epistemological picture here which does not have such drastic 
consequences. 
 
How can this help algoepistemology? If many of our epistemic 
endeavours are to be replaced by algorithms can these be protected 
against the misleading setting of an unfriendly environment? Maybe. 
There are informational clues that give away unfriendly epistemic 
environments. It is just that the algorithms prefer to go for fast 
computation over this slow monitoring activity. What kind of 
programme would be able to spot an unfriendly environment? Let‘s go 
back to Zebra. In that case what we receive is physical stimuli that 
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cause to pause and reflect. That kind of reflection is inherently 
unavailable to algorithms. What is needed will likely be some kind of 
human-like judgment even if this is restricted just to spotting 
unfriendly epistemic environments which are prone to leading the 
algorithm astray. It may be that entire fields are highly susceptible to 
generating unfriendliness.  
 
To sum up, an algorithm fails in a specific epistemic virtue. It does not 
– cannot – reflect on its conclusions or its inputs with the kind of 
rounded social context that a human operator can. It cannot think, 
‗$27million is patently absurd for any book and so something must 
have gone wrong,‘ or ‗The plane has been climbing too high, 
something must have gone wrong.‘ Nor does it understand the figures 
it deals in. They lack the reflective capacity necessary to check for 
absurd results. Consequently, they will always have problems 
identifying unfriendly environments. We can programme them to 
manage some risks as and when they can check previous instances with 
the current action. They will not be able to identify indiscriminable 
unfriendly environments in the way that humans can because they lack 
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that reflective capacity needed to solve problems like the frame 
problem. 
 
In conclusion, algorithms can be epistemic agents but not particularly 
virtuous ones and so we do, as epistemologists, have reason for 
concern at their widespread use even whilst they give us more capacity 
to deal with the complex world we have made. What would an 
epistemically virtuous algorithm look like? It would be, at the least, one 
that reflected on unusual cases by comparison with previous cases. But 
more than this it would be one that searched for unpopular and, on the 
face of it, unpromising information for the sake of curiosity. It would 
therefore be a much more open code than is previously used. This 
would be less efficient but also more able to spot unfriendly 
environments and be less disposed to the kind of absurd results we 
have seen to date. 
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7.2 Information, meaning and knowledge 
 
―What is it in the territory that gets onto the map?‖ We know the 
territory does not get onto the map. That is the central point about 
which we here are all agreed. Now, if the territory were uniform, 
nothing would get onto the map except its boundaries, which are the 
points at which it ceases to be uniform against some larger matrix. What 
gets onto the map, in fact, is difference, be it a difference in altitude, a 
difference in vegetation, a difference in population structure, difference 
in surface, or whatever. Differences are the things that get onto a 
map…. Of this infinitude, we select a very limited number which 
become information. In fact, what we mean by information – the 
elementary unit of information – is a difference which makes a 
difference. (Bateson 1972, 320–321) 
 
In earlier chapters I argued that in order to understand epistemic 
concepts and, in turn, to understand knowledge attributions, we must 
understand their meaning and how they are used.97 We mean many 
things by ―information‖. In the quote that heads this chapter, the 
anthropologist and cyberneticist Gregory Bateson defines information 
as ‗a difference which makes a difference.‘ This might make 
information sound like almost anything. To some extent this is true. 
We are used to hearing the word ―information‖ used in so many 
                                                          
97 Parts of this chapter are adapted from Kerr (2012). 
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contexts from freedom of information to the information age to the 
information superhighway to information overload and so on. This 
chapter looks at the relation between information and meaning: both 
how information gets its meaning – in other words, what makes 
information meaningful – and how we can explain meaning using the 
conceptual tools of information theory. In previous chapters we have 
asked ―What is information?‖ or ―What does ―information‖ mean?‖ 
The question that concerns us in this chapter is whether information 
itself is meaningful. 
 
7.2.1 The theory of meaning and the symbol grounding 
problem 
 
The theory of meaning is an enormous topic in the philosophy of 
language. In its most general form, it is the attempt to explain how our 
language connects to the external world; that is, the relation between 
what we say and what we are speaking about. The issue is not as 
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straightforward as it sometimes appears at first glance. At the start of 
the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote: ‗The difficulty of my 
theory of logical portrayal was that of finding a connection between 
the signs on paper and a situation outside in the world. I always said 
that truth is a relation between the proposition and the situation, but 
could never pick out such a relation.‘ (Wittgenstein 1961, 19e-20e) 
 
Philosophers of language at the end of the 19th century had noticed 
that the thing that a word refers to is not necessarily the same as the 
meaning of the word. Frege distinguished two aspects of meaning 
which he called Sinn (or ―sense‖) and Bedeutung (usually translated as 
―reference‖). (Frege 1960) Consider the example of the planet Venus. 
Venus was once known by two names: those who saw it at sunrise 
knew it as ―the Morning Star,‖ and those who saw it at sunset called it 
―the Evening Star.‖ These two names express a difference sense, but 
they have the same reference, viz. the planet Venus. This reference-
based theory of meaning was followed by numerous attempts to find 
the ―hook‖ that connects our words to the things they are about. 
Philosophers of information claim that the problem of meaning is 
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actually much wider. Theories that explain meaning have been limited 
by their focus on language, specifically on speech and writing. 
Philosophers of information try to explain meaning by referring to a 
much more general phenomenon than language, which is, of course, 
information. This gives rise to two central questions: (i) how 
information acquires its meaning (and consequently, to the question of 
what meaning is) and (ii) how the theory of meaning can be illuminated 
by informational concepts.  
 
Let us take each of these in turn. The first question has been called the 
―meaning grounding problem‖ and it concerns where meaning comes 
from or how an entity can acquire meaning. We recognize some marks, 
symbols, sounds, gestures, signs, and so on as meaningful yet others 
are meaningless. But just knowing the relationship between symbols or 
sounds does not ever amount to knowing the meaning of those 
symbols and sounds. Consider a subspecies of the meaning grounding 
problem which concerns how symbols or data acquire meaning. This is 
known as the symbol grounding problem. It can be illustrated with a 
familiar example. Suppose that you have just arrived in a foreign 
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country with no knowledge of the local language and you are 
attempting to find your way to your hotel. You notice a sign with some 
letters printed on it, you hear people speaking and gesticulating, you 
see traffic directions and symbols. All of this is more or less 
unintelligible to you. You buy a dictionary but it is entirely written in 
the local language. Nevertheless, you persevere and look up the word 
on the sign. You then begin to look up the words in the definition; and 
then the words in that definition, and so on. Of course, you will 
probably never be able to derive any meaning from this dictionary as 
the mere relations between symbols cannot provide you with the 
―hook‖ that connects those symbols to the world which they seem to 
refer to. 
 
Stevan Harnad described the problem as: 
 
How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be 
made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings 
in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, 
manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded 
in anything but other meaningless symbols? (Harnad 1990) 
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The problem he describes is, put somewhat crudely, how can we get 
something from nothing? If we find meaning in the symbols – for 
example, the particular colour pattern before our eyes at the moment – 
then are we not just imposing the meaning that we already have in our 
minds onto the environment? If so, where did the meaning in our 
heads come from in the first place? We seem to run into a regress: a 
circular repetitive sequence which only prompts further questions. A 
―symbolist‖ (for example, Jerry Fodor 1980, 1985) would say that the 
meaning of the symbols is grounded in the relationship between the 
symbol system and the world. Many symbolists believe that cognition 
can be reduced to a kind of symbol manipulation. If correct, this is 
promising as we can theoretically simulate cognition in artificial agents 
by equipping them with the right rules for manipulating symbols. In 
humans, this symbol manipulation is subconscious and autonomous 
and once the brain receives symbols then, assuming it is functioning 
properly, it will acquire the relevant meanings. Research in cognitive 
science, however, highlights the interpretative and problematic nature 
of picking out the objects, events, and states of affairs that symbols 
refer to and so the symbolist account seems to simplify the function of 
cognition. 
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So how ought we to resolve the symbol grounding problem? One 
option is to rely on perception. We can say that when we learn a 
language, for example, we learn how to appropriately map symbols to 
specific referents. Suppose that, in the illustration given above, you 
abandon your dictionary and try to work out what the people around 
you are saying. You listen to their words, observe what they point to, 
and construct a small bilingual dictionary of your own. Each time 
someone points to an object and appears to refer to it you write down 
what they say and translate it into your own language. Unfortunately, 
you sometimes hear someone say a word and seem to refer to a 
completely different object or situation. Again, no matter how close 
and detailed your observations it seems that you will never completely 
understand what the meaning of the word is just by noting the 
structural relations between words, symbols and gestures.  
 
What is more, whilst symbols are usually discrete, self-contained 
entities, the external world for the most part is not. If we go along with 
this approach we are either sorely lacking in symbols if we want to 
describe the world well or we conflate many things when using the 
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same symbols. In any case, as described by Hilary Putnam, just as a set 
of mathematical equations can be mapped onto a near-infinite number 
of structures in the world, a system of relations between symbols can 
be mapped onto a near-infinite number of structures in the world. 
Hence, there is no non-arbitrary way in which symbols acquire 
meaning (Putnam 1999. See also Lakoff 1987). 
 
A second approach is to abandon our assumption that there is a direct 
relation between symbols and referents. An alternative approach might 
be found in research in embodied cognition, which takes cognition to 
be highly dependent on the physical capacities and actions of an agent. 
Specifically, we can view meaning as a way of coordinating action to 
achieve certain goals. According to this approach, the meaning of a 
particular situation for the agent is the combination of actions available 
to it. For example, the meaning of being close to a car, for a human, 
might be travel but for a cat it might be shelter. Consequently, the 
symbol grounding problem is dissolved rather than solved. There is no 
need to look for the ―hooks‖ that connect references and referents, 
speech and what we speak about. Rather, what ought to be matched is 
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goals and affordances: what the agent wants to achieve and what 
opportunities are afforded by a situation to achieve that goal. 
 
7.2.2 Statistical approaches: Shannon and Weaver 
 
Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver were mathematicians often 
credited with inventing information theory. Their landmark paper, A 
mathematical theory of communication, published in 1948, proposed 
an influential model of the communication of data and signals. Instead 
of focusing on the meaning (in the sense of interpretation or reference) 
of data, they constrained their model to the level of detail and 
frequency of the data. In other words, the content of the symbols is 
irrelevant; it does not matter what the information is about. All that 
matters is the quantifiable qualities of the data. Their model defines 
what have become the main components of many subsequent 
mathematical or probabilistic approaches to information, such as Bar-
Hillel and Carnap, and Dretske discussed below. These components 
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are the sender, message, transmission, noise, channel, reception, and 
receiver. By way of explanation, consider how a telephone system 
works. We have a person, A – the sender – speaking to another person, 
B – the receiver. The message is what A, the sender, says. The signal is 
the sound waves produced by the sender when she speaks, which are 
then carried through the electrical system (the transmitter) along a 
channel to B, the receiver. We can represent this as follows, 
 
Figure 8. The Shannon-Weaver model of communication 
 
This model has been applied not just to describe the external processes 
between two cognitive agents but also the internal processes of the 
mind. George Sperling, for example, described how environmental 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   381 
 
sounds are processed through cognitive systems and transformed until 
they reach the conscious level. One failing of the Shannon-Weaver 
model is its inadequacy for describing the transmission of information 
between multiagent or distributed systems; for example, when 
accurately describing how two people communicate or the communi-
cation between distributed computational systems where the line 
between who is the sender and who is the receiver becomes blurred. 
Today, most researchers recognize the benefits the mathematical 
theory of communication affords in terms of a useful probabilistic 
theory of the correlations between states of a sender and a receiver 
whilst acknowledging its limitations for many forms of communica-
tion. 
 
7.2.3 Probabilistic approaches: Bar-Hillel and Carnap 
 
Shannon and Weaver defined information in terms of probability space 
distribution. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap developed a 
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related probabilistic approach which sought to do justice to the 
problem of meaning, which Shannon and Weaver had deliberately set 
aside. Their approach was based on what is called the inverse 
relationship principle. According to this principle, the amount of 
information associated with a proposition is inversely proportional to 
the probability associated with that proposition. The core idea is that 
the semantic content of p is measured as the complement of the a 
priori probability of p, 
CONT(p) = 1 – P(p) 
 
Where CONT is the semantic content of p (p could be a set of 
sentences, events, situations or possible worlds). Crudely, CONT(p) is 
a measure of the probability of p not happening, or not being true. 
This means that  the less probable or possible p is, the more semantic 
information p is assumed to be carrying. Tautologies, like ―all ravens 
are ravens‖ have to be true. So they are assumed to carry no 
information at all.  Since the probability that all ravens are ravens is 1, 
P(p) is 1, so CONT(p) is 1-1, i.e. 0. By extension, we might presume 
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that contradictions – statements which describe impossible states or 
whose probability is 0, such as ―Alice is not Alice‖ – to contain the 
highest amount of semantic information. Thus we seem to run into 
what has been called the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox: the less likely a 
statement is, the greater its informational content, until you reach a 
certain point at which, presumably, the statement contains no 
information at all since it is false. As Bar-Hillel and Carnap state: 
 
It might perhaps, at first, seem strange that a self-contradictory sen-
tence, hence one which no ideal receiver would accept, is regarded as 
carrying with it the most inclusive information. It should, however, 
be emphasized that semantic information is here not meant as imply-
ing truth. A false sentence which happens to say much is thereby 
highly informative in our sense. Whether the information it carries is 
true or false, scientifically valuable or not, and so forth, does not 
concern us. A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too 
informative to be true (1953, p. 229). 
 
7.2.4 Probabilistic approaches: Dretske 
 
Fred Dretske was one of the earliest philosophers to formally connect 
information to theory of meaning. In a theory he called Indicator 
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Semantics he wrestled with the problem of how data and information 
can be ―upgraded‖ to knowledge. Dretske supposed that the 
relationship between data and meaning was central to resolving this 
puzzle and key to this relationship was the further connection between 
signal and receiver. The relationship between signal and receiver is 
familiar from many scenarios: in a telephone call we receive a signal; a 
television antenna transmits a signal to an aerial; and so on. 
 
This relationship is analogous to how our minds receive signals (or 
stimuli) from the world or how we communicate with one another. It 
is a bit like the relationship that pertains when two mountaineers climb 
a mountain. Often a length of rope will connect the two climbers so 
that the follower, Bob, can signal to the leader, Alice, whether he is 
climbing or not. If Bob wants to climb, he will tug on the rope, thereby 
sending a signal to Alice to give him more slack in the rope. This 
relationship only works if there is a tight connection between the signal 
that is sent and the beliefs formed by the receiver. Dretske suggested 
that if the probability that a certain state of the world (e.g. that Bob is 
tugging on the rope) given a certain mental state (e.g. that Alice 
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believes that Bob needs more slack) is 1, then the mental state (the 
belief) has that world state as its content. Alice‘s belief, in other words, 
that Bob wants more slack only contains the information that Bob is 
tugging on the rope if and only if her belief is a reliable indicator that 
Bob is tugging on the rope. In this case, her belief is a reliable indicator 
since it would take a freak occurrence for her to believe that Bob is 
tugging on the rope if he were not. Philosophers call such beliefs 
‗sensitive‘. Only sensitive beliefs, therefore, are informative. 
 
In Knowledge and the flow of information, Dretske uses the notion of 
information to explain and develop the concepts of knowledge, 
perception and meaning. (Dretske 1981) He uses the Mathematical 
Theory of Communication (MTC) described above but considers it to 
have several limitations. MTC is a theory of data quantification and 
transmission rather than a theory of information, as we would normally 
describe it in ordinary language. It is this latter account that Dretske 
wants to provide. Secondly, MTC is an account of the statistical 
properties of transmission and the average amount of information 
generated by a source. Under Dretske‘s ordinary-language understand-
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ing of information, however, information is associated with singular 
events. As a solution to these limitations Dretske proposes the 
following definition of a signal‘s informational content. 
 
A signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional 
probability of s‘s being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, given k alone, less 
than 1) Where k is a variable that represents how what an agent already 
knows can determine the information carried (for that agent) by a 
signal. 
 
For example, Fred‘s utterance that he is a professor does not carry the 
information that he is a professor of philosophy, but if you already 
know that Fred‘s discipline is philosophy then for you, his utterance 
does carry the information that he is a professor of philosophy. This is 
similar to the variable I outlined in my description of Bayesian 
inference that contains relevant background knowledge when receiving 
and processing states. 
 
Dretske defends the claim that the value of the conditional probability 
in his definition of information is one and not less than one on three 
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grounds. The first is that we ought to satisfy, Dretske claims, a basic 
principle of information flow known as the conjunction principle. This 
principle states that if a signal A carries the information that B, and A 
carries the information that C, then it also carries the information that 
B and C. If the conditional probability requirement was less than one, 
then this principle would not be satisfied. Secondly, Dretske wants his 
account to be consistent with what he calls the Xerox principle. This is 
the principle that if A carries the information that B, and B carries the 
information that C, then A carries the information that C. So 
information flow is transitive. If the conditional probability 
requirement was less than one, then again this principle would not be 
satisfied. Thirdly, if the conditional probability requirement was less 
than one we would be tasked with setting some kind of threshold on it. 
There appears to be no non-arbitrary way to do this and, more 
importantly, were it to be done then the epistemological significance of 
information would be dramatically reduced. 
 
One problem with setting the conditional probability requirement to 
one is that since there are very few conditional probabilities of one, the 
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amount of information flow is low. To combat this problem, Dretske 
proposes the idea of fixed channel conditions and relevant alternatives. 
The latter I have previously discussed in §3.2. In brief, Dretske states 
that conditional probability requirements are made relevant to a set of 
possible relevant alternatives to the communication channel. The 
problem with this, as discussed earlier, is that there is no obvious 
method for deciding what counts as a relevant alternative or for 
excluding what does not count. 
 
7.2.5 Semantic approaches: Floridi, levels of abstraction, and 
syntax 
 
The fourth approach we will look at is known as the General 
Definition of Information (GDI). (Floridi 2005) This theory proposes 
a tripartite definition of information: 
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The General Definition of Information (GDI) 
p is an instance of information, understood as semantic con-
tent, if and only if:  
(GDI.1) p consists of one or more data; 
(GDI.2) the data in p are well-formed; 
(GDI.3) the well-formed data in p are meaningful. 
 
In other words, if what you have is not a well-formed combination of 
meaningful data, then you do not have information. Here, ―well-
formed‖ means that the data are correctly structured according to the 
relevant syntax. The question that falls out of this statement – viz. 
when is data correctly structured? – is problematic enough. We have 
already discussed the importance of a relevant syntax. The question 
raised by (GDI.3) is the primary concern of this chapter – namely, 
when is well-formed data meaningful? In other words, how can data 
acquire their meaning? No doubt, we often attribute meanings to data. 
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We can point to a datum on a graph and infer that the datum means 
that, say, the recorded temperature at a certain pressure is 50˚c. We can 
read a weather report and infer that the data in the report mean that it 
is likely to rain tomorrow.  But what are needed are general principles 
which would be exportable across conceptual platforms. What allows 
us to make these inferences is the structure of the data and the syntax 
that we use to interpret it. 
 
Here, syntax means something broad. It is the system, structure, code 
or language that determines the form, construction or composition of 
information. It is not necessarily linguistic – think, for example, of an 
instruction diagram for building flat-pack furniture, or Morse code 
signals. Bateson, in the quote at the head of this chapter, notes that on 
a map only differences in altitude, and not consistencies in altitude, 
would be represented (i.e. as contours). But if we do not understand 
the syntax of the contour lines – the differences – we may misunder-
stand what they represent.  
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Consider the following illustration from Dretske: An airplane pilot uses 
altimeters to determine the plane‘s altitude. An altimeter is essentially a 
pressure gauge – it responds to changes in air pressure and the pilot 
takes this to represent changes in altitude. Note that we must say 
―takes this to represent‖ here as what is crucial is not just what the 
device measures but what those measurements are taken to represent. 
Conflating the two can lead to bad inferences being drawn from the 
altimeter‘s movements. For example, if the aeroplane strays into an 
environment that has an unusual air pressure, and the pilot takes its 
movements to represent altitude, he will acquire false beliefs about the 
altitude. Similarly, if we take the altimeter out of the plane and place it 
in a depressurized container, the altimeter will register a much higher 
altitude than is, in fact, the case. In such examples, it is not that the 
altimeter is malfunctioning – it is doing its job perfectly well – but that 
we have incorrectly understood the syntax of the information it 
provides. We do not understand what this information means. When 
the altimeter responds to external changes in its environment it is not 
actually generating any information per se. What is generated might 
instead be called data. 
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We need a syntactical structure – what philosophy of information calls 
a Level of Abstraction – to give that data meaning and determine its 
informational content. We often hear people say, and have no doubt 
said ourselves, things like, ―It looks cloudy. Does that mean it will 
rain?‖ ―What does irascible mean?‖ ―That‘s the third time a black cat 
has crossed my path. What does it mean?‖ and so on. What we are 
saying when we use the word ―mean‖ is given by the kind of answers 
that we expect to satisfy the question. The answer that clouds are often 
used in literature to symbolise the coming of rain would not be a 
helpful answer to the first question but that the presence of certain 
types of cloud indicates that it is likely to rain would. The answer that it 
means that an a feline animal with dark coloured fur has travelled in 
such a manner as to move adjacently to your own trajectory would not 
be a helpful answer to the last question whereas the answer that black 
cats crossing your path give you luck might be satisfying (to the 
superstitious amongst us). We might conclude from this that the 
meaning of a bit of information depends on our interests or goals. 
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7.2.6 Pragmatic approaches 
 
We receive a lot of stimuli or signals in our day-to-day lives – either 
through newspapers, television, and the internet, or just the stimuli and 
signals we receive from all the objects we pass as we walk down the 
road. Our minds need a way of managing all that data and selecting 
only the meaningful, informative, and – hopefully -- true. One of the 
first steps in this process is deciphering what this putative information 
means. Charles Sanders Peirce was an American philosopher in the 
later 19th century who co-founded the Pragmatist movement  with 
William James and John Dewey, but who also tackled some of the 
problems we face in deciphering the meaning of various signals. Peirce 
thought that this problem of the meaning of signals, what he called 
Semiotics, was in fact something of a prima philosophia. He wrote, ‗[I]t 
has never been in my power to study anything, – mathematics, ethics, 
metaphysics, gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, 
comparative anatomy, astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, 
the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, metrology, except 
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as a study of semiotic.‘ (Peirce 1977, 85–86) Clearly, Peirce thought 
semiotics could help with quite a range of studies! 
 
Peirce argued that in order to understand the meaning of a signal, we 
are not concerned with every aspect of the signal but only the 
signifying element. For example, in order to understand that smoke 
means fire, we do not need to know everything about the smoke – its 
shape, the particular way its fumes form, its precise colour, and so on – 
but only that element of it that signifies the presence of fire. Peirce 
used a lot of different terms for the signifying element of a signal – 
―sign‖, ―representamen‖, ―representation‖, and ―ground‖. We will just 
call them signs. Consider a beehive in your garden as a sign that there 
are bees in your garden. It is not every single characteristic of that 
beehive that signifies that there are bees in your garden. The colour, 
size, or shape of the hive is not particularly important and plays what 
Peirce calls a ―secondary signifying role‖. The primary signifying role in 
this case is the causal connection between the type of object that a 
beehive is and the presence of bees. This relationship is the sign. The 
meaning of this sign is ―there are bees here!‖ There may be other signs 
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that there are bees in the garden: the pollen count, a bee sting on a 
child that unfortunately bothered one of the garden‘s residents, and the 
noise that bees make perhaps. 
 
What makes these things signs is their capacity to indicate the presence 
of bees. The colour of the stripes on a bee, its gender or age, are not 
essential to indicate the presence of the bee and so are not signs that 
there are bees. A second element to this connection is, in Dretske‘s 
terms, that receiver‘s interpretation of the sign. Roughly, this is the 
meaning we take from the relationship between the sign (the beehive) 
and the object (the bees). Peirce thought that signs determine their 
interpretation. That is, the beehive draws our attention to the 
connection between beehives and bees and in so doing determines that 
we will believe that there are bees. 
 
When we talk about meaning in this communicational form, we often 
imply two concepts: intention and understanding. When Alice tells Bob 
that she is currently in Edinburgh, Scotland, she intends to transmit the 
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information contained in what she says. She also intends that Bob is 
her audience and she assumes or predicts that he will understand what 
she says. Furthermore, in order for Bob to receive this information he 
must understand what Alice meant, at least to some degree. If he 
understands by her sentence something radically different from what 
Alice intended for him to understand then there has been a ―failure to 
communicate‖: a failure, in other words, to transmit meaningful 
information. This is an intuitive picture of human communication. 
 
Of course, the reality is that this picture is largely impressionistic. 
Humans can communicate effectively – that is, can bring about 
through communication whatever effects they wish – with surprisingly 
little common understanding. We can communicate with those who 
speak other languages or with children and have our intentions 
understood. Even with our linguistic peers there is often a significant 
disparity between what one person said and what their interlocutor 
took them to have said, and nevertheless, whatever that person wished 
to have happen was not completely blocked by this ―indeterminacy‖ of 
meaning. 
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Very little of this is true for computational communication, such as 
might take place between an internet server and a web browser or 
between you and ―Siri‖, Apple‘s ―natural language‖ application for its 
mobile operating system. Thirty years on from the publication of 
Searle‘s ―Chinese room‖ argument and 60 years from Turing‘s 
Imitation Game test for computer intelligence, we have become used 
to computers talking to us and even conversing with them, to some 
degree. They ask us questions such as, ―Would you like to listen to 
your messages?‖ or, ―Do you want to save changes?‖ and when we 
answer they respond appropriately. Conversely, we sometimes ask 
them questions such as when we interact with Apple‘s ―Siri‖ or when 
we execute a database query. It is possible for computers to take part in 
this kind of interaction without any understanding of what they are 
saying or doing. They are like the subject in the Chinese room passing 
on lists of symbols she cannot make sense of. This does not mean that 
it would not one day be possible for an intelligent machine to 
understand conversations (in the deepest sense of the word) but that it 
is not necessary for them to take part effectively and appropriately in a 
wide range of situations. 
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Computers are, for want of a more precise definition, information 
processors. That is, data goes in one end, and information comes out 
the other. Much of the last 60 years of research in Artificial Intelligence 
has wondered whether humans too are information processors in 
much the same way. Our brains and varied sensory apparatus pick up 
data from the environment, process it, and generate information. Some 
theorists in cognitive science speculate that our visual behaviour can be 
predicted or even simulated through Bayesian calculations, essentially 
the claim that the brain is a giant, superfast, probability calculator, 
trying to choose the most mathematically probable interpretation of 
any given data set. The metaphor may be tenuous. It seems unlikely, 
after all, that the human brain could be literally equivalent to an 
artificial machine. Certainly, the brain has been compared to many 
artificial machines throughout the history of ideas, from the catapult in 
Ancient Greece, to a mill in the 17th century, to the telegraph, and 
hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems in the early 20th century. 
(Searle 1984) We might conclude that saying the brain is a computer is 
just the latest in an ancient tradition of saying the brain is whatever 
technological marvel happened to be nearest to hand. We can refine 
the question in this chapter to whether computers can mean things in 
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the same way that humans do. If they can mean what they say/display 
then we might be more tempted to say that they are functioning like 
human brains (and vice versa if they cannot).  
 
So far we have looked at a number of approaches which try to answer 
the question of how data acquire meaning. We looked at statistical 
approaches such as Shannon and Weaver‘s mathematical theory of 
communication; probabilistic approaches such as Bar-Hillel and 
Carnap‘s or Dretske‘s theory of meaning; semantic approaches such as 
Floridi‘s; and Peirce‘s pragmatic approach. We also looked at several 
specific problems in the philosophy of information such as the symbol 
grounding problem and the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox. Finally, we 
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7.3 Agency, algorithms, analysts and the north-seeking 
gyro 
 
7.3.1 Noise, ambiguity and the North-seeking gyro 
 
Skilled analysts (like skilled infants) are performing analogous 
inferences on the information they perceive and coming to acquire 
perceptual beliefs. It is easy to see the similarities beyond mere 
phenomenology. The only access analysts have to their world is also 
through the senses (and sensors) which provide information about the 
states of the well. This information is also generally corrupted by 
random fluctuations, noise and ambiguity. The same log can be 
interpreted differently by different analysts. Intelligent and adaptive 
analysis is tied to the ability to reduce uncertainty by corroborating 
different sources of information and drawing on prior experience. 
None of this is to say that noise and ambiguity are altogether negative 
influences. In fact they are necessary parts of how the system hangs 
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together. A system which could not recognize and deal effectively with 
noisy signals would be extremely maladaptive. What is more, the 
history of the technology used in this field has many examples where 
noise turned out to be of great benefit, once it was recognized for what 
it was: not messy nonsense, but evidence of another variable.  
 
Recall how I argued that the philosophical and epistemological issues 
with which this essay is concerned all stem from one practical 
constraint: we cannot (ordinarily) see what is going on down there in a 
wellbore, the hole and its contents being located up to 10,000 or 
15,000ft under the ground or sea. I add the qualification ‗ordinarily‘ 
because I hope to demonstrate that the use of these instruments does 
in fact make possible a kind of seeing, perception enhanced by the use 
of compasses, cameras, gyroscopes, and other ‗perceptual‘ equipment 
(note that the word ‗gyroscope‘ derives from the Greek skopeein, 
meaning ‗to see‘ and gyros meaning ‗turn‘; compasses are familiar 
devices for orienting a person or vehicle and so their connection to 
location and direction is plain; cameras are probably, of these three 
instruments, the most credible tool for perception-enhancement and 
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will be discussed in some detail). The second point to make is that 
while some of the knowledge derived from the reports of these 
instruments can be accessed by other means, much cannot and the 
reliability and accuracy of most is greatly enhanced by their use. 
 
Early surveying instruments would produce complicated data reports 
or ‗logs‘ of various measurements which engineers would have to read 
and interpret into some meaningful propositional form. Given that no 
instrument is ever perfect many of these logs would be quite messy or 
‗noisy‘ and not obviously indicate any one particular interpretation. 
Mud-pulse telemetry is a case in point: The circulating mud system has 
a noisy pressure wave from the pumps and rig systems of filtering 
hydraulics do not always reveal a clear pulse. Any air in the ‗mud‘ 
(typically a composite of clay, chalk and other minerals) causes it to 
compress and contract and so one cannot easily see the pressure spike 
on the graph (if you can imagine, the graph produced is a wave with 
peaks and plateaus and the imprecision of the results makes it difficult 
to read where the wave is peaking). Similarly gyroscopes used in 
surveying must be corrected for ‗drifting‘—the inevitable loss of a 
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gyro‘s initial orientation over time—as well as other imprecisions and 
differences depending on the well‘s geographical location.  
 
Analysts and engineers have a suite of techniques for correcting for 
these noisy interference patterns. However, just as we correct for what 
we perceive to be ‗noise‘ or ‗junk‘ we may also be ignoring what, if only 
we knew more, could be useful, valuable information.98 In the case at 
hand, it was only later that engineers realized that they were junking the 
gyro‘s measurement of the natural rotation of the Earth! Recall that the 
Earth is in fact an enormous gyro, a spinning mass trying to hold a 
particular orientation in space established around 4.5 billion years ago. 
This natural process was later exploited in the 1980s by Don van 
Steenwyk, the engineer who developed the North-seeking gyro. This 
gyroscope is capable of finding True North without having to be 
primed at a known orientation.  
 
                                                          
98 The history of science and technology is replete with examples of technologists purportedly 
‘correcting for’ or treating as ‘junk’ information which may, at a later date, be sought after. 
Think, for example, of contemporary scientific attitudes towards so-called ‘junk DNA’. 
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The ‗junk‘ seen by early surveyors was a function of the rotation of the 
Earth. Suppose we accept my earlier argument that what we are dealing 
with is perceptually-sourced knowledge. In that case, what did the 
engineers at this time know of the data they took to refer to junk, 
noise, messy signal, imperfection in the transmitter, and so on? It is not 
that the data actually referred to the rotation of the Earth, for it was 
good and useful procedure for an analyst to correct for this corruption. 
What the analysts and engineers knew was indexed to a particular 
framework of interpretation. This framework changed when some 
ingenious engineers noticed that Earth rotation would have an effect 
on the tool. Thus, the conditions for knowing what the data referred to 
and correctly interpreting the log had changed. 
 
Nor is it that the standards or thresholds for knowing changed. It was 
an interpretive framework that changed and this is best accounted for, 
I would argue, by the Kuschian, communitarian, collectivist analysis I 
have presented throughout this thesis. In many fields of inquiry—
archaeology, forensic science, here in petroleum engineering—entities 
leave traces of information that are waiting to be read by interested 
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observers who notice that what they are seeing is not meaningless. 
Since their status as relevant evidence is truly up in the air we cannot 
be asked to rule them out (and hence prove our knowledge) before this 
status is confirmed. Just as our own perceptual cognitive systems must 
adapt to handle noisy or ambiguous signals, any engineering science 
which is perception-like or whose instruments function as extensions 
to perceptual capacities must also have algorithms for handling noisy 
or ambiguous signals. 
 
7.3.2 Return to Deepwater Horizon: Information and 
prediction 
 
Over the course of a week in April 2010, two events caused 
widespread destruction to our environment and daily affairs, including 
tragically in the latter case, 11 deaths. The first involved hundreds of 
thousands of carbon dioxide emissions per day, the second involved 
tens of thousands of barrels of crude oil. Both were (in practice) not 
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predicted. The first was the eruption of the Icelandic volcano, 
Eyjafjallajökull. The second was the blowout and subsequent leak at 
the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU). Both 
events attracted great public and political interest and prompted 
questions to be asked of authorities, scientists and engineers tasked 
with predicting and, where possible, preventing or mitigating their 
impact. The 2010 eruption cancelled thousands of flights throughout 
Europe—the most significant restriction in living memory—and cost 
hundreds of millions of pounds to business and the tourism industry in 
the UK.  
 
Whilst that event was significant, the effects of the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout (DHB) were much more devastating. 11 men were killed in 
the explosion, from Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi.  17 others were 
injured. In total, approximately 4.9 million barrels of petroleum 
escaped in the three months before the well was capped.  The 
consequences to marine and wildlife habitats, local fishing and tourism 
are by now known internationally. A reasonable question to ask is, why 
did we not know these events were going to happen? Volcanic 
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eruption forecasting is far from being a perfect science. Scientists and 
engineers can, at best, predict some volcanic eruptions by spotting 
early indicators just before an imminent eruption. As regards DHB, 
allegations were made that BP, Halliburton and others could have 
known—indeed did know—about the blowout well before it actually 
occurred.  
 
How reliable is the science and engineering for predicting blowouts in 
the oil and gas industry? In February 2009, BP stated that it was 
―unlikely that an accidental surface or subsurface oil spill would occur 
from the proposed activities.‖ Without a detailed and protracted 
analysis of the internal machinations of the companies involved we 
may never conclusively know the answer to this but we can engage in 
an analysis of the issues of collective responsibility and group 
knowledge which arise out of this case as well as with the kinds of 
perceptually-sourced beliefs that come into play when using technology 
to observe subterranean or submarine events. Social epistemologists 
have a role to play in diagnosing how it is we can hold companies or 
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other groups responsible for lack of knowledge and what kind of 
knowledge can be had of properties and events in an offshore oil rig. 
 
What kind of knowledge were newspaper headlines like those listed 
above inquiring about? (§1.1.1) They ask about knowledge pertaining 
to the integrity of the well cement casing; whether it was known that 
the well was likely to suffer from a blowout (i.e. that the well‘s pressure 
control systems would fail); they ask who was responsible for knowing 
the risks and who was responsible for ensuring adequate safety 
procedures were in place. Now, it may be the case that these questions 
expect too much from the drilling engineers and safety officers. It 
would seem that there are many positions a person may hold in 
contemporary society where they are expected to be able to predict 
events which are beyond the predictive capacities of current scientific 
and engineering methods. For now let us consider what an agent might 
be responsible for. One cannot, presumably, hold the individual 
significantly responsible for what is largely creditable to the efforts of a 
group. However, the group cannot entirely be responsible for the kind 
of knowledge we have been concerned with. In part, this knowledge is 
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generated through a process of informational interpretation and 
prediction. Let us consider this aspect now. 
 
7.3.3 Capping the well and recapping the hypothesis 
 
First, let us ask what can be known of the properties and events in an 
oil rig and then we will ask who can know it. I have already presented 
how the relevant knowledge is perceptually sourced and then put to 
communal arbitration. To recap, the fieldwork research involved 
working for a petroleum engineering company, specifically in the areas 
of well logging analysis and wellbore navigation. This is the analysis of 
data gathered from oil and gas wells in order to work out if the well is 
sufficiently productive, to diagnose problems (such as the risk of a 
blowout), and to direct drilling or interception of a well, and so on. 
One of the striking findings of working with other analysts was that it 
became apparent that the better qualified someone was to read and 
analyse these logs—the more experience and expertise they had—the 
more likely they were to describe their interpretations in perceptual 
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terms. In truth, those who were at the earlier stages of their career 
tended to follow quite formulaic processes in deciding, for instance, 
whether to remove an outlying data point or emphasize a particular 
value. At other times their modus operandi appeared, to a novice and a 
non-engineer, to border on the arbitrary. Skilled and experienced 
analysts on the other hand were likely to describe what they were doing 
in casual perceptual terms: 
 
―It looks like zone 6 is thieving water‖ – Analyst, SP 
 
―[pointing] Can you see that the temperature is rising here? Because 
of oil.‖ – Analyst, MT 
 
―Looking at that... It doesn‘t look right.‖ – Engineer, BK 
 
Or to simply pass over the fact that we were interpreting a data log, as 
in the following dialogue: 
 
Eric Kerr: How do I know I should cut it [the on-screen representation 
of the PLT data in Emeraude] here? 
Analyst, SP: You see where the spinner goes up here? That‘s where 
there‘s a perforation.‘ 
 
Engineering anti-individualism: a case study in social epistemology   411 
 
By way of explanation, I should say that ‗spinner‘ refers to a particular 
tool inserted into the PLT and the velocity it is rotating at. Therefore, 
it sounds odd to say that one ‗sees‘ that the spinner goes up, when one 
is looking at a graphical representation of data received from the PLT. 
I do not wish to place too much significance on these conversations as 
they can be interpreted as metaphorical usage. Nevertheless, we have 
all had, I believe, experiences where we are reading a novel, inputting 
data on a spread-sheet or, if we are computer programmers, writing a 
line of code for a piece of software, where we transcend the experience 
of reading information and see what the information refers to. This is 
indicative, I suggest, of the somewhat unromantic fact that what we are 
doing when we are seeing is processing information (albeit often so 
quickly as to give the impression of seeing entire discreet objects). 
7.3.4 Conclusions on data interpretation and information 
 
In Ch. 6 I remarked that whilst we readily accept, on the basis of 
biological evidence, that perceptual knowledge (for example, seeing 
that an object is blue) is constructed, we are reluctant to accept the 
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same about communal knowledge (knowledge that gains its status, in 
part, by virtue of shared consensus). And yet, in some sense, there is 
little principled distinction other than the contingent one that eyes are 
located in the head whilst other people are located elsewhere in the 
world. In this chapter I have explored one way in which cognitive 
science can expand on this approach. An informational approach to 
epistemology allows us to explore epistemic systems and evaluate their 
knowledge attributions.  
 
I also reviewed the history of meaning in information to diagnose the 
importance of the meaning of concepts and their use to understanding 
the practices that make use of them. 
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Chapter 8 
CAT, knowledge, and groups 
8.1 Groups and perception 
8.1.1 Introduction 
Consider the following headlines from print and online newspapers 
from the months following the blowout. 
 
BP, Halliburton Knew Oil Spill Cement Unstable99 
BP and Halliburton knew of Gulf oil well cement flaws100 
Did BP know more than they led on?101 
Studies suggest MMS knew blowout preventers had ‗critical‘ flaws‘102 
                                                          
99 BP, Halliburton knew oil spill cement unstable. Discovery News, 29th October 2010.  
http://news.discovery.com/earth/bp-halliburton-oil-spill.html. 
100 Goldenberg, S. & Kollewe, J. 2010. BP and Halliburton knew of Gulf oil well cement flaws. 
The Guardian, 29th October 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/29/bp-oil-
spill-bp. 
101 Wilson, J. 2010. Did BP know more than they led on? KETK NBC, 30th October 2010.  
http://www.ketknbc.com/news/did-bp-know-more-than-they-led-on.  
102 Clayton, M. 2010. Studies suggest MMS knew blowout preventers had ‘critical’ flaws. The 
Christian Science Monitor, 17th June 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0617/Studies-
suggest-MMS-knew-blowout-preventers-had-critical-flaws.  
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What did BP know?103 
BP wasted a lot of time in responding to the Gulf of Mexico oil disaster 
last year with remedies it knew wouldn‘t work, the chief executive of 
Exxon Mobil said.104 
BP Oil Spill: 7 Secrets BP Doesn‘t Want You to Know105 
 
Cases such as the Deepwater Horizon incident are particularly 
interesting in this respect as it seems to be common to ask questions 
about the epistemic responsibility of a group, rather than the more 
typical case of an individual. These ordinary ways of speaking may be 
intended to indicate the social character of the knowledge involved. 
The idea that BP should or could know anything about what happened 
is philosophically puzzling. When we first think of what kind of thing 
can have knowledge many of us will tend to think of biological entities 
– usually a human being. That is, we think of something which has a 
mind, beliefs, will, agency, a brain, perceptual faculties, perhaps, and so 
                                                          
103 Lugarten, A. & Knutson, R. 2010. What did BP know? The Columbus Dispatch, 9th June 
2010. http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2010/06/09/what-did-bp-
know.html. 
104 Exxon: BP wasted time in Gulf of Mexico. United Press International, 20th April 2011. 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/04/20/Exxon-BP-wasted-time-in-
Gulf-of-Mexico/UPI-31641303300666/. 
105 Emami, G. 2010. BP oil spill: 7 secrets BP doesn’t want you to know. Huffington Post, 7th 
May 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/05/7-secrets-bp-doesnt-
want_n_563102.html. 
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on. Legal entities such as corporations do not possess any of these 
things. Put this way, it sounds very odd to ask whether BP knew 
anything at all. And yet it is a common feature of ordinary language 
use. (Goldman 2004, p. 12; Hakli 2007, p. 249; Quinton 1975/1976, p. 
17; Schmitt 1994a, pp. 257-8)  
 
Here, knowledge is attributed not to individuals per se, as is traditional 
in epistemology, but to groups, collectives, corporations, and so on. 
‗What did they know and when did they know it‘ became something of 
a mantra for various groups asking questions of BP, Halliburton, 
MMS, Goldman Sachs, and others. Why do we use this language, and 
what do we mean by it? Coincidentally, Lackey also uses an example 
from the Deepwater Horizon disaster. She points out that when 
discussing matters of such import in a serious setting such as a 
courtroom or when discussing serious matters such as the moral and 
legal responsibility of certain parties, no one could read the group 
knowledge attribution as, 
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…merely metaphorical or as an exaggeration, as in the case when one 
says, The injured mouse just sat there as I approached him—it was as if 
he knew that I was going to help him,‘ or ‗The wind blew the stick 
precisely to mark our location—it seemed to know that we needed to be 
rescued.‘ (Lackey, forthcoming a, p. 4) 
 
In these cases there is no suggestion that the mouse or the wind might 
have really known the propositions in question. When compared to 
these common ordinary language cases the proposition in favour of 
group knowledge attributions seems more plausible.  
 
An obvious objection to the strong view that groups can possess 
knowledge is that knowledge requires belief and groups do not have 
belief. Across a range of philosophical disciplines, the possibility that 
groups may indeed have beliefs or even minds has been considered by 
a number of researchers. (Hutchins 1995a, 1995b; Giere 2002; Gilbert 
2004; Meijers 2003, 2003; Pettit 2003; Tollefsen 2002, 2007, 2009; 
Tumollini & Castelfranchi) In this chapter I will be taking a different 
tack. Namely, I will forego the condition that knowledge requires 
belief. This is not to deny the obvious point that if I know that snow is 
white I must also believe that snow is white—of course, it sounds 
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ridiculous to claim to know something whilst also claiming that one 
does not believe it—but it is to assert the methodological principle that 
the study of knowledge does not require a concomitant study of belief. 
Since the beliefs of agents are often quite opaque to the outside 
observer (and occasionally to the introspector) an epistemological 
methodology that does not require any investigation into the beliefs 
held by particular agents may prove more fruitful. The communitarian 
and informational approaches outlined in this thesis provide such an 
approach. So, if belief is not required for our study of knowledge—and 
we do not have the tricky problem of ascribing mental states to entities 
that do not seem to have minds—what is there to say about our 
ordinary language use of group knowledge attributions? 
8.1.2 Group knowledge attributions: The spokesperson view 
 
Let us suppose that these ordinary language uses are indicative of a 
systematic and widespread phenomenon that deserves our attention. A 
number of routes have been taken when explaining this feature of 
language use. One option is that it is shorthand for saying that a 
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particular individual knows it. This has been termed the ‗spokesperson‘ 
view. (Lackey, forthcoming a, and forthcoming b) According to this 
view, when we say that a group—e.g. BP—know p we mean that there 
is an individual within the group—e.g. former chief executive of BP, 
Tony Hayward—knows p. The spokesperson view is useful for 
describing certain kinds of groups but wholly inadequate for others. 
For example, when describing the knowledge ascriptions of groups 
which have a formally-designated representative, the spokesperson 
view seems to capture much of what we are aiming at when we use the 
group knowledge attribution. 
 
When the knowledge attribution regards a Court of Session decision, 
for instance, there is a definite decision (containing knowledge claims, 
beliefs, opinions, and so on) to which all members of the group (all 
sitting judges) adhere. All members are formally taken to subscribe to 
the decision by virtue of their membership of a group whose formal 
structure requires it. Even though one or more of the judges may not 
concur with the decision, it is appropriate to say that the decision 
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represents the decision of the Court of Session.106 Similarly, after a 
public inquiry into ethical standards of the British press, a particular 
spokesperson from a newspaper may be nominated to express the 
settled views of the newspaper‘s editorial board. It is appropriate in 
such cases to attribute knowledge to the group—to ‗The Daily X‘ 
newspaper, for example—as we know that the members of the group 
have accepted (perhaps formally signed) a statement which the 
spokesperson then reads out. These ‗formal‘ groups fit neatly with a 
‗spokesperson‘ approach to group knowledge attributions.  
 
An odd quirk of the spokesperson view becomes apparent when we 
consider negative attributions: That is, attributions of the form: no one 
in the group knows p. Consider the following statement regarding the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
                                                          
106 The Court of Session is the highest civil court in Scotland. The same point could be made 
with regard to any court where typically a panel of two or more judges sits and so there is a 
designated quorum. 
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‗Nobody believed there was going to be a safety issue,‘ Mr. Hafle told a 
six-member panel of Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service 
officials.107 
 
How would the spokesperson view deal with such cases? We must 
assume from what Hafle says that if not one member of the group 
believed there was going to be a safety issue, the group does not 
believe it either. Alternatively, he may be saying that every member of 
the group was agnostic with respect to the proposition, ‗There is going 
to be a safety issue.‘ The latter, that every member of the group had no 
opinion with respect to whether there was going to be  a safety issue, 
seems unlikely and negligent so we must assume that he meant the 
former. However, the consequence of the former statement is that 
every member of the group believed that there was not going to be a 
safety issue. The spokesperson view states that Hafle represents the 
group when he implies that every member of the group believed that 
there was not going to be a safety issue but this seems to be ‗beyond 
his pay grade‘ as spokesperson of the group and beyond what the 
                                                          
107 From Urbina, I. 2010. Documents show early worries about safety of rig. The New York 
Times, 29th May 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/us/30rig.html?pagewanted=all. 
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spokesperson would be justified in asserting. He may be able to 
express the formally accepted opinion of the group but it seems to 
misrepresent what is believed by the members. The spokesperson view 
entitles the spokesperson to express the formally accepted opinion of 
the group. However, when it is couched in such terms as to say, ‗Every 
member of the group believes p,‘ when it may well be the case that 
some of the members were agnostic towards p, this seems to stretch 
the limits of what the spokesperson is entitled to state. 
 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that these are odd quirks and the 
spokesperson view typically does capture and represent the opinion of 
the group. However, if we consider groups which have no formally 
appointed representative or formal (or informal/implicit) system of 
agreeing to the group belief, then it is wholly inappropriate. This seems 
to apply to most of the cases we have discussed in this dissertation. In 
scientific laboratories, oil rigs, engineering offices, and so on, the 
knowledge that is produced by the group is rarely possessed by any 
single member, nor is any single member given the authority to 
represent a group view. In most scientific research groups or 
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engineering offices, it is typically not the case that all members (or even 
most members) tacitly or formally accept a set of beliefs held by any 
one member. It is likely in these cases that the knowledge held by the 
group as a whole greatly exceeds the knowledge held by single one 
member of that group. Therefore, there will be cases where knowledge 
is attributed to the group (knowledge of the final product of the 
research, for example) which no single member would be justified in 
asserting. 
 
8.1.3 Group knowledge attributions: Summative and 
aggregation procedures 
 
Another option is that when we say that the group knows p, we mean 
that the individuals that comprise the group know p either in the sense 
that they all know it or the majority know it or some other quorum 
knows it. (Quinton 1975/1976; Gilbert 1994, p. 235) This is called a 
summative approach or judgment aggregation approach: the process of 
aggregating group members‘ individual beliefs or judgments into 
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corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as 
a whole. (See Cariani 2001; List and Pettit 2002, 2004; and List 2005) 
The problems of collective knowledge, collective belief, group minds, 
etc. are difficult and well-covered. The approach does, however, have 
problems. It is easy to see how some groups fit into the aggregation 
approach better than others. Court decisions, for example, are typically 
formally canonized. It is clear that, in the case of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, for instance, a ‗majority opinion‘ is so-called because it 
represents the opinion of a majority of justices. (Rupert 2005) 
 
The same applies for other formal groups such as medical panels or 
boards of directors where there is a formally recognized system for 
stabilizing and aggregating the beliefs of individual members. These 
kinds of groups, however, are rare when compared to the many groups 
that have no such formal procedures. These other kinds of groups—
informal groups, if you like—are much more difficult to aggregate and 
much more interesting for epistemologists working on issues of 
testimony, communitarianism or social epistemology. Teams of logging 
analysts are informally grouped. So can logging analysts‘ beliefs be 
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Three analysts are debating whether or not a particular zone in the well 
contains more than 90% water. Analyst A believes that it does and she 
believes that if it does then we should recommend that BP halt 
production. Analyst B also believes that there is more than 90% water 
in that zone but does not think that the team should make the 
recommendation to halt production. Analyst C believes that there is less 
than 90% water in the zone but does agree with A that if there was 
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Following List, We can represent this dilemma as follows. 
 
 p p → q q 
Analyst A True True True 
Analyst B True False False 
Analyst C False True False 
Majority True True False 
 
Figure 9. A discursive dilemma 
  
The table shows an odd inconsistency for aggregation theories. Whilst 
a majority of the group believe p, and believe that if p then q, a majority 
does not believe the simple logical conjunct of those two premises, 
namely q. List calls this the rationality challenge. As he puts it, the 
problem illustrates that, ‗under the initially plausible aggregation 
procedure of majority voting, a group may not achieve consistent 
collective judgments even when all group members hold individually 
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consistent judgments. (List; see also Pettit 2001; List and Pettit 2002, 
2004; List 2005a) 
 
List and Pettit (2002) have shown that no aggregation procedure can 
generate consistent collective judgments i) for any logically possible 
combination of complete and consistent individual judgments on the 
propositions, ii) where each individual judgment has equal weight in 
determining collective judgments and iii) the collective judgment on 
each proposition depends only on the individual judgments on that 
proposition, and the same pattern of dependence holds for all 
propositions. There are some alternatives available to those who wish 
to preserve aggregation procedures. The first is to give up on i). In 
some cases, this may be desirable. Where, for example, the disagree-
ments are sufficiently limited or there are other mechanisms in place 
for reducing disagreement. For example, a group that would not 
experience the odd combinations of individual judgments as in the 
dilemma, need not necessarily worry about i). However, could the 
group be sure that such irrational occurrences could not happen? As 
the procedure does not work in general, it is philosophically 
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unsatisfying. Alternatively we could reject ii). Pauly and van Hees 
(2005) have shown that if we give up only on ii), the only possible 
aggregation procedure is a ‗dictatorial procedure‘. (List 2005) 
 
That is, the collective judgments are always those of some antecedently 
fixed group member. In some groups this will be satisfactory (perhaps 
one person will be nominated committee chair, for instance). In teams 
of logging analysts, it will rarely be appropriate. Finally, we could give 
up on iii). In other words, we could treat the ‗premises‘ in the table as 
different in priority from the ‗conclusions‘. However, as List points 
out, aggregation procedures which violate iii) ‗may be vulnerable to 
manipulation by prioritizing propositions strategically‘. We can easily 
see how this might happen in logging analysis. Suppose all three 
propositions in our example are designated as premises. That is, i) 
there is more than 90% water in the zone; ii) if there is more than 90% 
water, we should halt production; and iii) we should halt production. If 
all these are designated as premises, then all three are collectively 
judged to be true. If, however, just p and q are designated premises, 
then p is judged to be true but q and p->q is judged to be false. 
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Remember that it may not always be the case that it is obvious what 
the premises are and what the conclusions are. 
 
There are a lot of problems with aggregation procedures and here is 
my solution for teams of logging analysts. At issue, ultimately, is 
collective responsibility. We are here asking what BP knew because we 
wish to hold whoever is responsible for the accident accountable. What 
is required is not a general solution but attention to the make-up of the 
sociotechnical system that forms the group. This includes the reliability 
of the technology providing information as well as the reliability of the 
receivers of that information. Epistemic responsibility requires that 
epistemic agents take responsibility not only for the beliefs that they 
form but the procedures they use to acquire those beliefs. Collective 
epistemic responsibility means that groups cannot shift all of the blame 
for ‗bad‘ beliefs or ‗bad‘ belief-forming processes onto one individual 
scapegoat but that responsibility lies with the whole system. In the 
wake of the Deepwater blowout, media attention focused on one 
individual, Tony Hayward, then CEO of BP.  Partly this was because 
of his perceived unwillingness to take responsibility for the crisis. 
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Whilst we have become accustomed, as members of the general public, 
to group ‗dictators‘ (as List calls them) taking the fall for the epistemic 
failings of the group, it is surely irresponsible (as well as being 
unproductive in the sense of being conducive to better systems) in 
most cases to apportion all of the blame to one agent for the failings of 
a system.  
 
In conclusion, the lone analyst cannot take epistemic responsibility for 
forming false beliefs about the well on a perceptual basis. This is 
because those perceptual judgments must pass the arbitration of the 
group for it to become group knowledge. Secondly, a dictator or 
scapegoat should not be pinned with all the blame since that form of 
aggregation does not generalize and we need a more sophisticated way 
of describing particular sociotechnical systems. Since none of these can 
currently be properly blamed for the system‘s epistemic failings the 
only conclusion we have is to, as the anarchists say, ‗blame the system‘.  
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8.1.4 Group knowledge attributions: Corporate epistemic 
responsibility 
 
Production logging tools (PLTs) provide us with logs which are open 
to interpretation in a way that perceiving the colour of an apple or even 
examining rock cuttings are not. A range of sometimes conflicting 
readings must be corroborated in such a way as to construct a 
convincing narrative of what is going on in the well. Sophisticated 
computer applications can sort through some of the mess by running 
statistical algorithms but can that alone provide justification? Note that 
two analysts reading the same log will often derive different 
conclusions, particularly so when it comes to specifics such as the 
proportion of hydrocarbons in the fluid. Here we have controversy 
and conflict. Nor can feedback on the truth-value of any assertions be 
provided from the world itself. In most cases, the analysts will present 
their case to production companies on the basis of internal discussions, 
not by testing their conclusions against the behaviour of the well. By 
contrast, if there was a dispute about whether a church spire was cubic 
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or spherical, we could usually test this against the world. We could, for 
instance, walk to the church and take a closer look. We need not rely 
solely on testimony. In most cases of logging analysis, once the data is 
retrieved, analysts must sort out any disputes between themselves.  
 
8.2 Epistemic communities and epistemic agents 
[Discussing the corroboration of well-log data using the temperature 
curve to work out total flow] EK: Are these results supposed to 
correspond to other analysts‘ judgments or results on the ground ‗out 
there‘? 
Analyst, SK: Mostly compared to whether we believe that is right, 
whether it fits our overall interpretation of the well. Like a police 
suspect. You have a perpetrator in mind, have to piece together the 
evidence to see if it fits. Evidence might overturn your initial suspicions 
but it‘s harder to overturn. 
 
8.2.1 What is a community? 
 
As we have seen, individual analysts will have their own predilections 
when analysing data. Although this phenomenon is not often 
acknowledged by epistemologists and philosophers of perception, 
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current research suggests that we do, each of us, see the world in non-
uniform ways.108 This individuality of perception is comparable to the 
logging analyst.  
 
How does this individuality relate to the group knowledge discussed in 
§8.1? Karin Knorr Cetina makes a persuasive case in Epistemic cultures: 
How the sciences make knowledge, that the traditional taxonomies of 
disciplines are not particularly helpful in contemporary science and we 
ought instead to divide different groupings as ‗epistemic cultures‘. 
(Knorr Cetina 1999) I have used this term elsewhere in the thesis as it 
captures a specific binding feature of certain sociotechnical groups: 
collective knowledge production. Cultures (or communities, as I use in 
this thesis) are to be divided by their different ‗knowledge machinery‘. 
She uses metaphors such as ‗knowledge machinery‘, ‗tools and 
instuments‘ and so on to engineer a notably pragmatic and praxis-
centered approach to her two laboratory case studies: high energy 
                                                          
108 Recent research on ‘super-recognizers’ is amongst a growing number of studies which 
indicate that there is much less uniformity to how each of us sees our environment than 
previously thought. See, e.g., Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama 2009. 
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physicists at CERN during the UA2 and ATLAS program and 
molecular biologists at the Max Planck Institute (conducted with Klaus 
Amann). The research groups varied in size from 300 to 2000 scientists 
at CERN and from 8 to 30 scientists at MPI. How does studying the 
‗construction of the machinery of knowledge construction‘ help us 
understand what is particular to these epistemic communities? Her 
answer is because it allows researchers to track the different ways by 
which an original thought transforms from a belief into knowledge or 
fact. 
 
Different cultural systems of behaviour, as we know, construe the world 
differently. If they involve sign processes, as they invariably do, the 
question is nonetheless on what, figuratively speaking, do they place 
their bets and stake their money - on signs or not on signs. They may 
choose to process signs in ways that upgrade their impact and make the 
most of their potential, or in ways that downgrade their role and 
minimize interaction with them. In short, they may construct their 
world in terms of sign processes, or continuously construct it away 
from such processes. Molecular biology practice, in the laboratories 
studied, shows the latter tendency. It shows a preference for experiential 
knowledge acquired through mechanisms that reduce representations 
and turn away from sign-mediated experience. (Knorr Cetina 1999 p. 
80) 
 
These disciplines are made up by their instrumentation and the way 
that these instruments communicate their information and the way 
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they are used to construct new knowledge is of their own making. For 
example, recall the North-seeking gyro and how its capability to derive 
its own orientation was only discovered from a reinterpretation of 
noisy data logs. Knorr Cetina observes similar phenomena underlying 
knowledge in high energy physics. Like Dretske, she considers 
knowledge to be the culmination of an transmitter-signal-receiver 
relationship. However, in high energy physics, these signals are 
invisible, shadowy footprints whose producers are never themselves 
observed. 
 
[The machinery of knowledge construction] moves in the shadowland 
of mechanically, electrically, and electronically produced negative images 
of the world – in a world of signs and often fictional reflections, of 
echoes, footprints, and the shimmering appearances of bygone events. 
(Knorr Cetina 1999, p. 217) 
 
This is in marked opposition to the culture of molecular biologists 
where, 
 
...the person remains the epistemic subject…. The laboratory, 
experimentation, procedures, and objects obtain their identity through 
individuals. The individual scientist is their intermediary—their 
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organizing principle in the flesh, to whom all things revert. (Knorr 
Cetina 1999, p. 217) 
 
Essentially, the difference Knorr Cetina is noting here is between a 
system where instruments and technical artefacts do the perceiving and 
where it is primarily done by humans seeing with technical artefacts. In 
the former, the particular configurations of the instrument and its 
capacities are the primary factor in producing knowledge; in the latter it 
is the intentions and skill of the biologist who retains control and 
maintains direction over the experiment. This is the distinction 
between an extended epistemic system and an enhanced epistemic 
agent. We can describe the biologist using autoradiographs or X-ray 
films as, in some sense, an epistemic agent extended or distributed over 
the artefacts but it seems a rather attenuated description. The biologist 
is at all times in total control of what to see, what to produce and what 
and how to interpret. The epistemic agency remains with her. 
However, when the knowledge machinery is so complicated, with so 
many parts and configurations, the scientist herself becomes lost as but 
one cog in a larger machine. It becomes in these cases more 
appropriate to describe the agency in a distributed or extended manner. 
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Those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms -- bonded through 
affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence -- which, in a given field, 
make up how we know what we know. (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.1) 
 
Knorr Cetina describes HEP as operating ‗in terms of a negative and 
reflexive epistemics.‘109 (Knorr Cetina 1999, p. 46) The individual is 
thus ‗erased‘ as an epistemic subject (Knorr Cetine 1999, p. 166) as she 
becomes part of this larger unit. (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.171) 
 
Bird makes a distinction between two kinds of social group: 
‗established‘ and ‗organic‘. (Bird 2010) Whilst Bird is skeptical of the 
various accounts of what ‗establishes‘ a group—in other words, what 
provides the necessary cohesion for us to say that the group believes or 
knows as a group—he concedes that less general claims about the 
nature of such groups can be made. He cites Gilbert, Tuomela and 
Schmitt as holding that established groups are held together by ‗a 
mechanism for forming joint commitment‘. (Bird 2010, p. 37) Juries, 
                                                          
109 By ‗epistemics‘ she means the ‗strategies and practices assumed to promote the ―truth‖-like 
character of results.‘ (p46, original emphasis) 
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medical ethics panels, residents committees, and the like are 
‗established‘ in the sense that there is some procedure in place for 
binding the members together in commitment to a belief or assertion. 
Organic groups, on the other hand, receive their cohesion from an 
inter-dependence based on a division of labour. Collaborative scientific 
research projects are typical examples of organic groups. In such 
groups each member relies on the work of others but need not be 
actively involved. But the engineering groups we have looked at are a 
mix of both establishment and organic. We need to look more closely 
at the company itself. 
8.2.2 Professional knowledge, cross-cultural knowledge, and 
attitudes 
 
Natural language is notoriously ambiguous and the term ‗knows‘ and 
its cognates are used in a variety of different senses. Epistemologists 
are concerned primarily with so-called ‗informational‘ or ‗propositional 
knowledge‘. Interestingly, this is the least common usage of ‗knows‘ in 
ordinary language. Epistemologists are usually concerned with what 
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may be called ‗knowledge that‘ as opposed to ‗knowledge how‘ but this 
distinction reveals the limits and ambiguities of ordinary language. 
Other European languages appear to accommodate this distinction 
more clearly. In the French, it is the distinction between ‗savoir‘ and 
‗connaitre‘; in the German, between ‗wissen‘ and ‗kennen‘. However, these 
languages also seem inadequate to define this distinction although, 
paradoxically, instances of each type may be generally accepted once 
the distinction is understood. It seems that there is an intelligible 
distinction to be made, though an acceptable definition has not yet 
been provided. 
 
I have said before that different societies have different attitudes 
towards what kind of thing knowledge is and what other doxastic 
attitudes or metaphysical concepts it is cognate with. (see, e.g., 
Goldman 2004; Hallen 2004; Harding 1998; Hongladarom 2002a; 
Maffie 1995; Mulder 1996; Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich 2001) It should 
be noted that my own fieldwork research was conducted in another 
culture and that this dissertation may run the risk of neglecting this 
fact, particularly considering a central thesis that proper knowledge 
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attribution is partly-conditioned by communities (and, by extension, 
cultures). The company in the case study is American and multinational 
but the vast majority of employees are from different parts of 
Southeast Asia and it would be unwise, I think, to translate Western 
intuitions and preconceptions onto, for example, Thai cultural 
practices. 
 
There is some, although not nearly enough, literature about the 
differences in epistemic practices in the West and the East. Alvin 
Goldman discusses Japanese culture in Knowledge in a Social World. 
(Goldman 1999, p. 125-126) Soraj Hongladarom argues for the 
possibility of alternative epistemic cultures to the Western or veritistic 
tradition. He argues that Thailand is a possible example of a culture 
which does not (intuitively or academically) consider knowledge as 
justified true belief and values social harmony over truth-as-
correspondence. (Hongladarom 1996 and 2002a) Goldman would 
likely respond that if that is the case then it is a culture with poor 
epistemic practices or one that does not value knowledge after all. 
Some epistemologists wish knowledge to be an acultural phenome-
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non—that is, to have no variance over cultures with regard to proper 
epistemic practices. It seems untenable to me but that is not what I 
wish to argue here. If engineers in Asia are less likely to connect 
knowledge and truth it is because engineers do not typically think of 
their work as aimed towards truth (as a scientist might). If I start to talk 
about truth—e.g. is this statement true—I am typically greeted with an 
exasperated expression or thrown up hands: ‗Who knows, right? It‘s 
just a guess.‘  
 
In this dissertation, we have been discussing perceptual knowledge and 
it is worth reflecting on the prominence given to perception in 
different communities. It is common in modern analytic epistemology 
for the author to use perceptual cases to make their case.110 There have 
been (and still exist) societies in which perceptual knowledge is 
privileged above all other forms of knowing. In ‗Yoruba moral 
epistemology‘, Barry Hallen describes how the Yoruba language culture 
                                                          
110 See, for example, the fake barn case cited in Goldman 1976: ‗Henry‘s belief that the object is 
a barn is caused by the presence of the barn; indeed, the causal process  is a perceptual one.‘ G. 
E. Moore, in his refutation of skepticism which is not particularly focused on perceptual 
knowledge, frequently used perceptual examples. (Moore 1903, p. 41; and Moore 1959, p. 128) 
See also Cohen (1998) and the ‗sheep-shaped rock‘ thought experiment; Palle Yourgrau‘s ‗zebra 
and painted mule‘ thought experiment (1983, p. 183; and DeRose 2000b); and countless others. 
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make a distinction between imo (putative knowledge) and igbagbo 
(putative belief). One can only have imo if they have witnessed 
something first-hand or if it is a personal matter. Hallen writes, ‗The 
example most frequently cited by discussants, virtually as a paradigm, is 
visual perception of a scene or an event as it is taking place.‘ (Hallen 
2004, p. 298) 
 
The take-home message is that if one wishes to make broad principled 
statements about the nature of knowledge – its relation to truth, its 
relation to certain virtues – one had better be prepared to back that up 
either with evidence that the intuition is more than cultural prejudice 
or that it does not matter what other communities prefer as there are 
solid reasons for thinking that this way is correct. I would prefer in this 
thesis not to pronounce on the best route here but do wish to say that 
the case is still to be made one way or the other. In the absence of such 
a case it is always worthwhile pointing out that other communities do 
not share the intuitions of other communities when it comes to 
knowledge, truth, and cognate concepts. 
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If neither of those routes is preferable I would argue that the most 
plausible explanation is that knowledge is a community-dependent 
term. And further that one of the best approaches for explaining that 
community-dependence is that developed in Kusch‘s communitarian-
ism. If ‗knowledge‘ does indeed mark a social status then it is little 
surprise that the application of this status varies across communities 
since we know already how varied other social statuses are even 
amongst quite closely-related communities. 
 
8.2.3 Epistemic responsibility revisited 
 
In recent years we have seen scientists and epistemic agents held 
responsible for prediction and interpretations which, arguably, extend 
beyond our current epistemic capacities. In September 2011, six Italian 
scientists and a former government official appeared on trial for 
manslaughter on the grounds that they failed to predict and 
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communicate the risk of an earthquake which occurred in 2009.111 At 
the beginning of 2011, a proposed amendment to the Weather Service 
Bill meant that South Africa‘s independent weather forecasters could 
be imprisoned for up to ten years – or fined up to £800,000 – if they 
issue incorrect severe weather warnings without official permission.112 
Increasingly, questions will be asked of those who hold positions of 
authority and expertise and who are trusted to advise parties on the 
probability of geological events. 
 
To put it another way, there appears to be a legitimate question to ask 
concerning those whose social status confers a particular epistemic 
responsibility upon them to know the probability of certain events 
occurring. One of Congressman Markey‘s tasks as chairman of the 
                                                          
111 The defendants were scientists who held various positions to do with advising government 
and the public on seismic activity in the area—head of the Serious Risks Commission, director of 
the Civil Protection Agency‘s earthquake risk office, etc. For more details see Hall, S. S. 2011; 
and The New York Times, Fountain, H. 3
rd
 October 2011. Trial over earthquake in Italy puts 
focus on probability and panic. Distressingly, the scientists were found guilty of manslaughter by 




112 Reported in The Telegraph, 12th January 2012. Newling, D. South Africa weather forecasters 
threatened with jail if predictions wrong. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/topics/weather/9010030/South-Africa-weather-forecasters-
threatened-with-jail-if-predictions-wrong.html. 
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select committee was to investigate what BP knew so that they may, if 
necessary, be held accountable for failing to act appropriately on that 
knowledge. Epistemologists ought to also be of help when it comes to 
holding agents responsible for their epistemic behaviour. A large 
research project in epistemology has attempted to discover the 
conditions under which an agent is epistemically responsible. (Amaya 
2008; Bishop 2000; Code 1984, 1994; Corlett 2008; Engel 2009; Greco 
1990, Hetherington 2002, 2003; Kornblith 1983; Steup 2001; Vaesen 
2011a) More work is needed to deliver an accepted general theory of 
when an agent is epistemically responsible and to inform legal and 
political policy.  
 
If we cannot do this then we have little chance of answering questions 
asked at the outset such as ‗Who is responsible for knowing this?‘ and 
‗What can we reasonably expect an epistemic agent to know in this 
context?‘ Epistemic responsibility is the idea that an epistemic agent 
acquires certain responsibilities accruing to her role as an epistemic 
agent. What those responsibilities are is a matter of great interest and 
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debate amongst epistemological academia.113 My tentative account at 
this point is that the responsibilities derive from the agent‘s social 
status. The agent‘s responsibilities are what is reasonable to expect of 
an agent given her social status and context. This is a very common 
legal test in most jurisdictions and may be roughly applicable in 
epistemic tests.  
 
An October 2008 special issue of Episteme marked a revival in interest 
in legal theory amongst analytic epistemologists. Alvin Goldman has 
claimed that legal adjudication systems primarily aim ‗(at least in part) 
to secure accurate judgment about material facts arising in a legal 
dispute‘ (Goldman 2008, p. 129). In fact, disputes about legal facts are 
relatively rare and are most commonly disputed in criminal cases. Yes, 
this is a part of legal process but it is not at all obvious that epistemic 
rules of this sort ought to be applied to court systems in general when 
‗what happened‘ is often not at issue and the case centres around 
disputes of law, legal interpretation. Courts are interested in epistemic 
                                                          
113 See, e.g., Axtell 2008; Code 1984 and 1987; and Greco 2001. 
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terms—truth, knowledge, evidence—but the ‗truths‘ they are interested 
in are primarily those stipulated by the Will of Parliament. A legal 
adjudication system is a quasi-epistemic system: that is, it should be 
evaluated significantly but not primarily on the basis of its epistemic 
performance. 
 
Does epistemic responsibility pertain to groups? Return to the 
courtroom for a moment. It is common to talk of rights and 
responsibilities pertaining to natural persons, that is individuals. But do 
juristic or legal persons in general have rights? That is, do corporations 
and other legal entities have rights? 
8.2.4 Group knowledge attributions and distributed-
extended cognition theories 
 
Here is one possible answer to the problem of group knowledge 
attributions based on the arguments I have set out in this thesis. Let us 
suppose that the reader accepts all the main arguments contained in 
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this thesis: That knowledge is a social status and depends on 
attributions from others; that perceptual knowledge is an informational 
and inferential kind of knowledge; and that knowledge typically 
depends on a network of people and technical artefacts. One 
conclusion we might draw from these three principles is that 
attributing knowledge to a group is no more mysterious or in need of 
explanation than attributing knowledge to an individual. It does seem 
to be socially appropriate to attribute knowledge to groups. (see 7.1.1) 
Groups are capable of possessing perceptual informational states as 
described in Chapter 5. They are capable of processing information 
and updating their internal states on the basis of external stimuli just as 
we are. Finally, groups are typically constituted of networks of people 
and technical artefacts. In the literature, this is described as a 
sociotechnical system. Most groups do their epistemic work (inquiry, 
investigation, belief-formation, assertion) within a technological 
framework (a court room, a science laboratory, an oil rig, an office). 
 
The conclusion I draw from this is that it is possible to argue that 
groups often know just in the same way that individuals know. Just as 
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we might think of the eye as an evolutionary augmentation of the 
existing sensory capacities our ancestors had, and as we might think of 
the microscope as another augmentation (albeit an artificial one), we 
can think of other technical artefacts and other people performing 
specific professional roles as further augmentations. Granted these 
conclusions rest on the axioms presented in this dissertation and I have 
made my best efforts in presenting them fairly and deliberatively. If the 
reader finds the communitarian account of knowledge, the informa-
tional account of perceptual knowledge, or CAT implausible on 
whatever grounds, the conclusion that groups have knowledge 
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8.2.5 Final conclusions 
 
At the start of this thesis I presented a suite of research problems. 
 
1. What is social epistemology and how can it help contextualize 
the particular epistemic responsibility that a professional per-
son holds. In particular, how can a communitarian epistemolo-
gy – which treats knowledge as a kind of social status—define 
different kinds of knowledge? 
 
2. What kind of knowledge do petroleum engineers have? What is 
technical knowledge? 
 
3. What are technical artefacts and how does this affect technical 
knowledge? 
 
4. Some technical knowledge appears to be perceptual. How do 
perceptual sources generate technical knowledge? 
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5. What epistemic agents can have this knowledge (individuals, 
groups, animals, artefacts, computers, etc.)? 
 
Let us now recap the answers. 
 
1. Social epistemology was shown to be a broad church with 
many non-complementary factions. 
 
I selected communitarianism, contextualism, and the Strong 
Programme as being of particular utility as the main purpose of the 
thesis was to give a practical application to the sophisticated theories of 
social epistemology. These three, I have argued, are most apt to 
perform this task. I argued that, with communitarians, we should see 
knowledge attributions as conferring a particular social status upon an 
individual or group. In this thesis I have focussed on a particular group 
of society, petroleum engineers in South-East Asia, and argued that 
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they have a distinctive kind of technical knowledge. I have also 
explored the extent to which this knowledge is perceptual. 
 
2. I argued that technical knowledge is knowledge of how to 
design, produce or operate technical artefacts. 
 
I presented a history of the design and production of technical 
artefacts in the field of study and then analysed the texts used in their 
operation. 
 
3. I explored the ontological nature of technical artefacts and its 
connection to the ontological nature of knowledge. 
 
Since I claim that technical artefacts can affect our human concepts 
(and thus what counts as knowledge) it was important to establish what 
technology, and technical artefacts, is. I argued that technical artefacts 
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are a branch of artificial kind. I proposed a five-fold necessary criteria 
for a technical artefact: 
 
a) Must use both structural and social terms in order to be comprehen-
sively described; 
b) Is designed (or chosen) to meet a need; 
c) Has a proper function; 
d) Has proper conditions of use; 
e) Is not appropriated as part of a single unorthodox instance of use 
but is part of a systematic structure of tool use of that kind which 
determines 1-4. 
 
4. I explored in detail how our perceptual faculties may be said to 
acquire knowledge. 
I proposed a theory of an extended epistemic system which 
incorporates technical artefacts into its knowledge-gathering 
mechanics. I looked at the phenomenological experience of workers in 
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engineering and assessed whether this experience was indicative of a 
more substantial point about the nature of the knowledge they aim to 
generate. 
 
I proposed the following conditions on technical knowledge: 
 
a) Technical knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge. 
b)  It includes use know-how as well as knowledge of how to 
design, produce, and operate artefacts. 
c) This knowledge is a central component of engineering and 
provides a distinction between the knowledge possessed by 
engineers and that possessed by natural scientists (although 
there is undoubtedly a great deal of cross-over between the 
disciplines). 
d) Technical artefacts have a proper function. Comprehensive 
knowledge requires knowledge both of this proper function 
and its empirical characteristics. 
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e) Proper function is constrained by normative considerations 
which are collectively and performatively sustained. 
f) Technical artefacts are an artificial kind. 
g) Artificial kinds are social institutions (due to self-reference) 
h) Technical knowledge (knowledge of technical artefacts) is 
knowledge of a social institution. 
i) Proper function is known, in the main, through testimony. 
j) This substantiates Kusch‘s claim at least in this case that the 
community is prior to the individual in the order of explana-
tion. 
k) Technical knowledge is social. 
 
5. I have throughout this thesis attempted to relate any theoretical 
questions back to lived experience and, in particular, to the 
findings of my fieldwork study. 
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Whether or not one accepts the conclusion that knowledge attributions 
extend across non-human or human-plus-x systems, I have strongly 
defended the claim that any comprehensive analysis of technical 
knowledge attribution which wishes to have utility must provide both 
social and physical descriptions of the knowledge attributions in 
question just as any comprehensive analysis of the ontological nature 
of technical artefacts requires a description of both its social and 
physical components. I would submit that this claim justifies the 
relevance of applied social epistemology to epistemology in general. 
 
Doubtless, to substantiate many of the claims in this thesis, more 
empirical research needs to be done. We need to know more about the 
epistemic practices of engineers, the differences between epistemic 
communities across professions as well as nations. Finally, we need to 
know more about the design, production, and operation of technical 
artefacts and how this conditions our epistemic practices. I put this 
thesis forward as an initial inquiry into what needs to be done and an 
answer to critics skeptical of the need for social epistemology. 




Source Mea Tra Int Inf Rel Fun Soc Oth Tot 
BP Amoco 
(1999) 
64 23 41 128 149 102 21 2 402 
%    32 37 25 5 1 100 
Hawkinson 
(2000) 
60 28 20 108 98 99 10 3 318 
%    34 31 31 3 1 100 
Darling 
(2005) 
43 7 51 101 83 61 30 5 280 
%    36 30 22 11 2 100 
Kaulback 
(2009) 
33 36 12 81 117 364 58 8 628 
%    13 19 58 10 1 100 
SDI (2010) 22 2 6 30 19 20 9 2 80 
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%    38 24 25 11 3 100 
Total 222 96 130 448 466 646 128 20 1708 
Total %    26 27 38 7 1 100 
 
Table #.1 ‘Tool’ reference in five petroleum engineering texts 
 
When Kaulback (2009) is excluded, the total percentages become respectively 34, 32, 




Source Mea Tra Int Inf Rel Fun Soc Oth Tot 
BP Amoco 
(1999) 
x x x 98 110 92 20 10 330 
%    30% 33% 28% 6% 3%  
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Cross-validated results were not requested for the subset of informational references 
(measurement, transmission and interpretation). The results are only to be used to 
cross-validate the quantity and spread of informational, reliability, functional, social 
and other references. 
 
Key to table #.1: 
 
Source, means the text used. 
Mea, means number of tool-references to measurement. 
Tra, means number of tool-references to transmission. 
Int, means number of tool-references to interpretation. 
Inf, means number of tool-reference to informational (the combined total of tool-
references to measurement, transmission and interpretation). 
Rel, means number of tool-references to reliability. 
Fun, means number of tool-references to proper function. 
Soc, means number of tool-references to societal. 
Oth, means number of other tool-references. 
Tot, means the total number of references and percentages thereof. 
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